Israeli Nuclear Strike On Iran Turned Back
By William Thomas
Jan 18th 2007
www.willthomas.net exclusive | 4,980 words
A recent strike by nuclear-armed Israeli Air Force fighter-bombers bound for targets in Iran was turned back after being intercepted by U.S. fighters over Iraq, this reporter has learned.
Two sources have independently confirmed the encounter, which took place on January 7, 2007. Though the first informant offered few details beyond an initial tip, a second source long-known by this reporter to have well-placed U.S. and “non-U.S.” military and government contacts provided specific information regarding the raid, which was aimed at the radical religious ayatollahs holding ultimate power in Iran.
Israeli nuclear strikes are not unprecedented. Soon after Desert Storm, U.S. Navy pilots told this reporter in Kuwait how in late 1990 Israel made good on its pledge to respond in kind to WMD attacks by launching nuclear-armed aircraft against Baghdad following a lethal assault on Tel Aviv by Scud missiles tipped with chemical warheads. That air strike was called off when the Americans refused to provide the vital IFF codes needed to fly through U.S.-controlled airspace.
When questioned concerning the “Identification Friend or Foe” transponder codes needed to overfly Iraq today, this source said that allied Israeli aircraft are routinely provided “squawk codes” when flying missions aimed at acquiring the characteristics of air defence radars triggered by their approach to Syrian, Jordanian, Iranian and U.S.-controlled Iraqi airspace.
This source added that visiting IAF warplanes are routinely “topped off” by American aerial refueling tankers, but only on condition that the Israeli jets fly a “racetrack” holding pattern—and do not continue “downtown” toward Iran.
The designated turn back point is the “160 station”—a clearly charted tapline road located 160 kilometers from Baghdad. Any aircraft proceeding beyond this point must declare its intentions. Otherwise, a USAF F-15 will take position off its wingtip. After waggling its own wings to attract attention, if the interloper fails to turn back, the American Eagle “drops behind and gets tone” by locking a Sidewinder anti-aircraft missile onto the offending plane.
According to this very reliable source, on two previous occasions Israeli fighter-bombers armed with nuclear bombs have headed “downtown” before being turned back over Iraq.
The January 7th mission, which trespassed beyond 160 station before being recalled by Israeli authorities, comprised three IAF F-16s. Each carried conventional munitions—as well as a single 20-kiloton nuclear bomb.
The atomic detonation that razed the city of Hiroshima and killed 140,000 people outright was a 13-kiloton blast. [Agence France-Presse Aug 6/05]
Hiroshima Atomic Bomb DEADLY DEFENCES
This report of an attempted nuclear strike contradicts military analysts who have long maintained that Israel would deploy as many as 25 I-model F-15 fighter-bombers from the 69th Squadron based at Hatzerim Air Base in the northern Negev, about 50 miles south of Tel Aviv. Any Israeli Air Force attack, it is believed, must first suppress Iranian air defenses, while ensuring that enough conventionally-armed F-15s get through to set back that country’s widely dispersed nuclear program for many years.
The latest model F-15 can carry as much ordnance as a neighborhood-flattening World War II B-17 heavy bomber. As the independent think tank Strategic Forecasting points out, the IAF “has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to conduct long-range strikes”—including the 1976 raid on Entebbe, 2,600 miles from Israel, and a 1985 attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunis, 1,500 miles away. [www.stratfor.com]
But Iran’s air defenses are far more formidable than any the Israeli Air Force has yet faced. Manufactured at the KBM factory near Moscow, Russian-supplied SA-18 Igla-S mobile missile batteries are said to be highly effective against low-flying jets. According to Russian intelligence sources known as DEBKA, the Igla’s mobility “makes them difficult to target and limits the maneuverability of Israeli planes.”
DEBKA has also revealed that Russian advisers from the Raduga OKB engineering group based in Dubna near Moscow have completed installing two advanced radar systems around the Bushehr nuclear reactor on the Persian Gulf. Codenamed “Tin Shield”, the mobile 36D6 systems are modified to protect Iran’s Russian-supplied nuclear facilities from American or Israeli aircraft, stand-off missiles, and cruise missile attacks. On January 12, 2006, Tin Shields also went operational around the uranium enrichment plants at Isfahan in central Iran.
Israeli JetsOther air defenses supplied by Moscow to Syria—and most likely Iran—include advanced mobile SS-26 Iskander-E surface to surface missiles carrying a 1,000-pound multiple warhead capable of dodging air defense radars and electronic jamming, as well as surface-to-air SA-10 “Grumble” missiles capable of engaging several targets simultaneously at various altitudes, and SA-18 “Grouse” shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles fitted with a 4.5-pound high-explosive warhead. The SA-18 has a maximum range of 5.2 kilometers and a maximum altitude of 3.5 kilometers.
