Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Sunday, July 27, 2008
How's that Afghanistan war workin' out for ya?
Taliban winning the war of words
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - In the first week of July, several people were killed in a village in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar by international forces. The US-led coalition forces described the operation as a precision air strike which had killed militants. Locals said they were civilians. Claims. Counter-claims. It seemed business as usual until investigations revealed that the air strike had in fact bombed a wedding party, killing 50, including the bride.
Though the incident was reported widely with concern for the civilian casualties, there was less attention on the other "collateral damage" it caused - the casualty of credibility.
The war of words between anti-government militants and pro-government forces has become so routine that little attention is paid to the contradictions in the claims. In the process, the anti-government insurgents are gaining, a dangerous situation when the government's legitimacy is already under question.
The power of the militants' propaganda is evident from a new report published by the Brussels-based independent International Crisis Group (ICG) this week. The report, "Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words", argues that the Taliban are "successfully tapping into the strains of Afghan nationalism and exploiting policy failures by the Kabul government and its international backers". The result, it says, "is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban".
A boom in independent media, with the help of generous donor support, began in 2001 following the ouster of the Taliban. As media houses mushroomed, however, little attention was paid to the efficacy of the communication strategies of the government and the international community.
Despite considerable funding of the offices of the communications departments of various ministries and high-level offices, little in the way of accountability has been sought from them. While media houses have had to "perform or perish", the communication wings of most government institutions bumbled along.
Take for example access to the media. The presidential spokesman (of Hamid Karzai) and the spokesman of the Ministry of Interior are arguably the two most important offices which give the government's viewpoint on major events. Yet among the media based in Kabul, these two are reliably known as the least accessible and their spokesmen are always "in meetings". Their offices, by relying on single individuals to impart information, are largely mute in their absence.
While spokesmen for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force are available and provide regular updates to the media, the office of the OEF is outside Kabul at the Bagram military base while the NATO media office is based in its headquarters in the capital.
Both bases are heavily fortified, making them difficult to access. The international forces also fail to provide transcripts of their press conferences, even though entering the military compounds is a tedious process which forces many journalists to opt out of attending the regular meetings.
Though the Taliban are understandably not easy to access, they provide ready updates on information and operations and their own claims. According to the ICG, the Taliban's rudimentary website is updated several times a day and the Taliban are able to put out their story rapidly, though its messages are sometimes contradictory.
The speed of the Taliban in communicating with the media is "much easier when spokesmen do not need to establish facts", the ICG states. However, the credibility that could compensate for the pro-government forces' lack of speed is also missing. Attuned to a military culture in which information is just part of propaganda in a situation of conflict, the international forces feel justified in presenting their version of the truth in the ongoing war. Unfortunately, this impacts not just on the military forces, but on the entire international community and the government.
Rather than step up their efforts to communicate, the pro-government forces are relying more on efforts to contain and control the media. Local journalists are from time to time issued "guidelines" on their content. A new media bill that is still on hold has invited fierce opposition from local journalists as it seeks to impose greater curbs on media content.
Journalists are also detained both by the government's national security apparatus and the international forces. While journalists cannot expect automatic exemption from the processes adopted by security agencies, the failure to charge the detainees or to produce any evidence leads to the assumption that the journalists were detained in connection with their professional work - an issue raised by the International Justice Network in Kabul last week.
When tasked with their lack of credibility or media savvy, pro-government spokesmen are prone to compare their efforts with those of the Taliban. However, this comparison is usually counter-productive since it invites the media to view the two "sides" as equal contending parties who need to be evaluated by the same yardstick, rather than automatically distancing the pro-government forces from the Taliban on the basis of a higher moral ground.
"The Taliban are adept at exploiting local disenfranchisement and disillusionment," the ICG report points out, emphasizing that "the Kabul administration needs to ensure it is seen as one worth fighting for, not least by ending the culture of impunity and demanding accountability of its members".
The ICG argues that the Taliban's propaganda is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban. The Karzai government and its allies must make greater efforts, through word and deed, it says, to address sources of alienation exploited in Taliban propaganda, particularly by ending arbitrary detentions and curtailing civilian casualties from aerial bombing.
"Whatever the military benefits of arbitrary detentions, they are far outweighed by the alienation they cause. The effectiveness of aerial bombardment, even if strictly exercised within the bounds of international law, must be considered against the damage to popular support," it says.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
Original article posted here.
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - In the first week of July, several people were killed in a village in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar by international forces. The US-led coalition forces described the operation as a precision air strike which had killed militants. Locals said they were civilians. Claims. Counter-claims. It seemed business as usual until investigations revealed that the air strike had in fact bombed a wedding party, killing 50, including the bride.
Though the incident was reported widely with concern for the civilian casualties, there was less attention on the other "collateral damage" it caused - the casualty of credibility.
The war of words between anti-government militants and pro-government forces has become so routine that little attention is paid to the contradictions in the claims. In the process, the anti-government insurgents are gaining, a dangerous situation when the government's legitimacy is already under question.
The power of the militants' propaganda is evident from a new report published by the Brussels-based independent International Crisis Group (ICG) this week. The report, "Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words", argues that the Taliban are "successfully tapping into the strains of Afghan nationalism and exploiting policy failures by the Kabul government and its international backers". The result, it says, "is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban".
A boom in independent media, with the help of generous donor support, began in 2001 following the ouster of the Taliban. As media houses mushroomed, however, little attention was paid to the efficacy of the communication strategies of the government and the international community.
Despite considerable funding of the offices of the communications departments of various ministries and high-level offices, little in the way of accountability has been sought from them. While media houses have had to "perform or perish", the communication wings of most government institutions bumbled along.
Take for example access to the media. The presidential spokesman (of Hamid Karzai) and the spokesman of the Ministry of Interior are arguably the two most important offices which give the government's viewpoint on major events. Yet among the media based in Kabul, these two are reliably known as the least accessible and their spokesmen are always "in meetings". Their offices, by relying on single individuals to impart information, are largely mute in their absence.
While spokesmen for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force are available and provide regular updates to the media, the office of the OEF is outside Kabul at the Bagram military base while the NATO media office is based in its headquarters in the capital.
Both bases are heavily fortified, making them difficult to access. The international forces also fail to provide transcripts of their press conferences, even though entering the military compounds is a tedious process which forces many journalists to opt out of attending the regular meetings.
Though the Taliban are understandably not easy to access, they provide ready updates on information and operations and their own claims. According to the ICG, the Taliban's rudimentary website is updated several times a day and the Taliban are able to put out their story rapidly, though its messages are sometimes contradictory.
The speed of the Taliban in communicating with the media is "much easier when spokesmen do not need to establish facts", the ICG states. However, the credibility that could compensate for the pro-government forces' lack of speed is also missing. Attuned to a military culture in which information is just part of propaganda in a situation of conflict, the international forces feel justified in presenting their version of the truth in the ongoing war. Unfortunately, this impacts not just on the military forces, but on the entire international community and the government.
Rather than step up their efforts to communicate, the pro-government forces are relying more on efforts to contain and control the media. Local journalists are from time to time issued "guidelines" on their content. A new media bill that is still on hold has invited fierce opposition from local journalists as it seeks to impose greater curbs on media content.
Journalists are also detained both by the government's national security apparatus and the international forces. While journalists cannot expect automatic exemption from the processes adopted by security agencies, the failure to charge the detainees or to produce any evidence leads to the assumption that the journalists were detained in connection with their professional work - an issue raised by the International Justice Network in Kabul last week.
When tasked with their lack of credibility or media savvy, pro-government spokesmen are prone to compare their efforts with those of the Taliban. However, this comparison is usually counter-productive since it invites the media to view the two "sides" as equal contending parties who need to be evaluated by the same yardstick, rather than automatically distancing the pro-government forces from the Taliban on the basis of a higher moral ground.
"The Taliban are adept at exploiting local disenfranchisement and disillusionment," the ICG report points out, emphasizing that "the Kabul administration needs to ensure it is seen as one worth fighting for, not least by ending the culture of impunity and demanding accountability of its members".
The ICG argues that the Taliban's propaganda is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban. The Karzai government and its allies must make greater efforts, through word and deed, it says, to address sources of alienation exploited in Taliban propaganda, particularly by ending arbitrary detentions and curtailing civilian casualties from aerial bombing.
"Whatever the military benefits of arbitrary detentions, they are far outweighed by the alienation they cause. The effectiveness of aerial bombardment, even if strictly exercised within the bounds of international law, must be considered against the damage to popular support," it says.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
Original article posted here.
Sunday, June 15, 2008
The day the NATO definitively but unofficially lost the war in Afghanistan
Insurgent attack frees hundreds from Kandahar prison
Canadian forces and other NATO troops have been deployed to Kandahar after the main prison in the southern Afghan city was attacked by militants, who set most of the prisoners free.
Maj. Jay Janzen, a spokesman for the Canadian Forces, said troops were on the scene and had established a security perimeter in the vicinity.
"We believe the situation is under control,” Janzen said, without elaborating.
Around 10 p.m., Taliban insurgents drove a car filled with explosives up to Sarposa prison's main gate and detonated it, destroying the gate and surrounding shops and killing 10 police officers in the vicinity.
Afghan officials also said Taliban insurgents fired several rockets at parts of the prison.
