Hezbollah: Mission accomplished

Defying U.S., Hezbollah stronger than ever

[-] Text [+]

By Tom Perry - analysis

BEIRUT (Reuters) - Hezbollah is set to achieve its long-held goal of winning the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel this week, emboldening the Iranian-backed group which has emerged even more powerful from recent conflicts.

Two years after standing its ground in a 34-day war with Israel, Hezbollah has reinforced its military wing and routed its U.S.-backed adversaries in Lebanon -- defying the United States, which sees it as a terrorist group and proxy of Tehran.

Hezbollah is now seeking reconciliation with its Lebanese rivals, hoping to cool sectarian tensions inflamed by its May takeover of Beirut. Those enmities could pose a threat to both the Shi'ite group and Lebanon if left unhealed.

"Hezbollah, far from being weakened in the 2006 war or in the subsequent political battles in Beirut, is stronger than ever," said Andrew Exum, a researcher on the group based at Kings College, London.

For Iran, the stature of a group established with the help of its Revolutionary Guards in 1982 is a great asset in its own confrontation with the United States and other powers over its nuclear ambitions and influence in the Middle East.

Hezbollah has replenished and expanded its arsenal since the 2006 war. Estimated to have received military and other aid worth several billion dollars from Iran, it is seen as one of the region's toughest fighting forces despite the February assassination of its commander, Imad Moughniyah.

Hezbollah brought some of its military power to bear on the streets of Beirut in May when it briefly took over Muslim areas of the city, effectively imposing its terms for an end to 18 months of political conflict with the governing coalition.

"Hezbollah is now certain that its position is guaranteed by the (Lebanese) military and the government," said Suleiman Taqieddin, a columnist with as-Safir newspaper, which is sympathetic to the opposition alliance led by Hezbollah.

A Qatari-mediated agreement after the street fighting met the main demands of Hezbollah and its allies -- a domestic triumph for a group which commands the loyalty of a majority of Lebanese Shi'ites, the country's biggest single community.

But the Doha settlement sidestepped many issues at the heart of conflict in Lebanon, including the fate of Hezbollah's arms. Having shaken off foreign and local pressure to disarm, nobody expects the group to give up its guns any time soon.

But with sectarian animosity at its worst since the 1975-90 civil war, Hezbollah's military clout is also a threat to the group's standing in the medium term, said Nabil Boumonsef, a columnist with the pro-governing coalition an-Nahar newspaper.

SEEKING RECONCILIATION

"In the same measure as Hezbollah is strengthened by its weapons, it is weakened internally because it inspires the fear of all. Weapons in Lebanon cause fear and will draw in more weapons," he said.

Seeking to ease tensions, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has stressed the need for reconciliation with rivals, the most prominent of whom is Sunni politician Saad al-Hariri.

Nasrallah has tried to use the prisoner swap with Israel that is expected to take place on Wednesday as a platform for internal rapprochement, calling it "a national accomplishment".

Hezbollah is to exchange two Israeli soldiers for five Lebanese said by Nasrallah to be the last held by Israel. The soldiers -- believed dead although Hezbollah has not said so -- were seized in a cross-border raid which sparked the 2006 war.

"This occasion is a unifying, national occasion," Nasrallah has declared.

But full reconciliation needs the support of Hariri and his foreign backers, including Saudi Arabia. The Sunni-ruled kingdom, which has its own Shi'ite minority and is concerned about the spread of Iranian influence, may not see acquiescing in Lebanon's new power balance as in its interest.

Even though a national unity government was formed last week after weeks of wrangling, sectarian tensions still smolder.

"Hezbollah's early May actions inflamed the Sunni 'street' in Lebanon and contributed to a dramatic increase in sectarian tensions," said U.S. Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Donald Kerr.

"Lebanon has seen an upswing of rearmament among all factions during the last year or more and the events of early May will no doubt increase this trend," he said in a May 29 address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

"The way ahead in Lebanon is uncertain."

Original article posted here.

Israeli authorities predicting earthquake in Lebanon. Looks like Washington warmongering neo Cons are warming up HAARP

Israel authorities warn hospitals to prepare for earthquake

>

View larger image

A strong earthquake could soon rock Lebanon and parts of Israel, authorities said on Monday, urging health officials in northern Israel to make preparations for such an event.

"The probability of an earthquake of a magnitude of up to six on the Richter scale, originating in Lebanon and being felt in Israel has increased," the health ministry said in a letter sent to medical officials in northern Israel.

Since February, abnormal seismic activity has been noted in southern Lebanon, which had suffered some 500 minor earthquakes in a three-month period, health ministry director-general Avi Yisraeli said in the letter.

"In May, the tremors have become more intense and were felt in northern Israel," he said adding that "should an earthquake of such magnitude hit northern Israel, it may cause substantial infrastructural damage in the area.

"All medical facilities and organisations must do everything they can to enhance the level of readiness," Yisraeli said in the letter published by the ministry on Monday.

Similar concern was issued by Lebanon's national scientific research centre.

The secretary general of the centre, Moueen Hamz, told AFP in Beirut that 800 tremors ranging in magnitude from 2.3-5.1 degrees on the Richter scale had shaken the south Lebanon regions of Tyre and Nabatiyeh since February 12.

"The tremors increased significantly in May and June," he said, urging the Lebanese authorities to take "serious prevention measures."

Experts in Lebanon expect a quake of between five and six degrees on the Richter scale to strike, like the tremor that shook Lebanon in 1956 killing 136 people and destroying 6,000 houses, Hamze said.

Some seismologists in Israel say that quakes have historically rocked the region every eight decades, and the last one was nearly 81 years ago.

About 300 people were killed in Jerusalem and nearby Jericho by the July 11, 1927 temblor.

A similar quake measuring seven on the Richter scale and with an epicentre in the Hula Valley, today in northern Israel, devastated the town of Safed and killed some 4,000 people in 1837.

Original article posted here.

