Who are they trying to kill so fast with the poorly regulated expasion of deadly bioweapons labs?

Lawmakers Worry that Lab Expansion Poses Risks

Jocelyn Kaiser

A congressional committee last week took a hard look at the explosion of U.S. biodefense research since the 2001 anthrax attacks and concluded that the number of labs is growing without adequate oversight. At a 5-hour hearing, federal officials acknowledged gaps in monitoring safety at biocontainment labs. But although scientists agree there's a problem, they worry that hasty reforms could do more harm than good.

The hearing by the House Energy and Commerce Committee oversight and investigations subcommittee was held to examine the growth in biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) labs, which study deadly pathogens for which there is no treatment, as well as BSL-3 labs, which study less risky bugs (Science, 28 September, p. 1852). The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) alone has spent more than $1 billion in the past 5 years on new BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs.

Meanwhile, a spate of accidents is stirring concerns about safety, including an unreported infection and other violations at Texas A&M University in College Station that led federal officials to suspend its biodefense work in June. The Texas incident came to light only after public records requests by the Sunshine Project, an activist group in Austin, Texas. At the hearing, subcommittee chair Bart Stupak (D-MI) asked, "Are so many labs doing this research that you actually increase the chances of a catastrophic release of a deadly disease?"

According to an analysis presented at the hearing, the risks are rising. In a preliminary report, Keith Rhodes of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that by its count there are five existing BSL-4 labs and 10 more under construction or planned by various funders (including separate labs at the same institution). GAO was unable to tally BSL-3 labs, which could number in the thousands. These labs mean more new workers and more dangerous pathogens in labs, Rhodes noted. Without any central oversight, "I would say we are at greater risk" for accidents and misuse, he said, adding that the FBI and intelligence agencies told GAO investigators that they share those concerns.

Other federal officials acknowledged gaps in oversight of labs handling select agents, pathogens that could be used as bioweapons. A 2003 regulation requires that these labs register with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and undergo inspections. But inspectors apparently missed serious problems at Texas A&M in 2006. Richard Besser, director of CDC's terrorism preparedness office, conceded a need to improve what he calls a "young program." He said CDC now plans to conduct more indepth inspections, including unannounced visits. Besser also endorsed creating an accident-reporting system, like those run by NASA and the aviation industry, that would enable labs to share experiences without being punished.

To date, 105 possible exposures and losses have been reported to CDC under the existing rules. The oversight subcommittee last week disclosed details of those incidents, which included animal bites, needle sticks, and possible lost samples. Three releases were detected when five workers became ill from working with a select agent. None of the incidents posed a public health threat, Besser said. Another case involving two shipments of leaky vials of anthrax resulted in a $450,000 fine last month for the shipper, the Lawrence Livermore Berkeley Laboratory in California.

Another gap highlighted at the hearing is that, unless the work involves recombinant DNA, no agency oversees labs working on pathogens not on the select-agent list, such as SARS and dengue. NIAID Deputy Director Hugh Auchincloss Jr. said agencies plan to form an interagency task force to improve biosafety oversight.

Rhodes suggested that a single agency should oversee all BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs. But one lawmaker cautioned against stifling research. Michael Burgess (R-TX) noted the research community's success at identifying the SARS coronavirus and stopping its spread in 2003. "I don't want to see us do anything that would rob us of that ability," he said. That concern is shared by the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) in Washington, D.C. "We need to be careful that whatever legislation emerges doesn't create such a burden that it actually interferes with public health measures and research," says ASM's public affairs director Janet Shoemaker.

The panel expects to hold more hearings on similar labs in other countries, and on the implications of closing the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located off Long Island, New York, the U.S. laboratory where the most dangerous animal pathogens are studied.

Original article posted here.