A Taliban spokesman said 30 insurgents on motorbikes and two suicide bombers attacked the prison. Qari Yousef Ahmadi also claimed that hundreds of Taliban prisoners were freed in the assault.
There were reports that 150 to 200 prisoners were still in the prison, with the rest having escaped.
But Wali Karzai, president of Kandahar's provincial council and the brother of President Hamid Karzai, said "all the prisoners escaped. There is no one left."
About 1,170 inmates were believed to have been in the prison and may now be roaming the streets of Kandahar city, Hunter said.
Canadian Forces are in command of Kandahar, and most of the roughly 2,500 Canadian troops in Afghanistan are stationed there.
The prison, the largest detention facility in Kandahar province, housed both common criminals and captured Taliban militants who had been fighting NATO troops and the Afghan government.
"It's a big blow. It's a very significant development," said CBC's Susan Ormiston, who visited the prison last April.
Suspected Taliban members detained by Canadian soldiers and turned over to Afghanistan officials are sent to the prison, located in the outskirts of the city.
Canada has spent $1 million on improvements to the facility, including new cell blocks and new windows.
Ormiston said Canadian officials were hoping the prison would become a model for other prisons in the region.
Original article posted here.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Who woudda thunk it seven years ago?
| Senior British Diplomat: 'Defeat' a Real Possibility in Afghanistan | |
| |
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| Paddy Ashdown (file photo) |
In an article published Wednesday in Britain's Financial Times, Ashdown notes the upsurge in Taliban-related violence and says public support for the Afghan mission is waning among NATO countries.
Ashdown says to make progress in Afghanistan, NATO must improve security by winning over moderates and convincing ordinary Afghans their government can provide better security than Taliban insurgents.
Ashdown also says there should be a greater focus on strengthening the Afghan government and rule of law, in a country where corruption and lawlessness is growing.
Ashdown, the former U.N. representative to Bosnia, was rejected last month by Afghan President Hamid Karzai for the post of U.N. envoy to Afghanistan.
Separately, Italy's defense ministry says an Italian soldier was killed and another wounded in an attack Wednesday outside the Afghan capital, Kabul. Officials say the troops were fired upon by insurgents, as they carried out civilian and military activities in the area.
Also today, at least three Afghan soldiers were killed and three wounded when their convoy hit a roadside bomb in the Musa Qala district of the Afghanistan's southern Helmand province.
Friday, January 18, 2008
The Afghani Nato blame game.
NATO hears 'noise before defeat'
By M K Bhadrakumar
When the blame-game begins in an indeterminate war, it is time to sit up and take note. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' interview with the Los Angeles Times on Wednesday rings alarm bells.
There has been no effort to claim he was misquoted. In fact, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell confirmed the chief was "not backing off his fundamental criticism that NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] needs to do a better job in training for counter-insurgency".
Morrell made a little concession, though, that Gates meant no offence to any particular NATO country. NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer responded he had the "greatest respect" for NATO forces fighting in southern Afghanistan. He advised Washington, "Combating insurgency is a complex thing, and not always easy." At The Hague, the American ambassador was summoned and asked to "clarify". Dutch Defense Minister Van Middlekoop publicly regretted, "This is not the Robert Gates we have come to know." Other European politicians expressed surprise, indignation.
In NATO history there have been few such laundering of dirty linen in public view. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban head Mullah Omar have achieved something that Soviet leaders Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev couldn't.
Washington mocks NATO
Gates' criticism was pinpointed - NATO was a lemon. He said: "I'm worried we're deploying [military advisors] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counter-insurgency operations ... Most of the European forces, NATO forces, are not trained in counter-insurgency; they were trained for the Fulda Gap [NATO's Cold War battle lines in Germany]."
Gates was giving vent to pent-up frustrations. Finally, Afghanistan is threatening to be a blemish on his successfully nurtured record in public service. On December 11, at the US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan, Gates admitted somberly, "If I had to sum up the current situation in Afghanistan, I would say there is reason for optimism, but tempered by caution."
Gates warned the NATO mission "has exposed real limitations in the way the alliance is, or organized, operated and equipped. I believe the problem arises in a large part due to the way various allies view the very nature of the alliance in the 21st century, where in a post-Cold War environment, we have to be ready to operate in distant locations against insurgencies and terrorist networks." He solicited help from US Congressmen for "pressuring" the NATO capitals "to do the difficult work of persuading their own citizens [in Europe] of the need to step up to this challenge."
Gates again spoke forcefully at the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Edinburgh, Scotland, on December 14. But "no one at the table stood up and said: 'I agree with that'," he later lamented.
This week, the Pentagon underscored its displeasure by making a deployment of 3,200 Marine Corps to southern Afghanistan, bringing the US presence to about 30,000 troops. The NATO force in Afghanistan numbers about 40,000, of which 14,000 are Americans. The Washington Post described the US move as one to "fill a void created in part by NATO's inability to fight the insurgency adequately, a job the allies never signed up to do". The majority of the marines will be directly engaged in fighting in the south alongside British, Australian, Dutch and Canadian troops, who have taken record casualties during the past year.
Of course, shadowboxing is to be expected in the run-up to the NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, in April, where Afghanistan will be a key agenda item. But that cannot explain away the unusual public discord. The reluctance on the part of major NATO powers to commit more troops to Afghanistan arises as much out of profound disagreement with Washington over the objectives of the war and the fashion in which the US spearheads the war as in deference to growing anti-war sentiment in Europe.
A general hits out
Gates' criticism draws heavily from a recent study authored by the US general who commanded the forces in Afghanistan from October 2003 until May 2005, Lieutenant General David W Barno, in the prestigious journal Military Review. Barno is an influential voice in the US defense community. He chose to begin his paper devoted to the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, citing lines by ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu, "Strategy without tactics is the slowest road to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
Barno claimed the US counter-insurgency strategy during his period produced "positive and dramatic" results. He gave the "center of gravity" in his strategy to the Afghan people and not the "enemy". He kept in view the Afghan people's "immense enmity to foreign forces" and deduced that eschewing the "Soviet attempt at omnipresence" in Afghanistan, only through a "light footprint approach" instead, could the war be successfully fought.
Barno wrote that Afghan people's tolerance for a foreign presence was "a bag of capital [that was] finite and had to be spent slowly and frugally" and, therefore, under his charge US forces took great care to avoid Afghan casualties, detainee abuse, or transgressions in observance of respect to tribal leaders or causing offence to traditional Afghan culture.
Second, Barno outlined that he and the then-US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, bonded as a team and they had a "unity of purpose" in ensuring perfect interagency and international-level coordination. According to Barno, the slide began in mid-2005 after he and Khalilzad were reassigned. Washington then decided to publicly announce that NATO was assuming responsibility for the war and that the US was making a token withdrawal of 2,500 troops.
"Unsurprisingly, this was widely viewed in the region as the first signal that the United States was 'moving for the exits', thus reinforcing long-held doubts about the prospects of sustained American commitment. In my judgement, these public moves have served more than any other US actions since 2001 [the fall of the Taliban] to alter the calculus of both our friends and our adversaries across the region - and not in our favor."
Barno implied NATO messed up the top-notch command structure he created. The result is, "With the advent of NATO military leadership, there is today no single comprehensive strategy to guide the US, NATO, or international effort." Consequently, he says, the unity of purpose - both interagency and international - has suffered and unity of command is fragmented, and tactics have "seemingly reverted to earlier practices such as the aggressive use of airpower".
Barno makes some chilling conclusions. First, he says the "bag of capital" representing the tolerance of Afghan people for foreign forces is diminishing. Second, NATO narrowly focuses on the "20% military dimension" of the war, while ignoring the 80% comprising non-military components. Third, the "center of gravity" of the war is no longer the Afghan people but the "enemy". Fourth, President Hamid Karzai's government is ineffectual "under growing pressure from powerful interests within his administration". Fifth, corruption, crime, poverty and a burgeoning narcotics trade have eroded public confidence in Karzai. Finally, "NATO, the designated heir to an originally popular international effort, is threatened by the prospects of mounting disaffection among the Afghan people."
What can be achieved?
Somewhere along the line, mud-slinging had to happen. Yet, almost everything Barno wrote could be true. Barno drew a handsome self-portrait. He whitewashes a controversial phase of the war. NATO inherited a dysfunctional war. By end-2006, it was no longer a winnable war. When the alliance's defense ministers gathered in the Dutch seaside resort of Noordwijk last November to commemorate the first anniversary of NATO in Afghanistan, the crisis atmosphere was palpable.
There were no offers of major reinforcements by the member countries. The Dutch indicated they were close to withdrawing their 1,600-strong contingent from Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan the coming autumn. The likely knock-on effect of the Dutch decision on countries such as Canada worried everyone present at the meeting. Germany, France, Italy and Spain insisted they were constrained by their national caveats guiding deployment of troops on non-combat roles.
The result has been a sort of "Balkanization" of Afghanistan, as Daan Everts, outgoing civilian representative of the NATO secretary general in Kabul, admitted to al-Jazeera in a recent interview. "You have a little 'German Afghanistan' in the north, an 'Italian Afghanistan' in the west, 'Dutch Afghanistan' in Uruzgan and a 'Canadian Afghanistan' in Kandahar and so on. Geographically we [NATO] have been fractured, but also sectorally with equal ineffectiveness - like giving the justice sector totally to the Italians, counter-narcotics to the British, the police to Germans, anti-terrorism to the Americans."