Another major worry for Israeli pilots is Iran’s first satellite. Carried into orbit by a Russian booster in October 2005, the Sinah-1 can provide a “look down” capability to spot low-flying aircraft long before they intrude Iranian airspace.
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant“The Iranians’ space programme is a matter of deep concern to us,” said an Israeli defence source at the time. “If and when we launch an attack on several Iranian targets, the last thing we need is Iranian early warning received by satellite.”
Moscow has also supplied an estimated $1 billion worth of advanced Tor-M1 anti-missile systems capable of destroying guided missiles and laser-guided bombs dropped from high-flying aircraft. “Once the Iranians get the Tor-M1, it will make our life much more difficult,” worried an Israeli air force source. “We can’t waste time on this one.” [www.envirosagainstwar.org; Sunday Times Dec 11/05; WorldNetDaily.com Dec 11/05]
OSIRIK, THE SEQUEL
According to DEBKA, Moscow intends to secure its investment at Bushehr “against the fate of the Saddam Hussein’s French-built Tamuz nuclear center, which the Israeli air force bombed out existence 24 years ago.”
Fitted with modified drop tanks to extend their range, a trio of smaller, more agile F-16s presents a much more difficult challenge to Iran’s defenders than a larger force of twin-engine F-15s. Renowned for their ability to “tweak” American-supplied weapons, the Israelis have, according to my inside source, managed to reduce the F-16’s radar profile “to the size of a kid’s tricycle.”
As he described it, “We fuel ‘em up and they go off the reservation, hit afterburners, hit the deck, and vanish...”
Demonstrating his insider knowledge, he further noted that the Israelis have modified the original drop tanks supplied by the Americans to simultaneously feed the F-16’s single engine, thereby avoiding the fuel management distractions required to keep the fighter in balance using the one-tank-at-a-time U.S. system.
Also unlike their USAF counterparts, Israeli F-16s can simultaneously jettison their spent underwing fuel tanks without the risk of a tumbling drop tank striking live ordnance suspended under the fighter’s wings.
ONE-WAY MISSION
But even fitted with drop-tanks, unless assisted by USAF tankers or allowed to land in Iraq, low-flying F-16’s will burn too much fuel to return. Unless they receive a message in flight to turn back, this source said, Israeli pilots “have already been told before they get into the plane they are not coming back.” He added that volunteer pilots are prepared to fly their nuclear bombs “into their targets” if necessary.
On January 7, after crossing into Iranian airspace, the three ground-hugging nuclear-armed Israeli F-16s would have turned north. Using conventional munitions, the jets would have attacked the 3rd Tactical Air Base at Hamadan to preclude pursuit by the obsolete Iranian air force F-4s stationed there.
Because the small Israeli strike force was expected to be flying a one-way mission, more modern Iranian F-5s and MiG-29s based at the 2nd Tactical Air Base at Tabriz would not have presented a problem on egress. [www.stratfor.com]
This source further stated that the crowded Iranian capitol and the “huge” Revolutionary Guard training facility at Hamadan are “defined targets.” He added that Hamadan is also the Revolutionary Guard’s “central depository for WMD.”
IRAN’S WMD
Late in 1990, as a Desert Storm gathered on Iraq’s western border, a convoy of six blacked out transport trucks departed a heavily guarded al-Jesira factory loading dock just outside Mosul. The vehicles included a 1983 red and white Scania transport van, a 1985 Scania with white cab and red box, an orange 1975 MAC truck, an orange 1986 Scania, a brown and white Volvo truck of unknown vintage, and another Scania transport sporting an orange cab and red box.
Already targeted by allied war planners, the al-Jesira Factory produced the uranium hexaflouride used in the difficult technical task of turning low-grade uranium into highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.
License plates obscured with mud, and traveling only at night, the trucks drove south to a second loading stop in Baghdad, before turning east into Iran. According to a declassified U.S. military intelligence report, the containers sent to Shiite Teheran by Saddam’s dissident Shiite generals were clearly labeled: “Tularemia,” “Anthrax,” “Botulinum” and “Plague”.
Their gift package also included an advanced Hewlett Packard computer, and a Linatron X-ray machine marked “pbg”. Both were shipped from Iraq’s nuclear weapons facility at Mosul, along with sealed containers of uranium hexafluoride. Details of these WMD transfers were contained in a September 30, 2004 U.S. Department of Defence intelligence report widely distributed among U.S. government and military leaders: Filename:22010744.91r, PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 11224; SUBJ: TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) MATERIEL DURING DESERT STORM [original text: www.gulfwarvets.com/gulflink/95071920.txt]
DECAPITATION
Also contradicting military aviation experts and IAF cover stories, this source revealed that the intended targets on July 7th were not aimed at turning Iran’s five heavily defended nuclear reactors into as many Chernobyls. Nor could the Israeli attackers expect to hit Iran’s hundreds of widely dispersed nuclear research facilities. Instead, the January 7 mission objective was to pre-empt Teheran’s ability to attack Israel by eliminating Iran’s “Command and Control”—the religious leadership holding the “go codes” required to launch an Iranian attack on Israel.