The cat is out of the bag about what Bush's Democratic Revolutions really mean

Explosively False Propaganda Bush's Middle East legacy

by Muhammad Sahimi

No part of the world, not even the United States, has been more deeply affected by George W. Bush's presidency than the Middle East. From the lofty goals of starting a "democratic revolution," making a "new Middle East," and helping the Palestinians to have their own independent state, to the bogus "war on terror," invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and meddling in Lebanon, Bush's Middle East policy has been simply one disaster after another. The reality is that the Middle East is of utmost strategic importance to the U.S. U.S. involvement in that region will not end after Bush leaves office in January 2009. Therefore, as the president's second term is coming to an end, it is important to consider the results of his Middle East policy, with the hope the next president will learn valuable lessons from Bush's many blunders and devise a more constructive Middle East policy. So let us consider his legacy. Iraq If there is one minor positive outcome of Bush's Middle East policy, it has to be the removal of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party from power. But at what price? Iraq has effectively been partitioned among the Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Iraq became a vast training ground for extremists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Kuwait. Iraq's infrastructure has been damaged greatly. It would take decades to put Iraq back to where it was before the war. Much of Iraq's cultural heritage was looted from museums. Iraqi prisoners were tortured at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. Two million Iraqis have left their country. Clearly, they are the highly educated (at least 3,000 of them professors), professionals, and the affluent, and, therefore, their departure is a great brain drain. Proportionally, it would be equivalent to 24 million Americans leaving the U.S. Close to 2.5 million Iraqis have been displaced within Iraq. Proportionally, it would be equivalent to 30 million American refugees within the U.S. As many as 1.1 million Iraqis may have been killed. Proportionally, it would as if over 13 million Americans had been killed, a staggering number. Notable among the dead are at least 230 Iraqi professors, with another 60 missing, presumably dead. At least 1 million Iraqi children have become orphans. Seventy percent of Iraqi children suffer from mental stress disorder. Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University, the 2001 Nobel laureate in economics, and Linda Bilmes of Harvard University estimated that the eventual cost of the war may reach $2 trillion. If, for a period of 10 years, the funding for cancer research were doubled, every American with diabetes or heart disease were treated, and a global immunization campaign that could save millions of children were carried out, the total cost would be about $600 billion. As if the price that the Iraqis have paid so far is not enough, the Bush-Cheney administration has demanded the following in secret "negotiations" with Iraq's government : Fifty-eight military bases. Control of Iraq's airspace below 32,000 ft. The authority to kill or arrest, without Iraq's permission, anyone deemed "hostile." The authority to stage a war against terrorists anywhere from Iraq without Iraq's permission. Full immunity from prosecution in Iraq for the U.S. military and civilian contractors. The last one the U.S. also demanded of Iran in the early 1960s, which sparked the June 5, 1963, uprising in Iran, which eventually led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. As Ayatollah Khomeini said at that time: "Capitulation means if we kill the dogs that the Americans bring to Iran, we will be jailed, but if they kill us, our spouse, or our children, or destroy our homes, they will not be even prosecuted in Iran." Bush's Iraq legacy? A destroyed country, only nominally unified, and probably a quasi-colony of the U.S. for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was an ocean of good will toward the U.S., and great support for destroying al-Qaeda. What happened? Afghanistan was attacked, even though the U.S. knew that the al-Qaeda leadership had already escaped to the border region with Pakistan, and Donald Rumsfeld reportedly said that "there aren't any good targets in Afghanistan." The Taliban were overthrown. But where is Afghanistan now? The Taliban are resurgent. They are gaining ground and the support of the ethnic Pashtuns, and they control most of southern Afghanistan. Recall that they were despised right before the 9/11 attacks. At least compared with Iraq, Afghanistan has received a dearth of aid. It is in turmoil, the best evidence of which is the assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai and the recent assault by Taliban forces on a prison in Kandahar that freed at least 400 Taliban fighters. The unemployment rate is at least 60 percent. Karzai is viewed by many Afghans as the puppet of the U.S., and this in a nation that has historically had little tolerance for foreigners and their agents. Opium production, which was banned under Taliban, is thriving. It supplies 93 percent of the world's heroin and 53 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. The government hardly controls anything beyond the capital, Kabul. The country has been effectively partitioned among warlords. The number of NATO troops has increased from 20,000 in 2003 to more than 64,000, including 3,200 new U.S. Marines. Practically every day innocent civilians are killed by NATO bombing, causing a strong backlash against NATO. Bush's Afghanistan legacy? An economic basket case that needs vast amounts of international aid to barely survive and will not be a viable state for decades, if ever. Pakistan Since 9/11, the U.S. has given Pakistan $11 billion in aid, in addition to forgiving its previous debts. Eighty percent of this aid has gone to the military to supposedly fight al-Qaeda. What has happened? Ninety percent of the military aid has been used by Gen. Pervez Musharraf to buy advanced weapons and put them on the Pakistan-India border, one of the most unstable areas in the world, where two nuclear nations are lined up against each other. Musharraf has, in fact, signed peace agreements with the Taliban's sympathizers in the western and northern Pakistan provinces, which means that both the Taliban and al-Qaeda have secure places to train terrorists. With U.S. consent or at least silence, Musharraf has violated Pakistan's constitution repeatedly. For example, last year he sacked and jailed Pakistan's Supreme Court judges who opposed him. He then appointed new judges who had to swear to loyalty to him rather than Pakistan's constitution. The jailed judges have yet to be released. The U.S. arranged for Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan to give a civilian face to the military dictatorship, without even making sure that she was secure. She was assassinated. Bush's Pakistan legacy? An unstable nuclear nation with a large number of radicals in its military intelligence (the ISI) who support the Taliban. Lebanon After the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005, and the subsequent Cedar Revolution, Bush pushed for democratic elections in Lebanon. These were held in spring 2005, but the results were not to Bush's liking. Not only did Hezbollah receive a significant fraction of the votes and send 14 representative to the parliament, but its partners in the March 8 coalition also received significant votes, and Hezbollah joined the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in July 2005. Condoleezza Rice's "directed democracy" project was a failure. But Bush did not stop meddling in Lebanon's affairs. He constantly provoked Siniora against Hezbollah and its allies, notably Michel Aoun, the Maronite ex-general. The result: Complete paralysis of the government. Then came the summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. Hezbollah began the war, and was rightfully condemned by the world. But Hezbollah had carried out several such small operations in the past, and each time there was a quick cease-fire. Not this time. With strong support by Bush and Cheney, Israel started a full scale war. Meanwhile, the U.S. prevented the United Nations Security Council from reaching any consensus regarding a cease-fire, buying time for Israel to supposedly crush Hezbollah. Condi Rice promised a "new Middle East," one in which Hezbollah would be defeated and Iran would be attacked. Twelve hundred Lebanese (1,000 of them civilians) and over 150 Israelis (40 of them civilians) were killed, and the infrastructure of Lebanon was greatly damaged by Israel's bombing. Hezbollah, however, won the war. Although a U.S. official told Seymour Hersh that the Israelis viewed Lebanon as "a demo for Iran," the Pentagon had to revise its plans for attacking Iran. After seeing the types of weapons used by Hezbollah, Gen. John Abizaid, then the Centcom commander, said the Iranians "have given us a hint about things to come." Hezbollah remained intact, its popularity in the Arab world greater than ever before. This was the second time it had won a war with Israel. The first time was in 2000 when, after fighting with Israel for 15 years, Hezbollah forced Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982. Bush, however, continued his meddling. He provoked Siniora to sack the security chief of Beirut's airport, allegedly a Hezbollah member, and shut down Hezbollah's optical communication network, which had played a crucial role in its victory over Israel. The result: Hezbollah swiftly took over West Beirut and routed forces loyal to Siniora. It demanded restoration of its communication network, giving the security chief his job back and veto power over all the government's decisions. Siniora had taken action against Hezbollah, counting on U. S. aid. The aid never came. Bush blinked. Siniora blinked. The result: Hezbollah got all of its demands and more. Michel Suleiman, a general with whom Hezbollah has good relations, is now the president. Hezbollah is more powerful than ever. Bush's Lebanon legacy? An organization that the U.S. has labeled as terrorist has won impressive strategic victories over both the U.S. and Israel and is in the driving seat. Iran Iran provided significant help to U.S. forces when it attacked Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. It opened its airspace to U.S. aircraft and provided intelligence on the Taliban forces. The opposition forces that it had been supporting for years, the Northern Alliance, were the first to reach Kabul and overthrow the Taliban government. Then, during the UN talks on the future of Afghanistan, after the Taliban's ouster, in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001, Iranian representative Mohammad Javad Zarif met daily with U.S. envoy James Dobbins, who praised Zarif for preventing the conference from collapsing because of last-minute demands by the Northern Alliance [.pdf]. Thus, the National Unity government led by Karzai could not have come to power without Iran's help. How was Iran rewarded? Two months later, President Bush made Iran a charter member of his imaginary "axis of evil." Then, in early May 2003 Iran made a comprehensive proposal to the U.S., offering to negotiate on all important issues, recognizing Israel within its pre-1967 war borders, and cutting off material support to Hamas and Hezbollah. The proposal was never taken seriously. What have been the results of Bush's belligerence toward Iran and his constant demonizing of that nation? Iranians saw the double standards when the U.S offered security guarantees and aid to North Korea and advanced nuclear technology to India, but only sanctions and threats to Iran. Thus, in 2005 they elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had run on a platform partly based on standing up to the U.S. Despite all the declarations that Bush has made against Iran's nuclear program, the fact remains that Iran has made far more progress in its nuclear program during his presidency than in the previous 30 years combined. This has come about only because Bush has refused to negotiate with Iran without any preconditions. Because of events in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, Iran's radicals are actually in the driving seat, and their popularity in the Islamic world is higher than ever. The hardliners have used Bush's idiotic proclamations of support for the reformists to label them as U.S. agents, and they have taken advantage of his threats against Iran to try to suppress the democratic movement. Bush's Iran legacy? A nation on the verge of achieving uranium enrichment and becoming a regional power. Palestine/Israel When Bill Clinton left the White House in 2001, the Israelis and the Palestinians were tantalizingly close to a peace agreement. Today, the probability of peace is practically nil. No other U.S. president has supported Israel as blindly and one-sidedly. He is also the first U.S. president who actually recognized Israel's policy of building and annexing settlements in the West Bank, giving Israel a secret letter committing the U.S. to such a policy. With Bush's support, Israel "evacuated" Gaza but created the largest jail on Earth: Gaza's land, sea, and air borders are all controlled by Israel. It attacks Gaza at will, and when it kills innocent women, children, and old men, what does Bush say? "Israel must defend itself." Bush and Rice pushed for democratic elections among Palestinians. The radicals actually wanted such elections too! What happened? The elections were held and certified as democratic by Jimmy Carter, but Hamas won. It received more votes than any other group, including Fatah, and took control of the Palestinian parliament. As usual, Rice was shocked. "Nobody saw it coming," she declared. (No secretary of state has made more trips to Israel and Palestine than Rice without having anything to show for it.) So what happened? Instead of trying to work with Hamas, which has never been a threat to the U.S., Bush began punishing the Palestinians by cutting off all aid and pressuring others to follow the U.S. lead. Hamas responded to this by routing the Fatah forces in Gaza, taking full control there. Bush has paid lip service to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In his recent speech before the Knesset, Israel's parliament, Bush promised the Palestinians that they would have a state of their own "over the next 60 years." Some promise. Bush's Israel/Palestine legacy? Peace between Israel and the Palestinians is more farfetched than ever. The Middle East In addition to all the above, here is the rest of Bush's legacy in the Middle East: When Bush was elected, the price of oil was about $35/barrel. Today it is close to $140. Roughly half of the oil price is due to political reasons, the most important of which is the instability in the Middle East, caused by Bush's wars and threats of war. When the 9/11 terrorist attacks happened, there was much sympathy for the U.S. in the Islamic world. Today, the U.S. is despised in much of the Islamic world. When Bush was elected, the U.S. and Iran had a chance for reconciliation, after Madeleine Albright's speech of April 2000, which expressed regrets for the CIA's role in the 1953 coup in Iran. Today, there is no such chance for reconciliation until at least after Bush leaves office. Bush was elected only eight months after the Iranian reformists had taken control of Iran's parliament in the March 2000 elections, and only seven months after then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had talked about "strong winds of change" in Iran. The reformists' victory, together with the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, had generated considerable discussions and soul-searching among the Arab nations of the Middle East about the need for reforms in their countries. In fact, some of them, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan, had begun moving cautiously toward reforms. But after 9/11 and Bush's "war on terror," all the cautious moves toward reform were halted. The regimes of these nations chose instead to hide behind the "war on terror" and justify the repression of their citizens. Bush still refuses to face the realities of the mess that he has created in the Middle East. His overall Middle East legacy is EFP, explosively false propaganda, through which he still tries to sell his fantasies to the public. Yes, Mr. President, contrary to what you said recently, there is such a thing as "objective short-term history," and you have failed its test miserably. Origianal article posted here.