Everts was unusually frank for a high-ranking NATO official. He said Afghan reconstruction has been a "bonanza for consultants, serious consultants, half-baked consultants, marginal consultants and mailbox consultants"; there has been an outflow of resources from Afghanistan of up to 40% of aid given to the country. "So there is this aid industry that descends on a poor nation and runs away with part of the loot." He called for a government in Kabul that is "more serious about problems" such as corruption, drug-trafficking and law-enforcement.
In such a mess, Lord (Paddy) Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon is due to arrive in Kabul shortly as the United Nations' super envoy. Is a British colonial-style governor the right answer? Lord Ashdown - former Royal Marine commando and special forces officer, Liberal Democrat leader, member of Parliament, the European Union's high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 2002-2006 - is a forceful personality, and was hugely successful in restoring order to the Balkan country torn apart by violence and ethnic cleansing.
But Afghanistan is notoriously untamed in history. Ashdown has sought to combine Everts' former responsibilities with those of Tom Koenigs, the low-profile German diplomat who served as the UN's special representative in Afghanistan. He hopes to be the main point of contact between Karzai's government and the international forces, the European Union policing mission and the UN contingent, apart from coordinating Afghan reconstruction efforts.
That is much too much for anyone to take on. But Ashdown is gifted. Even then, the chances are the blame-game is going to accelerate. The Afghans are unlikely to accept a British viceroy - even if he wears a blue beret. Karzai's government resents being bypassed. While in theory a "unity of purpose" and a formal link between the Afghan government and among NATO and the EU and the UN is desirable, there are problems. Some UN member countries do not want a direct relationship with NATO (or vice versa). NATO will chaff at subordination to the UN. There is no such thing as a unified EU voice. Least of all, Washington simply doesn't know how to be self-effacing.
Reconciliation with the Taliban
But then, Ashdown's real mission lies elsewhere, in addressing the core issue: What do we do with the Taliban? No doubt, the Taliban's exclusion from the Bonn conference seven years ago proved to be a horrible mistake. That was also how the Afghan and Pakistan problem came to be joined at the hips.
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf made a valid point in his interview with the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel this week when he said al-Qaeda isn't the real problem that faces Pakistan. "I don't deny the fact that al-Qaeda is operating here [Pakistan]. They are carrying out terrorism in the tribal areas; they are the masterminds behind these suicide bombings. While all of this is true, one thing is for sure: the fanatics can never take over Pakistan. This is not possible. They are militarily not so strong they can defeat our army, with its 500,000 soldiers, nor politically - and they do not stand a chance of winning the elections. They are much too weak for that," Musharraf said.
The heart of the matter is Pashtun alienation. The Taliban represent Pashtun aspirations. As long as Pashtuns are denied their historical role in Kabul, Afghanistan cannot be stabilized and Pakistan will remain in turmoil. Musharraf said, "There should be a change of strategy right away. You [NATO] should make political overtures to win the Pashtuns over."
This may also be the raison d'etre of UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon's intriguing choice of a Briton as his new special representative. Conceivably, the inscrutable Ban has been told by Washington that Ashdown is just the right man to walk on an upcoming secretive bridge, which will intricately connect New York, Washington, London, Riyadh, Islamabad and Kabul.
The point is, Britain grasps the Pashtun problem. Britain realizes that the induction of US special forces into the Pakistani tribal areas, or the custodianship of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile, or an al-Qaeda takeover in Pakistan isn't quite the issue today.
That is why Musharraf's four-day visit to London starting on January 25 assumes critical importance. British mediation in Pakistani politics may already be working. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has begun calibrating his stance.
Reconciliation between Musharraf and the Sharif brothers is in the cards. Shahbaz Sharif will be on call in London during Musharraf's stay there. If the reconciliation - thanks to British (and Saudi) mediation - leads to the formation of a national government in Pakistan, a leadership role for Nawaz Sharif may ensue and Pakistani politics may gain traction. Nawaz Sharif is the only politician today with the credentials and stature to mount the dangerous platform of Islamist nationalism and reach out to the Taliban and its followers inside Pakistan. The Sharif brothers could be invaluable allies for the Pakistani military - and for NATO - at this juncture.
Barno sidesteps the ground realities. The US strategy's real failure happened, in fact, in the 2003-2005 period when he was in charge of the war. Of course, the failure was not at the military level, but at the political and diplomatic level. That was a crucial phase when the window of opportunity was still open for a course correction over the Taliban's exclusion from the Afghan political process. The Taliban should have been invited to come in from the cold and join an intra-Afghan dialogue and reconciliation. The extreme emotions of 2001 had by then begun to ebb away.
On the contrary, Khalilzad's diplomatic brief was that the US presidential election of 2004 was the priority for the White House. The "war on terror" in Afghanistan was a milch cow in US domestic politics. Presidential advisor Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney shrewdly calculated that an enemy in the Hindu Kush was useful for the Republican Party campaign, while resonance of the booming guns in Afghanistan would be a good backdrop for election rhetoric against a decorated war veteran like John Kerry.
And, showcasing of Karzai in Kabul's presidential palace helped display Afghanistan as a success story. A victorious Karzai indeed landed in the US to a hero's welcome from George W Bush on election eve. Bush went on to win a second term, but the Afghan war was lost. The slide began by mid-2005 as the embittered Taliban began regrouping. As the year progressed, as Everts and many others pointed out, the Iraq war "sucked the oxygen away from Afghanistan". How could Gates possibly admit all that? He would rather NATO take the blame. But then, it is a sideshow in actuality.
Britain is now called on to salvage the Afghan war. NATO at best will be a sleeping partner. The Hindu Kush is all set to be Lord Ashdown's theater. He represents the UN; the White House reposes confidence in him; he takes counseling and directions from London, which coordinates with Riyadh and Islamabad - and then, gingerly, he sets out, searching for the Taliban. Incidentally, among his many attributes, Lord Ashdown is a gifted polyglot who speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and other languages. Maybe he already speaks Pashto.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
Original article posted here.
By M K Bhadrakumar
When the blame-game begins in an indeterminate war, it is time to sit up and take note. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' interview with the Los Angeles Times on Wednesday rings alarm bells.
There has been no effort to claim he was misquoted. In fact, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell confirmed the chief was "not backing off his fundamental criticism that NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] needs to do a better job in training for counter-insurgency".
Morrell made a little concession, though, that Gates meant no offence to any particular NATO country. NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer responded he had the "greatest respect" for NATO forces fighting in southern Afghanistan. He advised Washington, "Combating insurgency is a complex thing, and not always easy." At The Hague, the American ambassador was summoned and asked to "clarify". Dutch Defense Minister Van Middlekoop publicly regretted, "This is not the Robert Gates we have come to know." Other European politicians expressed surprise, indignation.
In NATO history there have been few such laundering of dirty linen in public view. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban head Mullah Omar have achieved something that Soviet leaders Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev couldn't.
Washington mocks NATO
Gates' criticism was pinpointed - NATO was a lemon. He said: "I'm worried we're deploying [military advisors] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counter-insurgency operations ... Most of the European forces, NATO forces, are not trained in counter-insurgency; they were trained for the Fulda Gap [NATO's Cold War battle lines in Germany]."
Gates was giving vent to pent-up frustrations. Finally, Afghanistan is threatening to be a blemish on his successfully nurtured record in public service. On December 11, at the US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan, Gates admitted somberly, "If I had to sum up the current situation in Afghanistan, I would say there is reason for optimism, but tempered by caution."
Gates warned the NATO mission "has exposed real limitations in the way the alliance is, or organized, operated and equipped. I believe the problem arises in a large part due to the way various allies view the very nature of the alliance in the 21st century, where in a post-Cold War environment, we have to be ready to operate in distant locations against insurgencies and terrorist networks." He solicited help from US Congressmen for "pressuring" the NATO capitals "to do the difficult work of persuading their own citizens [in Europe] of the need to step up to this challenge."
Gates again spoke forcefully at the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Edinburgh, Scotland, on December 14. But "no one at the table stood up and said: 'I agree with that'," he later lamented.
This week, the Pentagon underscored its displeasure by making a deployment of 3,200 Marine Corps to southern Afghanistan, bringing the US presence to about 30,000 troops. The NATO force in Afghanistan numbers about 40,000, of which 14,000 are Americans. The Washington Post described the US move as one to "fill a void created in part by NATO's inability to fight the insurgency adequately, a job the allies never signed up to do". The majority of the marines will be directly engaged in fighting in the south alongside British, Australian, Dutch and Canadian troops, who have taken record casualties during the past year.
Of course, shadowboxing is to be expected in the run-up to the NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, in April, where Afghanistan will be a key agenda item. But that cannot explain away the unusual public discord. The reluctance on the part of major NATO powers to commit more troops to Afghanistan arises as much out of profound disagreement with Washington over the objectives of the war and the fashion in which the US spearheads the war as in deference to growing anti-war sentiment in Europe.