“This cuts off the head of the snake and makes response impossible,” my source said. “Decapitating” the country’s top leaders is possible, he went on, because they tend to feel safer by congregating. “Iranians are so untrusting of the communications networks and methodologies most other people use, they don’t use the Internet,” he asserted. “They use the ‘sneaker net’ to walk the message over.”
nuclear air burstAccording to a London newspaper, a “massive” Israeli intelligence operation has been underway in Iran since that country was designated the “top priority for 2005.” [Sunday Times Dec 11/05]
But my source described “years” of insertions of Israeli agents into Iran. Besides locating that country’s underground nuclear installations, Israeli “moles” are principally charged with “pinpointing individuals that would have to be taken out,” he said. “To assure that the government is nonfunctional, you have to go at least 10 people back” from Iran’s top religious and political leaders.
“ It’s like a fatwa,” he continued. Acting as “target designators,” Israeli agents equipped with miniaturized homing beacons “stay glued” to Iranian leaders.” Because Iran’s religious and civil leadership often holds meetings on trains, a single well-timed Israeli strike “can take them all out,” he affirmed. “Going downtown, goin’ for the black robes, they have on the ground confirmation.”
Unlike a conventional high-explosive bomb, detonation of a hydrogen bomb ensures “success” in aborting a perceived Iranian attack by frying that all of that country’s computers, phones, radio and other electronic equipment in a massive Electromagnetic Pulse. Because Iranian military electronics are not “hardened” against EMP, and because Iranian war-fighting doctrine stipulates that commanders “use everything they have and hold nothing in reserve,” this source pointed out that if an Israeli air raid is suspected, “all their stuff will be lit up.” As a consequence, after an EMP from an atomic air burst, “Everything on will now be permanently off.”
So will everyone caught in the initial blast wave and firestorm extending more than a dozen miles from the mushrooming blast’s epicenter, as well as all those caught in the radioactive fallout that follows. Ensuring regional radiation sickness, the sharkay day wind blows from NW to SE over Iran and surrounding countries, before shifting 180 degrees during the nighttime shamal.
CROSSING THE RED LINE
With Iranian missiles able to hit Tel Aviv and the Israeli nuclear plant and atom bomb dump at Dimona, and major powers pledged to Teheran’s defense, how Israel and the world expects to escape the moral, military and political consequences of another Hiroshima was not explained.
According to my informant, the three “warning” nuclear strikes launched against Iran and aborted by Israel came in response to threatening military moves that accompanied belligerent public statements by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
“When they start to deploy, you decapitate so they can’t issue a go order,” he said. “What would you do if your country was as small and vulnerable as Florida? If someone keeps saying they are going to punch you in the face, and then they start to get up out of their chair, what are you going to do? When it’s the survival of your family, the survival of your [race], there are no rules.”
Though this source would not confirm the other two dates, one Israeli nuclear strike might have been launched shortly after December 14, 2005, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the Holocaust a “myth” and suggested that Israel’s Jews be relocated to Europe or Alaska.
Dubbing Ahmadinejad, “Admin-job”, this source dismissingly described the Iranian President’s role as “tech support” for the radical ayatollahs, whose national constitution calls for unremitting terror attacks against Israel and the United States—despite near unanimous opposition by Iran’s predominantly younger demographic.
Because Ahmadinejad “does what the black robes tell him,” the Iranian president’s pre-approved public utterances are taken seriously by Israelis, who reportedly became alarmed just prior to
January 7 when the Iranian political leader made a short radio statement to his nation saying that a “consolidated” response was required to Bush “and the Zionists”. That the Iranian president issued his address over more publicly accessible shortwave radio, instead of making his usual televised announcement was apparently considered especially menacing by Israeli intelligence.
Likening Israel to a tiny white desert scorpion that is “utterly fearless” in its own defense, this source emphasized that its leaders are “more than deadly serious” in defending their UN-imposed homeland. Determining the point where Iran becomes “a mortal threat” to Israel’s security by crossing the so-called red line “is a minute by minute decision,” he said.
That red line was said to be breached in March 2006, when an Israeli army assessment warned that Iran was capable of enriching enough uranium to start producing nuclear weapons within three years. The previous December, Israeli President Ariel Sharon had declared, “Israel—and not only Israel—cannot accept a nuclear Iran. We have the ability to deal with this, and we’re making all the necessary preparations to be ready for such a situation.” [www.stratfor.com]
Israel’s military intelligence chief Aharon Zeevi Farkash also warned the Knesset, “If by the end of March the international community is unable to refer the Iranian issue to the United Nations Security Council, then we can say the international effort has run its course.” [www.envirosagainstwar.org; Sunday Times Dec 11/05; WorldNetDaily.com Dec 11/05]
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