Moscow: 'Georgia used foreign soldiers'
Russia's top investigator claims to have evidence that citizens from Nato member states including the US and Turkey fought for Georgia in the five-day war in August.
Asked to list the nationalities of the foreign fighters it believes were involved, Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Prosecutor-General's investigative committee said: "America, the Czech Republic, Chechnya, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Turkey."
"There were also two snipers - one from Ukraine and I believe a Latvian woman" - Alexander Bastrykin"It was a fairly small number of people. They mainly fulfilled support roles", Mr Bastrykin told reporters in Russia's second city of St Petersburg.
Suggesting that some had conducted training for the Georgian armed forces, he said: "There were also two snipers - one from Ukraine and I believe a Latvian woman."
He added that he considered the presence of foreign fighters a criminal offence and would raise the issue at a meeting with representatives of Interpol.
A senior security official in Tbilisi dismissed the statement and said by law only Georgian nationals could serve in the country's armed forces.
Kakha Lomaia, the Secretary of Georgia's National Security Council, said: "The statement that almost half of the world was fighting in our army in August is just a fantasy of those in the Russian leadership who would like to justify killings of the peaceful population."
Russia launched a massive counter-offensive on land and sea in August after Georgian forces tried to retake South Ossetia, a Moscow-backed separatist region that rejects Tbilisi's rule.
Original article posted here.
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Maybe be wishful thinking or propaganda, but I thought it was good news so posted. Caveat emptor: I wouldn't rely on its prognostication.
End of Saakashvili rule is near - Georgian opposition leader
TBILISI. Nov 25 (Interfax) - Georgian opposition leader Giorgy
Khaindrava believes Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is losing
popularity, but is doing everything to retain power.
"Saakashvili realizes that his days [as president] are numbered,
and he is doing everything to hold on to power to ensure his security,"
Khaindrava told Interfax on Tuesday.
"After the August catastrophe," Saakashvili is "a political corpse"
and "is unlikely to stay in power before the end of his second (and
last) presidential term," said Khaindrava.
"What is dangerous in Georgia now is not so much Saakashvili, but
the criminal group that has usurped power and that can create a lot more
problems," he said.
"We have more than once warned Western politicians that the coming
to power of Saakashvili and people close to him is dangerous not only
for Georgia, but nobody listened to the Georgian opposition. Now the
West is probably reconsidering its attitude to Saakashvili because he
was the catalyst of the aggravation of relations between the West and
Russia," said Khaindrava.
Khaindrava did not rule out that the situation in Georgia may
seriously aggravate in the next few months as a result of the August
events and the world crisis and that "Saakashvili and the Georgian
opposition will no longer be able to control it and people will take to
the streets."
When asked how pragmatic it would be for the Georgian opposition to
come to power in this situation, Khaindrava said: "There will be no
other way out, because otherwise Georgia will face a humanitarian
catastrophe."
"After the August events, Georgia virtually lost its statehood and
its fate is now being decided in the capitals of other countries, but it
cannot go on like this," he said.
Khaindrava accused the Russian authorities of "aggression and
occupation of Georgia." "Russia's imperialist policy is interested in
chaos in Georgia, and a second occupation stage is possible to maintain
it," he said, adding that the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity
and the return of Abkhazia and South Ossetia "will not be taken off the
agenda under any circumstances" if the Georgian opposition comes to
power in Georgia.
Commenting on the November 23 attack on the cars carrying the
presidents of Georgia and Poland, Khaindrava called this incident "a
prank by Saakashvili and [Polish President Lech] Kaczynski, who have
long lost the trust of their people in their countries."
Original article posted here.
TBILISI. Nov 25 (Interfax) - Georgian opposition leader Giorgy
Khaindrava believes Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is losing
popularity, but is doing everything to retain power.
"Saakashvili realizes that his days [as president] are numbered,
and he is doing everything to hold on to power to ensure his security,"
Khaindrava told Interfax on Tuesday.
"After the August catastrophe," Saakashvili is "a political corpse"
and "is unlikely to stay in power before the end of his second (and
last) presidential term," said Khaindrava.
"What is dangerous in Georgia now is not so much Saakashvili, but
the criminal group that has usurped power and that can create a lot more
problems," he said.
"We have more than once warned Western politicians that the coming
to power of Saakashvili and people close to him is dangerous not only
for Georgia, but nobody listened to the Georgian opposition. Now the
West is probably reconsidering its attitude to Saakashvili because he
was the catalyst of the aggravation of relations between the West and
Russia," said Khaindrava.