A general hits out
Gates' criticism draws heavily from a recent study authored by the US general who commanded the forces in Afghanistan from October 2003 until May 2005, Lieutenant General David W Barno, in the prestigious journal Military Review. Barno is an influential voice in the US defense community. He chose to begin his paper devoted to the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, citing lines by ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu, "Strategy without tactics is the slowest road to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
Barno claimed the US counter-insurgency strategy during his period produced "positive and dramatic" results. He gave the "center of gravity" in his strategy to the Afghan people and not the "enemy". He kept in view the Afghan people's "immense enmity to foreign forces" and deduced that eschewing the "Soviet attempt at omnipresence" in Afghanistan, only through a "light footprint approach" instead, could the war be successfully fought.
Barno wrote that Afghan people's tolerance for a foreign presence was "a bag of capital [that was] finite and had to be spent slowly and frugally" and, therefore, under his charge US forces took great care to avoid Afghan casualties, detainee abuse, or transgressions in observance of respect to tribal leaders or causing offence to traditional Afghan culture.
Second, Barno outlined that he and the then-US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, bonded as a team and they had a "unity of purpose" in ensuring perfect interagency and international-level coordination. According to Barno, the slide began in mid-2005 after he and Khalilzad were reassigned. Washington then decided to publicly announce that NATO was assuming responsibility for the war and that the US was making a token withdrawal of 2,500 troops.
"Unsurprisingly, this was widely viewed in the region as the first signal that the United States was 'moving for the exits', thus reinforcing long-held doubts about the prospects of sustained American commitment. In my judgement, these public moves have served more than any other US actions since 2001 [the fall of the Taliban] to alter the calculus of both our friends and our adversaries across the region - and not in our favor."
Barno implied NATO messed up the top-notch command structure he created. The result is, "With the advent of NATO military leadership, there is today no single comprehensive strategy to guide the US, NATO, or international effort." Consequently, he says, the unity of purpose - both interagency and international - has suffered and unity of command is fragmented, and tactics have "seemingly reverted to earlier practices such as the aggressive use of airpower".
Barno makes some chilling conclusions. First, he says the "bag of capital" representing the tolerance of Afghan people for foreign forces is diminishing. Second, NATO narrowly focuses on the "20% military dimension" of the war, while ignoring the 80% comprising non-military components. Third, the "center of gravity" of the war is no longer the Afghan people but the "enemy". Fourth, President Hamid Karzai's government is ineffectual "under growing pressure from powerful interests within his administration". Fifth, corruption, crime, poverty and a burgeoning narcotics trade have eroded public confidence in Karzai. Finally, "NATO, the designated heir to an originally popular international effort, is threatened by the prospects of mounting disaffection among the Afghan people."
What can be achieved?
Somewhere along the line, mud-slinging had to happen. Yet, almost everything Barno wrote could be true. Barno drew a handsome self-portrait. He whitewashes a controversial phase of the war. NATO inherited a dysfunctional war. By end-2006, it was no longer a winnable war. When the alliance's defense ministers gathered in the Dutch seaside resort of Noordwijk last November to commemorate the first anniversary of NATO in Afghanistan, the crisis atmosphere was palpable.
There were no offers of major reinforcements by the member countries. The Dutch indicated they were close to withdrawing their 1,600-strong contingent from Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan the coming autumn. The likely knock-on effect of the Dutch decision on countries such as Canada worried everyone present at the meeting. Germany, France, Italy and Spain insisted they were constrained by their national caveats guiding deployment of troops on non-combat roles.
The result has been a sort of "Balkanization" of Afghanistan, as Daan Everts, outgoing civilian representative of the NATO secretary general in Kabul, admitted to al-Jazeera in a recent interview. "You have a little 'German Afghanistan' in the north, an 'Italian Afghanistan' in the west, 'Dutch Afghanistan' in Uruzgan and a 'Canadian Afghanistan' in Kandahar and so on. Geographically we [NATO] have been fractured, but also sectorally with equal ineffectiveness - like giving the justice sector totally to the Italians, counter-narcotics to the British, the police to Germans, anti-terrorism to the Americans."
Everts was unusually frank for a high-ranking NATO official. He said Afghan reconstruction has been a "bonanza for consultants, serious consultants, half-baked consultants, marginal consultants and mailbox consultants"; there has been an outflow of resources from Afghanistan of up to 40% of aid given to the country. "So there is this aid industry that descends on a poor nation and runs away with part of the loot." He called for a government in Kabul that is "more serious about problems" such as corruption, drug-trafficking and law-enforcement.
In such a mess, Lord (Paddy) Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon is due to arrive in Kabul shortly as the United Nations' super envoy. Is a British colonial-style governor the right answer? Lord Ashdown - former Royal Marine commando and special forces officer, Liberal Democrat leader, member of Parliament, the European Union's high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 2002-2006 - is a forceful personality, and was hugely successful in restoring order to the Balkan country torn apart by violence and ethnic cleansing.
But Afghanistan is notoriously untamed in history. Ashdown has sought to combine Everts' former responsibilities with those of Tom Koenigs, the low-profile German diplomat who served as the UN's special representative in Afghanistan. He hopes to be the main point of contact between Karzai's government and the international forces, the European Union policing mission and the UN contingent, apart from coordinating Afghan reconstruction efforts.
That is much too much for anyone to take on. But Ashdown is gifted. Even then, the chances are the blame-game is going to accelerate. The Afghans are unlikely to accept a British viceroy - even if he wears a blue beret. Karzai's government resents being bypassed. While in theory a "unity of purpose" and a formal link between the Afghan government and among NATO and the EU and the UN is desirable, there are problems. Some UN member countries do not want a direct relationship with NATO (or vice versa). NATO will chaff at subordination to the UN. There is no such thing as a unified EU voice. Least of all, Washington simply doesn't know how to be self-effacing.
Reconciliation with the Taliban
But then, Ashdown's real mission lies elsewhere, in addressing the core issue: What do we do with the Taliban? No doubt, the Taliban's exclusion from the Bonn conference seven years ago proved to be a horrible mistake. That was also how the Afghan and Pakistan problem came to be joined at the hips.
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf made a valid point in his interview with the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel this week when he said al-Qaeda isn't the real problem that faces Pakistan. "I don't deny the fact that al-Qaeda is operating here [Pakistan]. They are carrying out terrorism in the tribal areas; they are the masterminds behind these suicide bombings. While all of this is true, one thing is for sure: the fanatics can never take over Pakistan. This is not possible. They are militarily not so strong they can defeat our army, with its 500,000 soldiers, nor politically - and they do not stand a chance of winning the elections. They are much too weak for that," Musharraf said.
The heart of the matter is Pashtun alienation. The Taliban represent Pashtun aspirations. As long as Pashtuns are denied their historical role in Kabul, Afghanistan cannot be stabilized and Pakistan will remain in turmoil. Musharraf said, "There should be a change of strategy right away. You [NATO] should make political overtures to win the Pashtuns over."
This may also be the raison d'etre of UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon's intriguing choice of a Briton as his new special representative. Conceivably, the inscrutable Ban has been told by Washington that Ashdown is just the right man to walk on an upcoming secretive bridge, which will intricately connect New York, Washington, London, Riyadh, Islamabad and Kabul.
The point is, Britain grasps the Pashtun problem. Britain realizes that the induction of US special forces into the Pakistani tribal areas, or the custodianship of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile, or an al-Qaeda takeover in Pakistan isn't quite the issue today.
That is why Musharraf's four-day visit to London starting on January 25 assumes critical importance. British mediation in Pakistani politics may already be working. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has begun calibrating his stance.
Reconciliation between Musharraf and the Sharif brothers is in the cards. Shahbaz Sharif will be on call in London during Musharraf's stay there. If the reconciliation - thanks to British (and Saudi) mediation - leads to the formation of a national government in Pakistan, a leadership role for Nawaz Sharif may ensue and Pakistani politics may gain traction. Nawaz Sharif is the only politician today with the credentials and stature to mount the dangerous platform of Islamist nationalism and reach out to the Taliban and its followers inside Pakistan. The Sharif brothers could be invaluable allies for the Pakistani military - and for NATO - at this juncture.
Barno sidesteps the ground realities. The US strategy's real failure happened, in fact, in the 2003-2005 period when he was in charge of the war. Of course, the failure was not at the military level, but at the political and diplomatic level. That was a crucial phase when the window of opportunity was still open for a course correction over the Taliban's exclusion from the Afghan political process. The Taliban should have been invited to come in from the cold and join an intra-Afghan dialogue and reconciliation. The extreme emotions of 2001 had by then begun to ebb away.
On the contrary, Khalilzad's diplomatic brief was that the US presidential election of 2004 was the priority for the White House. The "war on terror" in Afghanistan was a milch cow in US domestic politics. Presidential advisor Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney shrewdly calculated that an enemy in the Hindu Kush was useful for the Republican Party campaign, while resonance of the booming guns in Afghanistan would be a good backdrop for election rhetoric against a decorated war veteran like John Kerry.
And, showcasing of Karzai in Kabul's presidential palace helped display Afghanistan as a success story. A victorious Karzai indeed landed in the US to a hero's welcome from George W Bush on election eve. Bush went on to win a second term, but the Afghan war was lost. The slide began by mid-2005 as the embittered Taliban began regrouping. As the year progressed, as Everts and many others pointed out, the Iraq war "sucked the oxygen away from Afghanistan". How could Gates possibly admit all that? He would rather NATO take the blame. But then, it is a sideshow in actuality.
