Iran's Ahmadinejad perhaps on the ropes

The two 'kings' of Iran

By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - There is an old Arab saying that two kings - or heroes - cannot live in one room.

Well, there appear to be more than two "kings" in Iran. The obvious one - who ironically is seemingly least in control - is President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The second is the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

Both "kings", however, are members of the same radical establishment, the "hawks" of Iranian politics. The other group of "kings" is headed by the so-called pragmatists, led by ex-president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who now heads the Expediency Council, and former reformist president Mohammad Khatami. Fate - and Ahmadinejad's policies - brought the two former presidents, who traditionally represent opposite ends of the political spectrum, into alliance. They are the "doves" of Iran.

Riding the wave of the hostage crisis
One of the signs that the Iranian president is not as powerful as the world believes he is can be found in the crisis over the 15 British sailors and marines taken hostage by Iran, and then freed by Ahmadinejad, in March-April.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) engineered their capture, under orders from the president, claiming that they had ventured into Iranian waters. Ahmadinejad needed the crisis for a variety of reasons. First, it would be great for local consumption and boost his image in the eyes of ordinary Iranians. Second, it would serve as a reality check for the West, showing Washington and London that he was a man who lived up to his word and should be taken seriously when he challenges the superpowers.

Third, Ahmadinejad may have wanted to strike a deal with the United States through Britain: we free the sailors, you lift the sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program. A formula along these lines, which included suspension of Iran's nuclear program, was even being discussed with Iranian leaders at the United Nations.

So the IRGC went ahead with the arrest of the British, having no clue how the rest of Iran - and the world - would react. One immediate indicator was that the Iranian press did not mention the crisis until it was leaked by the British, and even then tried to play down the event in the hope of minimizing the damage caused by the IRGC.

This clearly shows that not everybody agreed with the president - and certainly not everybody wanted to use the crisis to boost Ahmadinejad's image in the Iranian street. The Iranian newspaper Aftab e Yazd wrote: "If we wanted, as the president says, to pardon them while we had the authority to try them, why did we not release them before [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair's ultimatum or three days after it?"

This is where other power brokers came into play to overshadow the Iranian president. They included reformers such as Khatami and Rafsanjani, and hardliners who nevertheless see Ahmadinejad's bravado as childish adventurism.

Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme Council on National Security, said that the captives would not be tried and that the crisis would be resolved peacefully. An ally of Khamenei, Larijani was right, and the hostages were released.

Although Khamenei made no comment, it is believed that he was categorically opposed to the staged arrest and the decision may have been made without his knowledge. But an even more important decision - setting them free - needed his approval. It could not have been done without Khamenei and it is his constitutional right as Supreme Leader to issue pardons and to overrule any decision taken by the president.

Denis Ross, a veteran US diplomat in charge of Middle East affairs under the Bill Clinton administration, argued, "Khamenei ordered the sailors released but allowed Ahmadinejad to do it - giving him a platform to weave his own public story and to bestow medals upon the IRGC soldiers who seized the sailors."

He argued that the pragmatists in Iran, who opposed the hostage crisis from Day 1, are the officials that the US must engage to get Tehran to suspend its nuclear program. They are the ones, he believes, who can be talked to because they see more danger than benefit in the continuation of Ahmadinejad's defiant attitude toward the Western world. He said, "It may not be easy to stop or suspend the program, but if we could convince those who agreed to cut Iran's losses on the British sailors that Iran's interests can be served better by abandoning their nuclear efforts, it's not impossible."

But if Khamenei was so upset by the hostage crisis, why did he let Ahmadinejad get full honors and publicity for their release? The reason, simply, is that Iran's leaders do not like to show the world that they are in disagreement - even if they are.

They want the Islamic Republic to project unity, given its standoff with the international community and the United States. They may bicker among themselves, and even try to eliminate each other politically in internal politics, but they will seldom come out and publicly let the US gloat at their differences.

It is very un-Iranian (at least since the revolution of 1979) to flash internal disputes before the outside world. Within Iran, however, there is increasing talk about a complete divide between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.

Originally, the grand ayatollah supported Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of 2005, explaining why and how he managed to defeat the veteran and well-established Rafsanjani (whom Khamenei then dreaded). The grand ayatollah could control a nobody like Ahmadinejad, while it was very difficult to control someone like Rafsanjani.

A change at the top?
That control today, two years later, has almost snapped, although Ahmadinejad has never - at least not in public - challenged Khamenei. Some in Iran are even starting to discuss replacements for the president, saying that early elections may be on the horizon and that Ahmadinejad may not even complete his term, which ends in 2009 (ironically the same year as President George W Bush's).

Ahmadinejad promised much in 2005 and has been unable to deliver. He promised a share of the country's oil with ordinary Iranians, more bread on their tables and more jobs. The Iranian economy is still under sanctions from the US, inflation is high, and so is unemployment. Disappointment, frustration, fear and animosity from power centers in Iran all combine to make the president's days look numbered. The threat of a US military strike on Iran aggravates the situation.