One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter: Hezbollah rises like never before in Lebanon

History in the making for Hezbollah

By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - British statesman Sir Winston Churchill once said, "History will be kind to me for I intend to write it." On another occasion, he said, "Although prepared for martyrdom, I preferred that it be postponed."

These two quotes came to my mind, as I imagined Hasan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, seated somewhere in Beirut, watching his allies and opponents hammer out a deal in Doha - to his favor - on Wednesday.

He must have been a very happy man because all of the Doha resolutions were almost tailor-made to Nasrallah's liking. Nasrallah finally got what he had been asking for, mainly a greater say for the opposition in the Lebanese government, and the ability to veto any resolution that runs against the interests of Hezbollah.

True, no early parliamentary elections are going to happen (as Hezbollah had requested) to oust the parliamentary majority of Saad al-Hariri, but the entire issue of Hezbollah and its arms was glossed over at the Doha meeting.

A fighter who often said that he seeks martyrdom in his war with Israel, Nasrallah, like Churchill, would certainly prefer that it be postponed. He needs time to enjoy the fruits of victory taken by Hezbollah in Qatar. He might be idolized by millions of Arabs, seen as a war hero and a charismatic, honest and inspiring leader. He might be hated beyond imagination by his opponents, seen as a terrorist and an Iranian stooge. But setting emotions aside - they don't really count in politics - the man has in every sense of the word proven his intention, and succeeded, in writing history; his way.

When Israel withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000, his opponents argued Nasrallah was finished. The young leader had legitimized himself for nearly 10 years as a freedom fighter, someone who was needed to combat the Israeli occupation. Now that Lebanon was free, theoretically, what was the use for Nasrallah or the arms of Hezbollah? He could not continue to hold arms, fight the Israelis, and appeal to his constituency now that the Israelis had left Lebanon.