Britain is now called on to salvage the Afghan war. NATO at best will be a sleeping partner. The Hindu Kush is all set to be Lord Ashdown's theater. He represents the UN; the White House reposes confidence in him; he takes counseling and directions from London, which coordinates with Riyadh and Islamabad - and then, gingerly, he sets out, searching for the Taliban. Incidentally, among his many attributes, Lord Ashdown is a gifted polyglot who speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and other languages. Maybe he already speaks Pashto.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
Original article posted here.
Monday, November 19, 2007
So how's that "War against Terrah" workin' out for ya?
Afghan policemen hanged, mutilated 
Original article posted here.
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan (AP) -- Taliban militants slashed the hands and legs of five abducted policemen in southern Afghanistan and hung their mutilated bodies from trees in a warning to villagers against working with the government, officials said Sunday.
U.S. soldiers guard the Shoura, or Conference of tribal elders in Charbaron, Afghanistan, on Sunday.
The discovery of the bodies came as officials said that recent violence and clashes had left at least 68 people dead across Afghanistan.
The officers had been abducted two months ago from their checkpoint in southern Uruzgan province, said Juma Gul Himat, the provincial police chief. The Taliban slashed their hands and legs and hung the bodies on trees Saturday in Gazak village of Derawud district, he said.
"The Taliban told the people that whoever works with the government will suffer the same fate as these policemen," Himat said. "This village is under Taliban control. There are more than 100 Taliban in this village."
Two tribal elders received the bodies of the policemen on Sunday, he said.
More than 6,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence this year -- a record number, according to an Associated Press count based on figures from Western and Afghan officials.
The executions followed several days of violence in the country's south which left at least 63 people dead, including 58 militants and two Canadian soldiers.
Also in Uruzgan, police shot and killed two suspected Taliban militants on Sunday as they approached a police checkpoint on a motorbike, Himat said.
In Zabul province, the Taliban ambushed and clashed with an army patrol Saturday night, leaving 11 suspected insurgents dead and four soldiers wounded, said Qasem Khan, a provincial police official.
Authorities recovered the bodies of the 11 militants killed alongside their weapons, Khan said.
In southern Helmand province, a suicide bomber attacked a NATO patrol Sunday in Gereshk district, damaging a vehicle but causing no casualties, said provincial police chief Mohammad Hussein Andiwal.
In Kandahar province, Canadian and Afghan troops battled militants and called in airstrikes in Zhari district on Saturday. One Afghan soldier and at least 20 suspected militants were killed, said provincial police chief Sayed Agha Saqeb.
A roadside bomb hit a NATO vehicle during the same battle, killing two Canadian soldiers and their translator and wounding three other Canadian troops, officials said.
Separately, a suicide bomber on a motorbike attacked a NATO convoy in Nangarhar province's Chaparhar district, killing an Afghan civilian and wounding another NATO soldier, officials said Saturday.
Elsewhere, 23 Taliban militants were killed during a U.S.-led coalition operation on Thursday aimed at disrupting a weapons transfer in southern Afghanistan, the coalition said.Original article posted here.
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
US policies contributing to the creation of a regional collapse that would threaten Pakistan even further and expose the Afghani loss
'Pain has become the remedy'
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
NAWA PASS, Pakistan border with Afghanistan - While I was waiting in a village mud mosque, several motorbikes emerged from the evening darkness along a dirt track.
Four strongly built men stopped in front of me and alighted, their faces flushed from their ride. They each gave me a hug, and their traditional Punjabi greeting was music to my ears after listening to a lot of Pushtu.
I asked the obvious question: "Are you Punjabi?" The concern on their faces was immediately noticeable. "No! We belong to this land and like many Afghans we were settled in Punjab [in Pakistan] and therefore learnt Punjabi and forgot Pashtu, but now we are back in our land and have learnt our language again," one of the men explained.
This is perhaps somewhat romantic. Although such Punjabis might have romantic ties with Afghanistan, they actually come from Pakistani Punjab. Before the partition of British India in 1947, Punjab was seen as a loyal colony of the British and their recruits fought against the Afghans. After partition, Punjabis were seen as usurpers who divided the Pashtun tribes in the name of a new country called Pakistan. To many Afghans, Punjabis are opportunists and while they claim to be Muslims, their culture is a blend of Hinduism and Sikhism.
Sadiq is not a commander: he cannot be, because whatever he might say about his ethnicity, for Afghans he is a Punjabi. I watched as he spoke fluent Pashtu to his Afghan comrades, moving from one group to another with a permanent smile on his face. Clearly, he is the natural leader of the diaspora of Punjabi guerrillas now in Afghanistan.
Sadiq was in the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani jihadi group focused on the struggle to regain Indian-administered Kashmir. He was trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to conduct guerrilla operations all across India. He knows how to generate resources and lead sorties.
He joined the Taliban in late 2004 as an ordinary fighter, but because of his skills he quickly rose through the ranks. He became a trainer and honed his men's battle skills. And although he is not a commander, he is more respected and important than many of them. He is the mastermind of all guerrilla operational plans in Afghanistan's Kunar Valley.
An emirate in the making
I said my final prayers of the day and had my dinner. It was tolerably cold, and I sat back and by the light of a gas lamp watched and listened to tired guerrillas discussing their day.
"I was thinking before coming here, how do you say your Friday prayers in the battlefield - I noticed you did not say any today?" I started the conversation with Sadiq.
"First, we are all travelers, so Friday prayers are not compulsory. But most importantly, this region has been declared darul harb [enemy country], so Friday prayers are suspended until it becomes darul Islam [abode of Islam]," Sadiq replied.
I continued this discussion with Sadiq on prayers and the circumstances in which they are suspended and restored, and soon all the people in the mud hut had gathered around and the conversation turned to the new dynamics of the Afghan resistance.
So I launched a series of questions. "It is still not clear who is in whose command. What is the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [leader of the Hezb-i-Islami]? Is [veteran Afghan resistance figure] Jalaluddin Haqqani under [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar, or is he commanding separately? Who do the Pakistan Taliban answer to? To Mullah Omar? And what are Pakistani jihadis up to?
Sadiq smiled at the barrage of questions and responded with some breaking news, "Mullah Omar, the Taliban shura [council], al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban have resolved this issue once and for all. Soon the mujahideen will announce the revival of a [region-wide] Islamic emirate, and after this - like all fighting groups gathered under a single command in Iraq - all commanders in Afghanistan will fall under the umbrella of the Islamic emirate.
"The Islamic emirate will govern [operations in] Afghanistan and Pakistan, and whether it is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or any other, they will be under a single command and will not be able to defy the emirate because this is Islam," Sadiq said.
The pronouncement of an emirate would be a major development, and I jumped to my feet. "Are you sure that an Islamic emirate will be announced soon?"
"Yes, indeed," said Sadiq smiling.
"Sadiq, you know what this means? It would challenge both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Are the Taliban capable of doing this?" I asked.
"Of course we are," Sadiq replied calmly.
"How?" I asked.
"Three years ago, it was actually a dream, but now circumstances have enabled such an environment. Apart from North Waziristan and South Waziristan [tribal areas in Pakistan], the mujahideen used to move in Bajaur [Agency] and Mohmand Agency as if they were moving in [the Pakistani cities of] Karachi or Lahore. We were terrified of being arrested and of the fact that somebody would be spying on us.
"We used to make secret trips to Afghanistan to conduct occasional raids. On the one side the Americans were after us, and on the other side our own Pakistani army was tracking us. We didn't want to fight the Pakistan army, after all, they are Muslims. We tried our best to avoid fighting them, and still hardly 3% of the mujahideen are fighting against them. However, Pakistan did not think the way we were thinking. They were more cruel and gruesome than the Americans.
"We had a companion who had fought alongside us in Kashmir. His name was Umer, and he was dead against fighting the Pakistani army. Whenever the military conducted operations, he used to desert his companions, saying he could not fight against Muslims.
"One day, he was arrested by the ISI. They hung him by one hand from a roof, and carved stars on his thighs with daggers. They humiliated him in all manners. When he was released, it was thought he would be a broken person.
"But now he is an advocate of jihad against the Pakistani army, bigger than anybody else. These sorts of incidents have turned the mujahideen into our camp. They understand they have been fooled in the name of jihad in Kashmir," said Sadiq, referring to Islamabad's de-escalation of fighting in the Kashmir Valley.
"In 2003, a gathering in Muredkey [the LeT's Pakistani headquarters] was an eye-opener to sincere jihadis. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed [chief of the LeT] introduced us to one Abdullah, a person wearing a prayer cap and a small beard. Many among us knew he was the head of the ISI's Kashmir cell.
"He addressed the gathering and made the point that the Kashmiri jihad could not achieve its objectives and that it was a lame duck. He advised the mujahideen to sit quietly at home until new circumstances developed. This sort of advice turned people into our camp, but the real revolution came because of al-Qaeda," Sadiq said.
"[Senior al-Qaeda leader] Abu Marwan al-Suri was killed [in May 2006] by the Khasadar force in Bajaur Agency. This is a force of peons. Had Marwan been killed by any elite commando force of the Pakistani army, we would not have been so saddened, but for a person like him to be killed by a third-rate force like the Khasadars, it was bad.