People being touted as possible presidential challengers and who are already campaigning include: Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign minister under Rafsanjani; Mahmud Nahavandian, a US-educated economist and national-security adviser; Mohammad Reza Aref, a vice president to Khatami who holds a degree from Stanford University in the US; and Mohammad Ali Najafi, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-educated mathematician who was minister of education under Rafsanjani. And Ahmadinejad is certain to go for another term.

The Rafsanjani-supported candidates can be expected to be vetoed by Khamenei, as he and the Guardian Council can veto any candidate and even propose alternatives. This happened with Ahmadinejad in 2005.

Velayati, though, is close to both Rafsanjani and Khamenei. At 62, the veteran statesman with a pediatrics degree from Johns Hopkins University served for 17 years as foreign minister.

In 1981, when Khamenei was president, he wanted to appoint Velayati as prime minister, but the decision was overruled by the Majlis (parliament). Velayati wanted to run in the presidential elections in 2005 (and had a good chance of winning) but backed out at the last minute when it became clear that Rafsanjani was running.

A week ago it was rumored that Khamenei wanted to appoint Velayati vice president, to replace the smart but colorless and neutral economist, Parviz Dawoodi. The story was even published in the Saudi daily Al-Hayat, showing that it was serious talk coming out of Tehran.

Had that happened, it would have meant challenging the powers of Ahmadinejad. Recently, Velayati was quoted as saying that suspending uranium enrichment was not a red line for the Islamic Republic, something that has been echoed by Rafsanjani. This is in sharp contrast to what Ahmadinejad has been saying for many months, that no matter what happened, Iran would not give up its right to uranium enrichment.

Several senior Iranian officials are even considering exit strategies from the corner in which Ahmadinejad has painted them over the country's nuclear program. These include solutions put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mohammad ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The first calls for complete suspension, which is what it will take to start negotiations between the US and Iran, while the latter calls for the suspension of activity but allows a face-saving operation of a handful of centrifuges.

It would be wrong to assume that the hardliners in Iran are few in number, given the increasing influence of Rafsanjani and other reformers. On the contrary, they are on the rise, thanks to the president.

In recent weeks, in what is probably an attempt to cover up for his failures in other matters, Ahmadinejad authorized a massive crackdown on students and young Iranians wearing "un-Islamic" clothes. Hundreds of women wearing short coats, tight shirts and tilted headscarves that showed some hair were hauled into police stations, resulting in a demonstration by more than 2,000 students from Shiraz University.

Immediately, Ayatollah Mahmud Hashemi Shahroudi, the head of the Iranian judiciary, warned the police that the arrests must stop because "they will backfire and have counterproductive effects". He added that the only result of such needless arrests would be "damage to society".

The pro-reform newspaper E'temad Melli carried an article by a female journalist addressed to Ahmadinejad saying: "Are our people's major problems of injustice and poverty ... being resolved?" She reminded him that during his election campaign in 2005 he had promised to fight poverty, create jobs and implement justice.

Another reform columnist, Masoud Behnoud, asked: "Has the government solved all problems, unemployment, inflation, soaring prices, corruption, housing shortage, etc to center its attention on women's dress?"

In reality there is a lot of tension in Iran and a great battle to balance power between the "doves" and "hawks". And Khamenei, while only 68, is known to be very ill, so his succession has to be taken into account. This heightens the importance of the struggle between Ahmadinejad on the one side, Khatami and Rafsanjani on another, and pro-Khamenei people such as Velayati and Larijani on the fringes.

The Ahmadinejad group is powerful, but certainly not as much as it was when it was backed wholeheartedly by the grand ayatollah in 2005. The Khatami reformist wing is weak, but popular in the West, explaining why it needs to be allied with a powerful Iranian heavyweight, who is both a leader in business and politics, such as Rafsanjani. The two men, along with former Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi, who heads the reformist National Confidence Party, form a troika that Ahmadinejad is having a hard time penetrating - or even becoming a part of.

A figure allied to this troika to watch is Sadeq Kharrazi, former ambassador to France and ex-negotiator in Iran's nuclear portfolio. Kharrazi is a pragmatic man who once conducted secret talks with the Americans in Cyprus, during the Khatami years, arranged by Rafsanjani. The clout of this group, especially after Khatami's recent visit to the United States and Britain, is increasing.

But an event that took place last week signals trouble for the "doves" and suggests that Ahmadinejad might not be as isolated as some would have it. Iranian secret police arrested Mohammad Husayn Moussavian on May 1 on charges of espionage and passing on sensitive information to foreign countries. Moussavian had been ambassador to Moscow and Berlin and was a top official in the nuclear portfolio during the Khatami presidency and is a close friend of Rafsanjani. The Iran Press Service quoted a "well-informed source" as saying: "The arrest of Mr Moussavian is a direct attack on Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani. At the same time, no authority could dare to take this decision without the prior authorization of Mr Khamenei."

What does this mean? Does it mean that at certain intervals, when it comes to challenging Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei can work together? The arrest of Moussavian would indicate this. But the minute this common threat is eliminated - or silenced - then the two "kings" will start working to undermine each other.

For now, Ahmadinejad is the weaker as he cannot - and will not - come out to challenge the grand ayatollah openly. This could change overnight, though, should Khamenei die or become incapacitated. Then it will be open season in Iran, and the world might get to see some dirty laundry at last.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

Original article posted here.