Yet, he survived. When Syrian president Hafez al-Assad died in June 2000, the same argument resurfaced, saying that an emerging Syria might be unable to fulfill its promises to Hezbollah. He also survived. In 2004, the United Nations passed Resolution 1559, calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah. One year later, voices echoed throughout the international community, calling on Nasrallah to lay down his arms.

The young Lebanese leader, people reckoned, would be unable to stand up to the United States, France and the UN. Four years down the road, Resolution 1559 is history when it comes to implementing the part about the arms of Hezbollah. The same fire was used against him in 2005, when former premier Rafik al-Hariri was killed and then again in 2006, when Israel launched its major war on Lebanon, with the intention of crushing Hezbollah. The war ended, and Resolution 1701 was passed, pushing Hezbollah away from its battlefield on the Israeli border. Even then, Nasrallah survived.

Eighteen months ago, Nasrallah ordered his supporters into downtown Beirut, in an open-ended demonstration aimed at bringing down the cabinet of the Saudi-backed Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora. The Hezbollah leader had engaged in a war of words with the pro-Western Lebanese government of Beirut, accusing them of conspiring with the Americans and the Israelis, during the summer war of 2006.

Among other things he blamed them for Resolution 1559, and said that they had called on Israel to extend its war, so that it could rid them of Hezbollah. Later in November 2006, the Shi'ite ministers representing Hezbollah and its sister party Amal, resigned from the Siniora cabinet. Nasrallah argued that this cabinet was unconstitutional because the Shi'ites were no longer in it.

The Saudi and American backed March 14 Coalition, however, refused to bend under pressure and held on to Siniora. This was a proxy war between the US and Saudi Arabia on one side, and Iran and Syria on the other. The Americans would simply not let Iran get the upper hand. Observers claimed that this time, Nasrallah had bit off more than he could chew.

Eighteen months passed, and no solution came about. Nasrallah still refused to back down - insisting that Siniora was no longer the prime minister of Lebanon - and blocked any negotiations regarding the arms of Hezbollah. The party would only disarm, he argued, once the Israeli-occupied Sheeba Farms were liberated.

Last week the confrontation turned violent, as armed Hezbollah fighters clashed with those funded by and loyal to parliamentary majority leader Hariri. The violence erupted after the Lebanese government tried to dismantle Hezbollah's security network, claiming that it was illegal, and dismissed the commander of security at Beirut airport, who is loyal to Hezbollah. This was an attack on the arms of Hezbollah, Nasrallah claimed, adding that in resistance, communication and security systems are no less valuable than bombs and missiles. "We will cut the arm of whomever tries to disarm Hezbollah," were the words of an angry Nasrallah. "Arms will be used to protect arms," he added, discarding an earlier promise he had made never to use Hezbollah weapons internally.

His men took their queue from there, stormed entire neighborhoods loyal to Hariri, and disarmed the Hariri bloc. Once in full control (within the short period of six hours) they called on the Lebanese Army to march in and take over. The Hariri-led March 14 Coalition cried foul play, and so did Saudi Arabia, claiming that Hezbollah had launched a coup and occupied Beirut. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal drew parallels between Israel's invasion of the Lebanese capital in 1982 and the 2008 offensive of Hezbollah, claiming that Nasrallah was another Ariel Sharon.

Everybody thought that by using his arms internally, Nasrallah had fired his last bullet. Some wrote of an upcoming civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Others speculated that it would be now easier for the international community and the Lebanese state to push through with an argument against Hezbollah arms, now that they had been used internally. This was the mistake of a lifetime, many said, for Nasrallah.

Under heavy lobbying from the Arab League, the US, France and Gulf heavyweights like Qatar, all parties boarded a plane and headed to Doha, leaving behind 82 dead civilians in Beirut. Residents of the Lebanese capital saw them off with big signs saying, "If you don't agree, don't come back."

The attendees of the Doha Conference included Christian leader Michel Aoun and parliament speaker Nabih Berri (two allies of Hezbollah), pro-US figures like Samir Gagegea and Walid Jumblatt, independents like the veteran journalist and member of parliament Ghassan Tweini, along with Hariri, and Siniora.

The only missing participant was Nasrallah, who could not make the trip to Qatar, for security reasons. For five days the assembled leaders met under Qatari auspices (at one point supervised directly by Sheikh Hamad, the emir of Qatar). They consulted around the clock with the Americans, the French, the Saudis, the Syrians and the Iranians. They finally came out with an agreement on May 21 that seemed to make everybody happy.

The Doha agreement states that:

1. All parties involved will meet by Sunday to elect a president for Lebanon. The presidential seat has been vacant since November 2007 and although all parties agreed on bringing current army commander Michel Suleiman to office, nobody seemed to know how to do that through parliament. General Suleiman, coined pro-Syrian and pro-Hezbollah, was never a favorite for March 14, nor for ex-army commander Michel Aoun, who also, had his eyes set on the vacant seat at Baabda Palace.

Last November 2007, Aoun was talked into a compromise; if he could not make it as king, then he would have to settle for the status of kingmaker. The Syrians backed Suleiman's election, since they were always suspicious of Aoun, who had been anti-Syrian during his long exile in Paris, during the heyday of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.

2. A new 30-man cabinet will be created within the next week by someone from the March 14 Coalition. No early parliamentary elections will take place, and the Hariri bloc will continue to dominate parliament until 2009. Meaning they remain in control of the post of prime minister. Siniora, who described the deal as a "great achievement in the history of the Arab nation", will step down and be replaced by one of two options, either Hariri himself, or the pro-Hariri member of parliament Mohammad al-Safadi.

But the new cabinet will have 16 seats for the Hariri majority, 11 for the Hezbollah-led opposition, and three seats to be appointed by the president. Since Suleiman is on good terms with Hezbollah, this means that the three seats appointed by him, will more or less, be allied to the 11 held by the Hezbollah-led opposition. That brings the total number of seats of the anti-Hariri team to 14. They can have veto power over any legislation passed by the Hariri team.

This will be used if the Hariri team tries to pass any decrees related to the International Tribunal, passed under Chapter Seven of the UN charter, related to the murder of Rafik Hariri. This new cabinet will place an immediate problem for the US, which supported Siniora and will extend unconditional support for whomever the new March 14 prime minister will be.

But how will they deal with 11 ministers in the new government, who are loyal to or members of Hezbollah? Will they ignore them - acting as if they do not exist - as they did with Hamas in Palestine? Or will they swallow their big words and see them as a stabilizing factor, as they did with the Sadrists who were cabinet ministers under Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq.

3. All parties pledge not to resign from the government or hinder its work. This was made to secure that Hezbollah will not walk out on the government, as it did with Siniora in November 2006.

4. Lebanon will adopt a 1960 electoral law for the parliamentary elections of 2009, with amendments in the Beirut district.

5. All parties pledge to refrain from using arms in order to resolve political conflict.

6. Security remains strictly monopolized by the state, and there can be no state-within-a state in Lebanon.

7. To show their goodwill, the Hezbollah-led opposition will tear down the tents that they had set up in downtown Beirut (the heart of the Hariri kingdom) bringing life back to the commercial district of the Lebanese capital.