"He was traveling in bus when he was identified as an Arab and was asked to descend. He took out his revolver and warned the Khasadars that he was a mujahid and did not want to kill any Muslims, so they should let him go. The Khasadars did not listen to him. You know Arabs, they do not escape - they fight until their last - but he tried to flee to avoid fighting Muslims, and was killed.
"His body was photographed and the pictures were presented to the Americans with pride and the people responsible received medals. Every mujahid felt humiliated. Brother ... our blood is not so cheap to be played around with by any third-rate person. Mujahideen were full of rage. They rose from their hideouts.
"Marwan's body became an inspiration. The aroma from his blood was a legend in Bajaur and his graveyard became a holy site. Reaction swept through Bajaur and in a matter of days the Khasadars' posts were wiped out and blown up. The army came to conduct operations, but was defeated.
"Our victories gathered all tribes around us. You know our biggest commander in Bajaur, Maulana Faqir Muhammad, was trained by the Pakistani army to resist the Soviets [in the 1980s] but after September 11 his brother was detained by the army. He was beaten to death.
"In 2005 the Taliban were limited to South Waziristan and North Waziristan and in Mohmand Agency there were only a few dozen of them, but now we number 18,000, thanks to the operations of the Pakistani army," Sadiq said, his face full of emotion.
"You asked me what makes us think we can establish an Islamic emirate," Sadiq said, and then recited famous Urdu and Persian poet Mirza Asadullah Baig Khan, who went under the pen name of Ghalib: "Pain has crossed its limits and has become the remedy."
"We have braved all their tyrannies. They cannot be more tyrannical than that. We are hardened and they are tired and now it is our turn and I promise that we will turn the tables on them soon," Sadiq said.
We were all tired, and went to bed, but my brain was racing so much it was a while before sleep came.
The next morning at breakfast we pick up on the same topic.
"Sadiq, whether it is right or wrong, don't you think that the new Taliban plans will create problems within the Pakistani army?" I asked.
"That does not matter. This battle cannot stop now. The mujahideen have been deceived so many times that now they have decided to fight the Pakistani army at all costs," Sadiq said, sipping his tea.
After a long pause, he continued, "You know, the Taliban are blamed for all the problems, but in actual fact it is America which will never allow a ceasefire between the Pakistani army and the mujahideen. The Americans will force the Pakistani army to fight against us and therefore this battle will continue," Sadiq said.
"Man, you are fighting against the army and blaming America," I taunted him.
"I will tell you why. The Americans know exactly how near we are to Islamabad and they are aware of defections in the Pakistani army, and they are also aware that only one or two defections at the level of colonel will mean that the mujahideen will get their hands on some batteries of missiles which can carry nuclear warheads.
"And they [Americans] know the moment the mujahideen get that, the game will turn in favor of the mujahideen both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then nobody will be able to stop our march. So the Americans want a big battle between the army and the mujahideen so that the end game will be that they can step in and destroy Pakistan's nukes under the pretext that the Pakistani army cannot protect them from the mujahideen," Sadiq said.
Shortly after breakfast, the Taliban said goodbye to me. On my way home, as I passed deserted checkpoints in Bajaur, I cast my mind back to the origins of the US-led "war on terror", the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Al-Qaeda carried these out with a particular aim - to invite the wrath of the American "cowboys" who would beat up Muslims to such an extent that a severe backlash would be generated.
Six years have passed, and we have had the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (maybe Iran in the offing). Yet it might be in the tribal areas of Pakistan that the real showdown begins. I can just imagine the dance of jubilation Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri will do on the news of a fresh grand operation by the Pakistani army there - it will only breed more Taliban.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
Original article posted here.
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
NAWA PASS, Pakistan border with Afghanistan - While I was waiting in a village mud mosque, several motorbikes emerged from the evening darkness along a dirt track.
Four strongly built men stopped in front of me and alighted, their faces flushed from their ride. They each gave me a hug, and their traditional Punjabi greeting was music to my ears after listening to a lot of Pushtu.
I asked the obvious question: "Are you Punjabi?" The concern on their faces was immediately noticeable. "No! We belong to this land and like many Afghans we were settled in Punjab [in Pakistan] and therefore learnt Punjabi and forgot Pashtu, but now we are back in our land and have learnt our language again," one of the men explained.
This is perhaps somewhat romantic. Although such Punjabis might have romantic ties with Afghanistan, they actually come from Pakistani Punjab. Before the partition of British India in 1947, Punjab was seen as a loyal colony of the British and their recruits fought against the Afghans. After partition, Punjabis were seen as usurpers who divided the Pashtun tribes in the name of a new country called Pakistan. To many Afghans, Punjabis are opportunists and while they claim to be Muslims, their culture is a blend of Hinduism and Sikhism.
Sadiq is not a commander: he cannot be, because whatever he might say about his ethnicity, for Afghans he is a Punjabi. I watched as he spoke fluent Pashtu to his Afghan comrades, moving from one group to another with a permanent smile on his face. Clearly, he is the natural leader of the diaspora of Punjabi guerrillas now in Afghanistan.
Sadiq was in the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani jihadi group focused on the struggle to regain Indian-administered Kashmir. He was trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to conduct guerrilla operations all across India. He knows how to generate resources and lead sorties.
He joined the Taliban in late 2004 as an ordinary fighter, but because of his skills he quickly rose through the ranks. He became a trainer and honed his men's battle skills. And although he is not a commander, he is more respected and important than many of them. He is the mastermind of all guerrilla operational plans in Afghanistan's Kunar Valley.
An emirate in the making
I said my final prayers of the day and had my dinner. It was tolerably cold, and I sat back and by the light of a gas lamp watched and listened to tired guerrillas discussing their day.
"I was thinking before coming here, how do you say your Friday prayers in the battlefield - I noticed you did not say any today?" I started the conversation with Sadiq.
"First, we are all travelers, so Friday prayers are not compulsory. But most importantly, this region has been declared darul harb [enemy country], so Friday prayers are suspended until it becomes darul Islam [abode of Islam]," Sadiq replied.
I continued this discussion with Sadiq on prayers and the circumstances in which they are suspended and restored, and soon all the people in the mud hut had gathered around and the conversation turned to the new dynamics of the Afghan resistance.
So I launched a series of questions. "It is still not clear who is in whose command. What is the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [leader of the Hezb-i-Islami]? Is [veteran Afghan resistance figure] Jalaluddin Haqqani under [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar, or is he commanding separately? Who do the Pakistan Taliban answer to? To Mullah Omar? And what are Pakistani jihadis up to?
Sadiq smiled at the barrage of questions and responded with some breaking news, "Mullah Omar, the Taliban shura [council], al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban have resolved this issue once and for all. Soon the mujahideen will announce the revival of a [region-wide] Islamic emirate, and after this - like all fighting groups gathered under a single command in Iraq - all commanders in Afghanistan will fall under the umbrella of the Islamic emirate.
"The Islamic emirate will govern [operations in] Afghanistan and Pakistan, and whether it is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or any other, they will be under a single command and will not be able to defy the emirate because this is Islam," Sadiq said.
The pronouncement of an emirate would be a major development, and I jumped to my feet. "Are you sure that an Islamic emirate will be announced soon?"
"Yes, indeed," said Sadiq smiling.
"Sadiq, you know what this means? It would challenge both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Are the Taliban capable of doing this?" I asked.
"Of course we are," Sadiq replied calmly.
"How?" I asked.
"Three years ago, it was actually a dream, but now circumstances have enabled such an environment. Apart from North Waziristan and South Waziristan [tribal areas in Pakistan], the mujahideen used to move in Bajaur [Agency] and Mohmand Agency as if they were moving in [the Pakistani cities of] Karachi or Lahore. We were terrified of being arrested and of the fact that somebody would be spying on us.
"We used to make secret trips to Afghanistan to conduct occasional raids. On the one side the Americans were after us, and on the other side our own Pakistani army was tracking us. We didn't want to fight the Pakistan army, after all, they are Muslims. We tried our best to avoid fighting them, and still hardly 3% of the mujahideen are fighting against them. However, Pakistan did not think the way we were thinking. They were more cruel and gruesome than the Americans.
"We had a companion who had fought alongside us in Kashmir. His name was Umer, and he was dead against fighting the Pakistani army. Whenever the military conducted operations, he used to desert his companions, saying he could not fight against Muslims.
"One day, he was arrested by the ISI. They hung him by one hand from a roof, and carved stars on his thighs with daggers. They humiliated him in all manners. When he was released, it was thought he would be a broken person.
"But now he is an advocate of jihad against the Pakistani army, bigger than anybody else. These sorts of incidents have turned the mujahideen into our camp. They understand they have been fooled in the name of jihad in Kashmir," said Sadiq, referring to Islamabad's de-escalation of fighting in the Kashmir Valley.
"In 2003, a gathering in Muredkey [the LeT's Pakistani headquarters] was an eye-opener to sincere jihadis. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed [chief of the LeT] introduced us to one Abdullah, a person wearing a prayer cap and a small beard. Many among us knew he was the head of the ISI's Kashmir cell.
"He addressed the gathering and made the point that the Kashmiri jihad could not achieve its objectives and that it was a lame duck. He advised the mujahideen to sit quietly at home until new circumstances developed. This sort of advice turned people into our camp, but the real revolution came because of al-Qaeda," Sadiq said.
"[Senior al-Qaeda leader] Abu Marwan al-Suri was killed [in May 2006] by the Khasadar force in Bajaur Agency. This is a force of peons. Had Marwan been killed by any elite commando force of the Pakistani army, we would not have been so saddened, but for a person like him to be killed by a third-rate force like the Khasadars, it was bad.
"He was traveling in bus when he was identified as an Arab and was asked to descend. He took out his revolver and warned the Khasadars that he was a mujahid and did not want to kill any Muslims, so they should let him go. The Khasadars did not listen to him. You know Arabs, they do not escape - they fight until their last - but he tried to flee to avoid fighting Muslims, and was killed.
"His body was photographed and the pictures were presented to the Americans with pride and the people responsible received medals. Every mujahid felt humiliated. Brother ... our blood is not so cheap to be played around with by any third-rate person. Mujahideen were full of rage. They rose from their hideouts.
"Marwan's body became an inspiration. The aroma from his blood was a legend in Bajaur and his graveyard became a holy site. Reaction swept through Bajaur and in a matter of days the Khasadars' posts were wiped out and blown up. The army came to conduct operations, but was defeated.
"Our victories gathered all tribes around us. You know our biggest commander in Bajaur, Maulana Faqir Muhammad, was trained by the Pakistani army to resist the Soviets [in the 1980s] but after September 11 his brother was detained by the army. He was beaten to death.
"In 2005 the Taliban were limited to South Waziristan and North Waziristan and in Mohmand Agency there were only a few dozen of them, but now we number 18,000, thanks to the operations of the Pakistani army," Sadiq said, his face full of emotion.
"You asked me what makes us think we can establish an Islamic emirate," Sadiq said, and then recited famous Urdu and Persian poet Mirza Asadullah Baig Khan, who went under the pen name of Ghalib: "Pain has crossed its limits and has become the remedy."
"We have braved all their tyrannies. They cannot be more tyrannical than that. We are hardened and they are tired and now it is our turn and I promise that we will turn the tables on them soon," Sadiq said.
We were all tired, and went to bed, but my brain was racing so much it was a while before sleep came.
The next morning at breakfast we pick up on the same topic.
"Sadiq, whether it is right or wrong, don't you think that the new Taliban plans will create problems within the Pakistani army?" I asked.
"That does not matter. This battle cannot stop now. The mujahideen have been deceived so many times that now they have decided to fight the Pakistani army at all costs," Sadiq said, sipping his tea.
After a long pause, he continued, "You know, the Taliban are blamed for all the problems, but in actual fact it is America which will never allow a ceasefire between the Pakistani army and the mujahideen. The Americans will force the Pakistani army to fight against us and therefore this battle will continue," Sadiq said.
"Man, you are fighting against the army and blaming America," I taunted him.
"I will tell you why. The Americans know exactly how near we are to Islamabad and they are aware of defections in the Pakistani army, and they are also aware that only one or two defections at the level of colonel will mean that the mujahideen will get their hands on some batteries of missiles which can carry nuclear warheads.
"And they [Americans] know the moment the mujahideen get that, the game will turn in favor of the mujahideen both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then nobody will be able to stop our march. So the Americans want a big battle between the army and the mujahideen so that the end game will be that they can step in and destroy Pakistan's nukes under the pretext that the Pakistani army cannot protect them from the mujahideen," Sadiq said.
Shortly after breakfast, the Taliban said goodbye to me. On my way home, as I passed deserted checkpoints in Bajaur, I cast my mind back to the origins of the US-led "war on terror", the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Al-Qaeda carried these out with a particular aim - to invite the wrath of the American "cowboys" who would beat up Muslims to such an extent that a severe backlash would be generated.
Six years have passed, and we have had the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (maybe Iran in the offing). Yet it might be in the tribal areas of Pakistan that the real showdown begins. I can just imagine the dance of jubilation Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri will do on the news of a fresh grand operation by the Pakistani army there - it will only breed more Taliban.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
Original article posted here.
Saturday, November 10, 2007
Monday, August 20, 2007
Signs of another lost war
Taliban, US in new round of peace talks
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - The few weeks between the visits to Pakistan of Richard Boucher, the US assistant secretary of state who left last week, and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, who arrives on September 10, could prove crucial in determining the fate of Afghanistan.
This is the timeline for secret three-party talks to establish teega (a Pashtu word for a peace deal that resolves a conflict) between the Western coalition forces in Afghanistan (with Pakistan), the Afghan government, and the anti-coalition insurgents of Afghanistan. The first round of talks has already begun in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta, Asia Times Online has learned.
The outcome of the talks will to a large extent decide the agenda of Negroponte's visit and the course of the US-led "war on terror" in the region.
The talks are based on previous Pakistan-inspired efforts to secure peace deals between the insurgents and the Western coalition in specific areas in Afghanistan with the longer-term goal of incorporating the Taliban into the political process both in Kabul and in provincial governments.
Similar deals were struck last year in the southwestern Afghan provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Urzgan, but they lapsed. In addition to reviving these, the talks aim to include the southeastern provinces of Kunar and Khost. The negotiators are Taliban commanders, Pakistani and American intelligence members, and Afghan authorities.
The Taliban, under the command of Mullah Mansoor (brother of the legendary Mullah Dadullah, who was killed in battle this year), are in Satellite town, Quetta, to talk of teega. The next rounds are scheduled for Peshawar, the provincial capital of North-West Frontier Province, and in the Waziristan tribal areas with Taliban commanders of the southeastern provinces.
Specifically, the deals aim to stop violence in selected areas and give the Taliban limited control of government pending the conclusion of a broader peace deal for the country and the Taliban's inclusion in some form of national administration.
The Taliban and coalition forces struck limited ceasefire deals last year in Kandahar and Helmand provinces (see the Asia Times Online series In the land of the Taliban of December 2006). These included the districts of Musa Qala, Baghran, Nawzad, Sangeen, Kajaki and Panjwai. However, to preempt the Taliban's planned massive uprising this year, coalition forces ended the ceasefires last December and engaged the Taliban in conflict.
As a result, the Taliban changed their plan and diverted to the northwestern areas of Farah and Badghis and also increased their activities in Ghazni, Kunar, Gardez, Khost and Nangarhar. Instead of face-to-face battles, as in the successful spring offensive of 2006, they refined their tactics in asymmetric warfare and carried out targeted actions, especially on development projects.
Rebuilding peace - and pipelines
Coalition efforts in Afghanistan include substantial development and reconstruction projects, but these have been hampered by the insurgency. A key project is a regional oil and gas pipeline project worth US$10 billion that will run from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan, the TAP, and possibly on to India, on which work is to be started in the near future.
A US company, International Oil Co (IOC), recently won the contract from Pakistan to construct the 2,200-kilometer pipeline over the next three years. In a statement, IOC said matters relating to security in Afghanistan and insurance guarantees had been finalized. The preferred route is the southern one, via Herat and restive Kandahar province.
Clearly, peace deals with the Taliban would help ensure the viability of such projects. But whether any deals struck will last is another matter. Taliban leader Mullah Omar is still not entirely behind them, and there is always the issue of al-Qaeda stirring trouble.
In the short term, though, the Taliban are likely to embrace the idea - provided they are given the realistic carrot of political gains - as they are in the process of refining a new command structure and need the breathing space.
However, many commanders based in the southeast are convinced that it would be a big blunder for the Taliban to slow down their activities for the sake of any deal. Instead, they want to seize this opportunity and drive for a bigger bargain, such as the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
The West's perception
Contrary to the Cold War era's Central Asian focus, Afghanistan is now seen in terms of the South Asian region, especially with regard to the struggle between Pakistan and India for strategic political and economic influence.
The ultimate goal now is to shut down this war theater, which has bred global militancy, so that initiatives such as the TAP can go ahead. TAP is the US alternative to a planned pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India.
Similarly, Western intelligence is convinced that Taliban and al-Qaeda assets in Pakistan are the root cause of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan, as confirmed in the United States' latest National Intelligence Estimate. Thus nothing could be gained by fighting a lone battle in Afghanistan's mountainous fastness.
So Pakistan was warned this year to eliminate the safe havens of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Islamabad was provided with a map of their assets and asked for an action plan. It was emphasized that coalition troops across the border in Afghanistan would be ready to take care of all "voids" Pakistan was not able to deal with in its own territory. But the Taliban have since left most of their known bases in Pakistan. (See Taliban a step ahead of US assault, Asia Times Online, August 11, 2007.)
The US now accepts that Pakistan still has access to and influence with the Taliban, unlike the government in Kabul. This realization eventually prompted Washington to sponsor the recent Pakistan-Afghanistan peace jirga (council) in Kabul to identify new players in the game before the "war on terror" enters a new phase in which the battlefield includes both Pakistan and Afghanistan, rather than Afghanistan alone.
The ongoing peace talks with the Taliban on Pakistani soil are a continuation of this process.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
Original article posted here.
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - The few weeks between the visits to Pakistan of Richard Boucher, the US assistant secretary of state who left last week, and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, who arrives on September 10, could prove crucial in determining the fate of Afghanistan.