Who wins now in Beirut politics? By virtue of avoiding another civil war, all sides win, topped with the Lebanese people. Certainly, Hezbollah came out victorious. So did the Syrians and Iran. The Syrians in particular seemed to be on cloud nine, since shortly after the agreement was announced in Doha another declaration came out, this time from Damascus, Tel Aviv and Ankara, saying that indirect talks had started between Syria and Israel, under auspices of the Turks.

The only side that might not be too happy with what happened in Doha is Saudi Arabia. The deal was brokered by the Qataris and not them, although they had been the ones to supervise the deal at Taif, which led to en end to civil war in 1990.

The Syrians, whom they had tried to sideline in Beirut and empower March 14, certainly proved that they still had a lot of weight in Lebanon, although they had been out of Lebanon - militarily - since 2005. Saudi Arabia's proxies were defeated militarily in the street confrontations last week, and politically in Doha. After all, despite all the macho talk, they finally bent and accepted the demands of the Hezbollah-led opposition. Hezbollah and its friends were actually given the veto power they had long wanted, kept their arms, and secured a president for Lebanon who was not a member of the March 14 coalition.

Nasrallah is writing history, just like Churchill but perhaps with a different pen and in a different handwriting.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

Weazl reposts: A little not so ancient history on Hezbollah's role in Lebanon:



Original article posted here.

Brokering peace (without and despite the United States): Lebanon

What the Moron's Middle Eastern policy has created: a strong threat to Israel.

Did Hezbollah Thwart a Bush/Olmert Attack on Beirut?

A Sudden Case of Cold Feet

by Franklin Lamb

This week Israel's Military Intelligence Chief, Major General Amos Yadlin complained to the Israeli daily Haaretz that 'Hezbollah proved that it was the strongest power in Lebanon... stronger than the Lebanese and it had wanted to take the government it could have done it,' He said Hezbollah, continued to pose a 'significant' threat to Israel as its rockets could reach a large part of Israeli territory.'

Yadlin was putting it mildly.

But what Intelligence Chief Yadlin did not reveal to the Israeli public was just how 'significant' but also 'immediate' the Hezbollah threat was on May 11. Nor was he willing to divulge the fact that he received information via US and French channels that if the planned attack on Lebanon's capitol went forward that Tel Aviv was subject, in the view of the US intelligence community to 'approximately 600 Hezbollah rockets in the first 24 hours in retaliation and at least that number on the following day'.

The Israeli Intel Chief also declined to reveal that despite Israel's recent psyche-war camping about various claimed missile shields 'the State of Israel is perfecting', that this claim is being ridiculed at the Pentagon. 'Israel will not achieve an effective shield against the current generation of rockets, even assuming no technological improvements in the current rockets aimed at it, for another 20 years. And that assumes the US will continue to fund their research and development for the hoped for shields' according to Pentagon, US Senate Intelligence Committee, and very well informed Lebanese sources.

The planned attack on Beirut

According to US Senate Intelligence Committee sources, the Bush administration initially green lighted the intended May 11 Israel 'demonstration of solidarity with the pro-Bush administration militias, some with which Israel has maintained ties since the days of Bashir Gemayal and Ariel Sharon.

In the end, 'the Bush administration got cold feet', a Congressional source revealed. So did Israel. Israel was not willing to proceed with the original Bush Administration idea which was to have Bush attend the May 15 Israel anniversary celebrations following the Israeli attack meant to hit Hezbollah hard, and give Bush the credit for coming to the dangerous region. The message was to be that Bush comes to the rescue 'on horseback and leads the US Calvary charge straight out of a B western movie where the bugle would sound and flag would be unfurled and the white hat good guys would show their stuff before riding into the sunset and back to Texas, leaving the results to the likely Obama administration to sort out.

The plan involved Israeli air strikes on South and West Beirut in support of forces it was assured would be able to surprise and resist Hezbollah and sustain a powerful offensive for 48 hours.

Also presumably disturbing to Israel was the report it received that Hezbollah 'had once again in all probability hacked its 'secure' military intelligence communications and the fear that the information would be shared with others.

The Hezbollah rout of the militias in West Beirut plus the fear of retaliation on Tel Aviv, ruining 60th anniversary celebrations, forced cancellation of the supportive attack.

Israel limited its actions to sending two F-15's and two F-16's into as far North as Tyre, one more of literally hundreds of violations of Lebanese airspace, sovereignty and SCR 1701.

Clearly frustrated, Cabinet Minister Meir Sheetrit said Israel should not yet take any action now, but warned' those things could change if Hezbollah takes over Lebanon.' a few minutes earlier he had declared that Hezbollah had done just that and had treated the Lebanese army as a doormat.

Later in the Sunday cabinet meeting, Minister Ami Ayalon called for an emergency meeting of the political-security cabinet to discuss 'the ongoing crisis in Lebanon and why Israel was not assisting friendly forces.' Minister Yitzhak Cohen (Shas) said that 'Israel must immediately ask the [United Nations] Security Council to hold renewed discussions over resolution 1701.' The minister was referring to the resolution that stopped the Israeli actions against Lebanon during the 34-day between in 2006, maintaining a fragile cease-fire.

Finally Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert informed Israeli supporters in Lebanon, through the media, and presumbly other means that' Israel was following the violence in Lebanon closely, but would refrain from intervening. Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai told Army Radio Sunday that Israel was prepared for the possibility that the situation in Lebanon will deteriorate into another civil war (meaning future opportunities for Israeli influence and interventon in Lebanon) and that the current fighting could end with a Hezbollah takeover of the government. 'We need to keep our eyes peeled and be especially sensitive regarding all that is happening there,' Vilnai told Army Radio.

The Bush administration, also disappointed, switched tactics and is opting for domination of the narrative of the fairly complicated events of the past week and using their media and confessional allies to launch a media blitz (minus Future TV for a few days} to flood the airways with:

· Hezbollah staged a coup d'état. Even Israel, if not the Bush administration, concedes Hezbollah has no interest in taking over the Government. (One observer, paraphrasing Winston Churchill's comment, deadpanned, 'Some Hezbollah Coup! Some Hezbollah Etat!')

· Hezbollah brought it forces from the South and occupied West Beirut: Hezbollah not only did not bring their forces from the South to Beirut (rather they remained on alert for an Israel attack down South)

· Hezbollah broke its pledge not to use Resistance arms against Lebanese militias and shot up West Beirut.

The facts are very different when viewed close up on the streets here.

When the Lebanese Resistance took the decision during the early hours of Friday morning to engage in civil disobedience, it delayed its actions so as not to preempt the Labor movement strike for higher wages which it supported. When the marching Strikers were prevented from moving into West Beirut the Opposition extended its civil disobedience manifestation.

Various militias, including the smartly outfitted Hariri 'Secure Plus' with its distinctive maroon tee-shirts and beige trousers, (now know locally by some as 'Secure Minus') a hoped for future Blackwater operation in Lebanon disintegrated surprisingly quickly because many of its green recruits brought down from Tripoli felt misled and betrayed regarding their job description as they were handed weapons an instructed to fight Hezbollah. Snipers from anti-Opposition factions killed civilians from rooftops in Beirut trying to ignite a civil war.

Hezbollah, acting in self defense, according to various officials, quickly clamped down on the trouble makers, took control of the streets, within hours handed them over to the army, and virtually evacuated West Beirut, retaining one position near Bay Rocks manned by unarmed representatives.

Meanwhile the Hariri influence has been greatly weekend in Akkar near the Palestinian Refugee camp of Nahr al Bared and in the Tripoli area. According to some political analysts, including, Fida'a Ittani, a regular columnist for the independent pro-opposition newspaper Al-Akhbar, wrote on May 14, the Future Movement, defeated in Beirut, no longer has any serious influence in the north.

Several Salafi al Qaeda admiring movements are present in Lebanon and like Fatah Islam's declaration this week that they will fight for the Sunnis, they vary in their attitudes from silent opposition to Future leader Saad Al-Hariri to fully supporting him as the leader of the Sunnis. These groups are valued by certain 'leaders' in Lebanon because are the only ones with coherent structures at the ideological, political, technical, and field levels.

Judging from Saad Hariri's confused statements at his subsequent news conference and statements by other parties, the bitterness of promised but unforthcoming assistance was evident.
For two days following the debacle of his forces imploding the head of the Future Movement said nothing. Finally on the 14th he broke his silence. The Halba massacre, committed by Hariri's Mustakbal militiamen which brutally and barbarically murdered 11 people from the opposition did not seem worthy of discussion as he spoke. In a press conference on Tuesday, Hariri simply ignored what all the Lebanese had seen on TV from weapons, ammunition and alcohol found in Future movement offices, and instead listed a series of delusions. 'We awaited an open war on Israel, and yet here is an open war on Beirut and its people' he stated. Some interpreted this rather odd statement either as a subconscious slip of the tongue on Hariri's part expressing his frustration that the Israelis help did not arrive or that his reported earlier incoherent state persisted.

Hariri's original speech was so confused that the Saudi channel al-Arabiyya stopped broadcasting it and only read excerpts from what he said, without showing his recorded speech.

When American criticism resumed, and Hezbollah fighters withdrew from the alleys surrounding his house, Hariri was urged to stand up and speak again, this time with a stronger tone, saying 'This has been decided by the Iranian and Syrian regimes that wanted to play a political game in Lebanon's streets. For us nothing has changed. We will not negotiate with someone having a pistol pointed to our heads.'

Anger at the Bush administration and Israel by certain warlords in Lebanon must feel much like the frustration of Secure Minus personal who rushed from Tripoli and felt misled, abandoned and cheated.

Franklin Lamb can be reached at fplamb@gmail.com

Original article posted here.

The Lebanese strife

A deadly miscalculation in Lebanon

By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - The Lebanese government made a fatal underestimation of how far leaders of the Shi'ite group Hezbollah would go to preserve what they believe are their rights, such as an intelligence network and the freedom to carry weapons.

The result is at least 81 people dead in clashes across the country since violence erupted on May 6; a political and military victory for Hezbollah and Iran and a stinging setback for the government and Saudi Arabia.

The crises was sparked last week in Beirut when the government of Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora ordered the communication and surveillance network at Runway 17 of Beirut Airport be dismantled, claiming it was "illegal and unconstitutional".

The decision was taken at a cabinet meeting on May 6 that lasted until 4 am, lobbied for by Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh. The network is one of the primary espionage tools used by Hezbollah in its war against Israel, keeping tabs on comings and goings at Beirut Airport.

Adding insult to injury, the Lebanese government dismissed Wafiq Shuqayr, the Shi'ite security commander of the airport, for planting the system in accordance with Hezbollah's wishes, supposedly behind the back of Siniora.

Hezbollah cried foul, claiming the network had been in place for years, adding that dismantling it was a red line because otherwise Beirut Airport would be "transformed into a base for the the CIA, the FBI and Mossad, referring to American and Israeli intelligence.
Hezbollah secretary general Hasan Nasrallah spoke just hours after the crisis started, saying the communication system and Shuqyar were "red lines" that could not be crossed. He reminded his audience that when Siniora became prime minister in 2005, one of the main points of his political program was "supporting the resistance" and giving it (Hezbollah) a free hand to wage its "war of liberation" against Israel in any way it saw fit.

Veteran Shi'ite cleric Abdul-Amir Qabalan, deputy chairman of the Higher Shi'ite Council, contacted the Lebanese government and advised it to back down, warning that Nasrallah must not be provoked and that he would not stand by and watch his security system being torn down. Qabalan said, "Touching this [communication] system affects our nationalism, integrity and loyalty to the nation."

The government refused to change course, arguing that security must be monopolized by the state and that it was inconceivable that a non-state party like Hezbollah could run a parallel security system at Beirut Airport.

In this stubbornness, the government failed to anticipate the value Hezbollah places on what it believed its key rights. Worse, Defense Minister Elias al-Murr, Interior Minister Hasan al-Sabe and Public Persecutor Said Mirza were tasked to create a team to look into other security violations committed by Hezbollah.

Engineering the escalation was Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, a one-time Nasrallah friend now turned enemy, who knew that within 48 hours the United Nations Security Council was due to discuss resolution 1559, regarding the disarmament of Hezbollah, which has yet to be fully implemented.

Nasrallah angrily replied that "we will cut the arm" of whoever tries to dismantle the arms of Hezbollah, claiming that security networks were weapons, just like missiles and guns. He then reminded that in the past, he would always say that "our weapons will never be used internally", but this time he warned that "weapons will be used to guard weapons".

He was not understating the situation. By the evening of May 7, all hell had broken lose in Beirut.

Hezbollah troops took to the streets of the capital and were confronted by armed men loyal to parliamentary majority leader Saad al-Hariri and Druze leader Jumblatt. Road blocks were set up all over the city, bringing back haunting memories of the 17-year civil war that ended in 1990, and snipers showed up on rooftops.

The Hariri-led March 14 Coalition cried foul, claiming that Hezbollah had launched a coup and taken over the (in the lightening speed of six hours). Parallels were drawn between Hezbollah's behavior in Beirut and the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007.

Nasrallah denied a coup was in the making, saying, "Had we wanted a coup, they [government leaders] would have woken up to find themselves in jail, or [thrown) in the sea."

Hezbollah fighters did storm entire neighborhoods of Beirut loyal to Hariri, aided by Amal militiamen loyal to the Shi'ite speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, an ally of Nasrallah. The poor training and weaponry of the Hariri team was no match for the sophisticated war machine of Hezbollah, which managed to ward off a massive Israeli attack in 2006.