This is the timeline for secret three-party talks to establish teega (a Pashtu word for a peace deal that resolves a conflict) between the Western coalition forces in Afghanistan (with Pakistan), the Afghan government, and the anti-coalition insurgents of Afghanistan. The first round of talks has already begun in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta, Asia Times Online has learned.
The outcome of the talks will to a large extent decide the agenda of Negroponte's visit and the course of the US-led "war on terror" in the region.
The talks are based on previous Pakistan-inspired efforts to secure peace deals between the insurgents and the Western coalition in specific areas in Afghanistan with the longer-term goal of incorporating the Taliban into the political process both in Kabul and in provincial governments.
Similar deals were struck last year in the southwestern Afghan provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Urzgan, but they lapsed. In addition to reviving these, the talks aim to include the southeastern provinces of Kunar and Khost. The negotiators are Taliban commanders, Pakistani and American intelligence members, and Afghan authorities.
The Taliban, under the command of Mullah Mansoor (brother of the legendary Mullah Dadullah, who was killed in battle this year), are in Satellite town, Quetta, to talk of teega. The next rounds are scheduled for Peshawar, the provincial capital of North-West Frontier Province, and in the Waziristan tribal areas with Taliban commanders of the southeastern provinces.
Specifically, the deals aim to stop violence in selected areas and give the Taliban limited control of government pending the conclusion of a broader peace deal for the country and the Taliban's inclusion in some form of national administration.
The Taliban and coalition forces struck limited ceasefire deals last year in Kandahar and Helmand provinces (see the Asia Times Online series In the land of the Taliban of December 2006). These included the districts of Musa Qala, Baghran, Nawzad, Sangeen, Kajaki and Panjwai. However, to preempt the Taliban's planned massive uprising this year, coalition forces ended the ceasefires last December and engaged the Taliban in conflict.
As a result, the Taliban changed their plan and diverted to the northwestern areas of Farah and Badghis and also increased their activities in Ghazni, Kunar, Gardez, Khost and Nangarhar. Instead of face-to-face battles, as in the successful spring offensive of 2006, they refined their tactics in asymmetric warfare and carried out targeted actions, especially on development projects.
Rebuilding peace - and pipelines
Coalition efforts in Afghanistan include substantial development and reconstruction projects, but these have been hampered by the insurgency. A key project is a regional oil and gas pipeline project worth US$10 billion that will run from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan, the TAP, and possibly on to India, on which work is to be started in the near future.
A US company, International Oil Co (IOC), recently won the contract from Pakistan to construct the 2,200-kilometer pipeline over the next three years. In a statement, IOC said matters relating to security in Afghanistan and insurance guarantees had been finalized. The preferred route is the southern one, via Herat and restive Kandahar province.
Clearly, peace deals with the Taliban would help ensure the viability of such projects. But whether any deals struck will last is another matter. Taliban leader Mullah Omar is still not entirely behind them, and there is always the issue of al-Qaeda stirring trouble.
In the short term, though, the Taliban are likely to embrace the idea - provided they are given the realistic carrot of political gains - as they are in the process of refining a new command structure and need the breathing space.
However, many commanders based in the southeast are convinced that it would be a big blunder for the Taliban to slow down their activities for the sake of any deal. Instead, they want to seize this opportunity and drive for a bigger bargain, such as the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
The West's perception
Contrary to the Cold War era's Central Asian focus, Afghanistan is now seen in terms of the South Asian region, especially with regard to the struggle between Pakistan and India for strategic political and economic influence.
The ultimate goal now is to shut down this war theater, which has bred global militancy, so that initiatives such as the TAP can go ahead. TAP is the US alternative to a planned pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India.
Similarly, Western intelligence is convinced that Taliban and al-Qaeda assets in Pakistan are the root cause of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan, as confirmed in the United States' latest National Intelligence Estimate. Thus nothing could be gained by fighting a lone battle in Afghanistan's mountainous fastness.
So Pakistan was warned this year to eliminate the safe havens of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Islamabad was provided with a map of their assets and asked for an action plan. It was emphasized that coalition troops across the border in Afghanistan would be ready to take care of all "voids" Pakistan was not able to deal with in its own territory. But the Taliban have since left most of their known bases in Pakistan. (See Taliban a step ahead of US assault, Asia Times Online, August 11, 2007.)
The US now accepts that Pakistan still has access to and influence with the Taliban, unlike the government in Kabul. This realization eventually prompted Washington to sponsor the recent Pakistan-Afghanistan peace jirga (council) in Kabul to identify new players in the game before the "war on terror" enters a new phase in which the battlefield includes both Pakistan and Afghanistan, rather than Afghanistan alone.
The ongoing peace talks with the Taliban on Pakistani soil are a continuation of this process.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
Original article posted here.
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Britain becoming as stupid as the US
Britain's £1.5m bribes fail to buy Taliban peace deal
BRITAIN has spent more than £1.5m in Afghanistan this year on a controversial scheme to bribe members of the Taliban to lay down their arms, even though it has failed to persuade any significant figures to defect.
The money was allocated in January and May after the killings of two top commanders, Mullah Osmani and Mullah Dadullah, and the arrest of Mullah Obaidullah, all members of the Taliban’s ruling shura, or council.
British officials expected this would lead to a dip in Taliban morale and encourage less extremist members to cross over, fearing that they were on the losing side — the so-called “Dadullah effect”.
Instead, heavy fighting has continued in the southern province of Helmand, where British forces have suffered 23 deaths so far this year. The only Taliban who have defected have mostly been foot soldiers, of whom there seems to be an unlimited supply, both from the madrasahs, or religious schools, in Pakistan and among disillusioned Afghans.
“It hasn’t had the results we’d hoped,” admitted a senior Foreign Office official, “though not for want of effort on our part.”
The news comes as David Miliband, the foreign secretary, prepares to fly to Afghanistan and Pakistan this week for his first key trip in his new post. Afghanistan has been chosen to show the commitment of Gordon Brown’s government to what it still regards as “a winnable war”, and to try to persuade Nato allies to step up their contributions.
Britain has 7,100 troops in Afghanistan — more than in Iraq — and officials no longer talk of withdrawal dates. The British ambassador to Kabul said recently that the country may take 30 years to stabilise. Senior military figures have been warning that Afghanistan could end up worse than Iraq.
Lord Inge, former chief of the defence staff, told the House of Lords this month that it was time “to face up to the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato”.
Last week a report by the Commons defence committee painted an alarming picture of spreading insurgency, insufficient troops and helicopters and confusion over strategy.
“The idea was to shake people up,” said James Arbuthnot, the Conservative chairman of the committee. “The international community as a whole is looking at Afghanistan as if a curious mime is being carried out that has no bearing on their lives.”
He added: “If Nato can’t patrol the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan . . . the insurgents will come one way and drugs the other.”
Miliband is keen to differentiate the Afghan conflict from that in Iraq.
In Kabul he will re-emphasise Britain’s long-term commitment and point out that Afghanistan is the real frontline on the war on terror.
“I don’t think there will be any change of direction but there will be a change of emphasis,” said a Foreign Office official. “There is more of a buzz about Afghanistan, more clarity of commitment, a sense that the dossier is being given priority.”
Miliband’s immediate challenge may be to convince the Dutch and Canadians, who also have troops in southern Afghanistan, to remain when their mandates expire in the next two years. Both face domestic opposition to staying on, which could leave Britain and the United States alone in the south.
He is also likely to face questions about the morality of rewarding Taliban fighters who have been killing British soldiers.
Until this year Britain had been sceptical about the independent peace strengthening programme to win over the Taliban. Although it claims to have persuaded about 4,000 people to lay down their arms, there is doubt about the numbers and almost all are low-ranking members. But in January, Whitehall was persuaded to change its policy as improved intelligence had helped to eliminate some key figures from the insurgency.
Osmani, operational commander for the six southern provinces, was killed in an airstrike in Helmand last December. Obaidullah, a former defence minister, was arrested in Pakistan in February. Then Dadullah, the one-legged Helmand commander, died in an operation involving the Special Boat Service in May.
“We saw that as a chance to communicate that the offer may not be on the table much longer,” said an official. “Come in now rather than wait to get slotted.”
The money was spent to spread this message, both through intelligence agencies and the peace strengthening commission, and also to pay for housing and transport for any who decided to make the switch.
Efforts to use Dadullah’s death to warn others were undermined by the Afghan government’s release of five Taliban including his brother, Mansoor Ahmad, in return for a kidnapped Italian journalist. Mansoor is now believed to be commanding Taliban operations in Helmand.
Dr Najib Mojadidi, deputy director of the peace strengthening scheme, criticised the international community for not supporting the programme. “I keep telling them we are absolutely short of funds,” he said. “If we could offer even one fifth of what they’re getting the other side of the border, many are willing to come over.”
Many Afghans are unhappy about the idea of rewarding killers. There was outrage last week when President Hamid Karzai pardoned a 14-year-old would-be suicide bomber who had been caught wearing an explosive vest and gave him US$2,000 to return to Pakistan.
The programme has been supported by the Americans but a top US general said he was sceptical: “It’s not like there’s some bright shining town on the hill for them to move to and you’re dealing with a pretty ruthless group on the other side.”
Original article posted here.
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