So amateurish were Hariri's men that it almost seemed as if they had no arms at all. They were round up in hours, disarmed and handed over to the Lebanese army. Rather than take control of the districts - to prove that this was not a coup - Hezbollah fighters called up the army, a third party, asking it to take control.
Vandalism did take place, and so did an ugly exchange of words between Hezbollah's team, who are all Shi'ite, and Hariri's men, who are all Sunnis. One of the most telling acts was shutting down all of Hariri's media outlets, which were very active in spreading anti-Hezbollah propaganda, including Future TV, Future News, Orient Radio and Future Newspaper. All of these were taken over by Hezbollah and then handed to the army, yet hoodlums did manage to break into Future TV and set one floor ablaze.

Many saw this as a proxy war between the Saudi Arabia-backed March 14 Coalition and the Iran-backed Hezbollah. Telecommunications Minister Hamadeh said the entire crisis was the doing of Tehran. His boss, Jumblatt, went even further, asking for the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador from Beirut.

Jumblatt's tone changed, however, 48 hours into the confrontation, when the fighting ended in Beirut and shifted to Druze villages overlooking the Lebanese capital. Hezbollah fighters surrounded his palace in Beirut, near the American University of Beirut, but did not invade. It was clear for Jumblatt, one of the United States' main and newfound allies in Lebanon, that it was pointless to resist Hezbollah.

Jumblatt got on the phone with Nabih Berri, the Nasrallah-allied speaker of parliament, and said, "I am a hostage now in my home in Beirut. Tell Sayed Hasan Nasrallah I lost the battle and he wins. So let's sit and talk to reach a compromise. All that I ask is your protection."

Nasrallah and Jumblatt had been good friends and strong allies during the heyday of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Druze leader had positioned himself as one of the main protectors of Hezbollah arms throughout the 1990s. A political animal, however, he changed sides when it was clear the Syrians had fallen out with Washington after the Iraq war and he transformed himself into one of the loudest critics of Syrian power in Beirut.

He put his full bet on the Americans, patched up with the George W Bush White House (which he had once accused of staging the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington) and became an aggressive critic of Nasrallah. In his speech on the eve of hostilities, Nasrallah said that the plan to transform Beirut Airport into a base for the US Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Mossad was the brainchild of "the government of Walid Jumblatt".

Intense fighting between Druze forces and Shi'ite militiamen raged on in the villages of Shouf, the towns of Aley and Shuwayfat, raising red sirens throughout Lebanon. This is where heavy fighting had taken place in the civil war - and although the war ended nearly 20 years ago - the wounds have not healed.

Two Hezbollah members were killed in the Druze districts, and another disappeared, prompting Jumblatt to give an urgent press conference, accepting blame for the entire ordeal and calling on his troops to lay down their arms, avoid a sectarian outburst, and transfer order of the districts to the Lebanese army.

Jumblatt added, "I must admit that the Iranians are smart and they knew how to play it in Lebanon. They chose a time when the US is weak in the Middle East and did it."

Calm was restored to Beirut when the government, with as much face-saving as possible, revoked its earlier decisions by transferring the issue of the communication system, and the security commander of Beirut Airport, to the army. Instead of executing the orders Army Commander Michel Suleiman, a neutral third party, declared both null. It is still unclear if the Siniora cabinet will issue a formal apology for its actions, as the Hezbollah-led opposition is requesting.

Regardless, it was a political and military victory for Hezbollah.

The March 14 claims it was a moral victory for itself as well, saying that they had helped prevent a civil war by backing down on their earlier legislation. To date, while fighting continues in the Druze mountains, and has even reached as far north as Tripoli, the government has not resigned. Not even has Interior Minister Hassan al-Sabe, who is a member of March 14.

Rumors circulated in Beirut that Siniora wanted to step down when the fighting was at its peek, but was prevented from doing so by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, enraged by what was happened in Beirut, realized that Iran - and the Syrians - had taken the upper hand in Beirut.

True, Hezbollah has restored all "occupied" districts to the army, but it is clear they were far superior in power, training, arms and logistics to Saudi Arabia's proxies in Lebanon. Additionally, they have done it once. Nothing prevents them from doing it again at any time the Saudi-backed government tries to dismantle, crush or curb Hezbollah's influence.

When a coup is not a coup
Speaking at the southern village of Bint Jbeil in 2005, Nasrallah once said, "There is talk of disarming the resistance. Any thought of disarming the resistance is pure madness. We do not want to attack anyone. We have never done so. And we will never allow anyone to attack Lebanon. But if anyone, no matter who, even thinks about disarming the resistance, we will fight him like the martyr-seekers in Karbala."

That sums it up. Nasrallah will not allow anybody to touch the arms of Hezbollah and is willing to fight to maintain his status, and that of his party, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His supporters argue that as a pragmatic leader, and a cunning statesman who excels in psychological warfare, he does not want to rule Beirut.

He is neither interested nor politically able (although it would be easy, in military terms). He realizes that the confessional system of Lebanon is too complicated for such a task, and said it bluntly last Wednesday, "If they told us to come take over, we would say 'no thank you'."

Had he wanted a real coup, he would not have transferred control to the Lebanese army, nor would he have laid down his arms in Beirut. He would have invaded and stormed the homes of Jumblatt and Hariri and arrested both of them, along with Siniora, and set up a new government, to his liking, and to that of Iran. But that is an illogical scenario that would never pass.

What he did last week in Beirut was show his power - flex his muscles - and tell the world, "I am still here. Still in control and still powerful - or as some would say, king - in Lebanese politics."
It was a rude wake-up call to all those who imagined he would never go this far to bring his message to the region and the international community.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

Original article posted here.

The latest pretext for the next failed intervention in the Middle East

International alarm at Hezbollah "coup" in Beirut

By Andrew Roche

LONDON, May 9 (Reuters) - The takeover of the Muslim half of Beirut by Hezbollah triggered alarm in the Arab world and the West on Friday, and the embattled Lebanese government called it an armed coup by the Iranian and Syrian-backed group.

The U.S. government on Friday restated its "unswerving commitment and support" for the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Egypt and Saudi Arabia called on Arab foreign ministers to meet urgently.

In Lebanon's worst internal strife since the 1975-90 civil war, gunmen battled on Beirut's streets this week.

A deadlock between the Hezbollah-led opposition and Siniora's anti-Syrian cabinet, backed by Washington and its Arab allies, has paralysed the country and left it without a president since November 2007.

The White House said it was "very troubled" by Hezbollah's actions and urged Iran and Syria to halt their support for the Shi'ite militant group.

The European Union, Germany and France urged calm and a peaceful resolution.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would telephone Middle Eastern leaders to discuss the crisis, U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said.

"I would restate our unswerving commitment and support for the Siniora government," he said.

"They are doing all the right things ... Its use and deployment of the military serve the best interests of the Lebanese people and Lebanon."

McCormack told reporters he was "not aware of any contemplation" of deploying U.S. forces in the area.

He denounced Hezbollah as "armed gangs ... using violence and the threat of violence, to achieve some political end" which would only harm the Lebanese people.

McCormack said the United States had encouraged parties with influence on Syria and Iran to "tell them that they should use whatever leverage they have with Hezbollah, to tell them to pull back from these kinds of actions".



CRISIS TALKS URGED

Siniora's governing coalition pointed the finger clearly at Hezbollah's backers.

"The armed and bloody coup which is being implemented aims to return Syria to Lebanon and extend Iran's reach to the Mediterranean," it said in a statement read by Christian leader Samir Geagea.

Syria said the issue was an internal Lebanese affair while Iran blamed "the adventurist interferences" of the United States and Israel for the violence.

Saudi Arabia is a main backer of the Sunni-led government in Lebanon.

"Egypt and Saudi Arabia have applied for an immediate meeting of the council of foreign ministers of the Arab League member countries," Egyptian state news agency MENA quoted an Egyptian foreign ministry spokesman as saying.

"The meeting is expected within the coming two days," he added.

Israeli President Shimon Peres said Hezbollah was leading Lebanon "to the verge of a civil war".

"It has nothing to do with Israel. It's an internal split," Peres said. "It's a tragedy for them. It's a tragedy for all of us." Two years ago Israel went to war with Hezbollah after it captured two Israeli soldiers.

France offered to help warring factions meet for talks, Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said.

"We call on everyone, each party, each force, to immediately stop the fighting and return to dialogue. We demand the barricades be lifted and the airport reopened," he added.

France and Italy said they were preparing evacuation plans for their nationals in Lebanon. Britain, France and Slovenia issued warnings against travelling there.

Hassan Nasrallah on developments in Lebanon

Normal Finkelstein on Hezbollah and Lebanon: Bringing the truth as undiluted as possible. A must listen.

Hezbollah consolidates power in Lebanon, embarassing the Moron and his idiot Middle East policy

Surprise! We're not loved.

POLITICS: Attitudes Toward U.S. Worsen in Arab World

By Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Apr 14 (IPS) - Despite renewed U.S. efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement this year, popular views of the United States in the Arab world have actually worsened since 2006, according to a major new survey of public opinion in six Arab states.

Nearly two-thirds, or 64 percent, of more than 4,000 respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) said they held a "very unfavourable" attitude of the United States, up from 57 percent in late 2006, while 19 percent more said their views were "somewhat unfavourable" -- roughly comparable to the results of 17 months ago.

At the same time, support for Iran and its nuclear programme appears to have risen over the same period, according to the new survey, the sixth in a series designed by University of Maryland Prof. Shibley Telhami and carried out by Zogby International since 2002.

The poll found that two-thirds of the Arab public (67 percent) believes Tehran has the right to pursue its nuclear programme and that international pressure to freeze it should cease. That compares to 61 percent who took the same position in 2006.

Remarkably, nearly three out of four Saudi respondents said that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it would have "positive" influence on the region, while 51 percent of UAE respondents agreed. Pluralities in Morocco and Egypt took the same position, while pluralities of roughly one-third in Lebanon and Jordan said Tehran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon it would make no difference.

The new survey also found that fears regarding both U.S. and Israeli designs in the region have also increased over the past 17 months, despite the length of time that has passed since the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war which inflamed anti-Israeli and anti-western opinion throughout the region.

Asked to name two countries that, in their view, posed the "biggest threat" to them, a whopping 95 percent and 88 percent of respondents named Israel and the U.S., respectively. That compared to 85 percent and 72 percent, respectively, in late 2006.

By comparison, the sense of threat posed by Iran appears to have diminished over the same period. While 11 percent of Arab respondents named Iran as one of the two greatest threats in late 2006, only seven percent did so in the most recent survey.

The survey, which was conducted in all six countries last month, is certain to be greeted with considerable dismay here in the U.S. capital where policymakers had been cheered by some recent polling. One 23-nation survey released by BBC earlier this month suggested that Washington's image around the globe had bottomed out last year and that the greater emphasis the George W. Bush administration has placed on diplomacy, rather than war and military threats, during its second term, as well as reduced violence in Iraq, had begun to pay off, at least in public diplomacy terms.

But Telhami's "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll" is highly regarded among Arabist scholars and public opinion specialists here who note that its consistency of methodology and questions over an unusually long period of time has given it considerable credibility. Telhami, an expert on Arab media, holds the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and serves as a senior fellow at the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, a major think tank here.

The survey found that while views on some issues varied among the six countries, cynicism about U.S. motivations and policies was fairly consistent. Eighty percent said their views of the U.S. are formed more by U.S. "policies" than by U.S. "values" -- up from 70 percent who took that position in 2006.

Nearly two-thirds of respondents (65 percent) said they don't believe that democracy is a real objective in the region, while 20 percent said it is an important objective but Washington is going about it the wrong way.

A 36-percent plurality said they did not believe reports that violence in Iraq has been significantly reduced over the past year, while 31 percent said any reduction of violence that has been achieved has little to do with the "surge" of U.S. forces there and that, in any event, it was only a matter of time before violence increases. Only six percent of respondents said they believed the surge was working and would enhance the chances of a stable political settlement.

Asked what they believe would happen if the U.S. quickly withdrew its forces, 61 percent said Iraqis would find a way to bridge their differences -- up from 44 percent in 2006. Only 15 percent said civil war in Iraq would expand rapidly, down from 24 percent in 2006.

Respondents in Lebanon (88 percent), Jordan (87 percent), and Saudi Arabia (66 percent) were particularly optimistic that Iraqis would reach a peaceful settlement if the U.S. withdrew its forces quickly.

Overall, four out of five respondents said they believe that Iraqis are worse off as a result of the U.S. invasion. Only two percent said they believed that Iraqis were better off.

The survey found a sharp rise in the percentage of respondents, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who identified the Palestinian cause as among their three most important public issues. Eight-six percent of all respondents named Palestine in that context, up from 77 percent in 2006 and 69 percent in 2005.

At the same time, however, a growing majority was found to be increasingly pessimistic about prospects for a two-state solution based on Israel's 1967 borders. Fifty-five percent overall said they believe the collapse of prospects for such a solution will likely lead to a state of "intense conflict for years to come". Views on the conflict were especially pessimistic in Lebanon and Jordan.

Asked which U.S. presidential candidate would have the best chance to advance peace in the Middle East, Democratic Sen. Barack Obama gained the most backing with 18 percent, followed by Sen. Hillary Clinton (13 percent), and John McCain (4 percent). But 20 percent of respondents said they weren't following the U.S. elections, and a plurality of 32 percent said the policy will be the same regardless of who is elected.

Asked to identify which foreign leader they admired the most, respondents generally volunteered those most outspokenly defiant of Israel and the U.S. The most popular was Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallay, who was named by 26 percent of respondents, up from 14 percent 17 months ago. Second-ranked was Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad at 16 percent, up from just two percent in 2006.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came up third with 10 percent of respondents, up from four percent in 2006, while al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was cited by six percent of respondents, up from four percent. Al Qaeda also appeared to receive a somewhat more sympathetic response among respondents than in late 2006.

Asked what aspect of the group, if any, they sympathise with the most, one-third of respondents told interviewers then that they "do not sympathise at all with this organisation." Only 21 percent took that position in the latest poll.

Original article posted here.