Khaindrava did not rule out that the situation in Georgia may
seriously aggravate in the next few months as a result of the August
events and the world crisis and that "Saakashvili and the Georgian
opposition will no longer be able to control it and people will take to
the streets."
When asked how pragmatic it would be for the Georgian opposition to
come to power in this situation, Khaindrava said: "There will be no
other way out, because otherwise Georgia will face a humanitarian
catastrophe."
"After the August events, Georgia virtually lost its statehood and
its fate is now being decided in the capitals of other countries, but it
cannot go on like this," he said.
Khaindrava accused the Russian authorities of "aggression and
occupation of Georgia." "Russia's imperialist policy is interested in
chaos in Georgia, and a second occupation stage is possible to maintain
it," he said, adding that the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity
and the return of Abkhazia and South Ossetia "will not be taken off the
agenda under any circumstances" if the Georgian opposition comes to
power in Georgia.
Commenting on the November 23 attack on the cars carrying the
presidents of Georgia and Poland, Khaindrava called this incident "a
prank by Saakashvili and [Polish President Lech] Kaczynski, who have
long lost the trust of their people in their countries."
Original article posted here.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Looks like there would be a down side for Obama not negotiating . . . (Hint: Get rid of the Polish and Czech missiles)
Belarus President Seeks to Deploy Russia Missiles
By ALAN CULLISON
MINSK, Belarus -- President Alexander Lukashenko is in talks with Moscow about placing in Belarus advanced Iskander missiles that could hit targets deep inside Europe.
President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, left, who met Oct. 26 near Moscow with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, says that Belarus would like to deploy missiles even if it doesn't reach an agreement with Moscow.
The talks raise the ante in the debate over a U.S. plan to deploy missile defense in Europe. They also complicate Western hopes for warmer ties with Belarus, which some in the U.S. and Europe hope could help to counterbalance an increasingly hostile Kremlin.
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Lukashenko said that he would like to see closer relations with the West but that he sympathizes with Russia on two flashpoints that have rocked relations -- the conflict in Georgia and U.S. plans to place antimissile systems in Europe to counter a potential threat from Iran.
Mr. Lukashenko said he "absolutely supports" Russia's plans to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad that would target the U.S. missile system. Kaliningrad is a Russian enclave in Europe that borders NATO members Poland and Lithuania, and missiles there could reach the proposed U.S. missile sites in Poland.
Mr. Lukashenko said Russia also had proposed putting Iskander missiles in Belarus, which is situated between Russia and Poland. And if a deal on the issue isn't reached, Belarus itself would like to deploy the missiles, he said.
"Even if Russia does not offer these promising missiles, we will purchase them ourselves," said Mr. Lukashenko, who said the technology for the Iskander optics and fire-control systems comes from Belarus. "Right now we do not have the funds, but it is part of our plans -- I am giving away a secret here -- to have such weapons."
Analysts said it is far from clear that Russia would really need to place missiles inside Belarus. The Kremlin has offered to give up its Kaliningrad plans if Washington drops its missile-defense system. Mr. Lukashenko's missile ambitions also could be a bargaining chip in his maneuvering between Russia and the West.
Though closely allied with and heavily dependent on Moscow, Mr. Lukashenko, a former collective-farm boss who has kept a tight grip on Belarus since he was elected president 14 years ago, has resisted the Kremlin's embrace.
But financial necessity may be tugging harder at Minsk than before. On Wednesday, Russia announced that it agreed to grant Belarus a $2 billion stabilization loan to shore up the government's finances, which have been strained by the credit crisis.
Under loan terms, Belarus agreed to pay for future oil and gas debts in rubles, a major priority of the Kremlin, which has sought to expand the use of the Russian currency beyond its borders.
Advisers to Mr. Lukashenko said he has lately put out feelers to improve relations with the U.S. and Europe, which slapped his government with sanctions in 2006 after he was accused of rigging his re-election. Sanctions were eased this year, after Mr. Lukashenko ordered the release of some political prisoners.
Like other leaders of former Soviet states, he has resisted Moscow pressure to side with the Kremlin in its conflict with Georgia by recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. So far the only countries to confer recognition are Russia and Nicaragua.
But he signaled he may tip toward Moscow on the issue and echoed Russia's argument that the West paved the way for the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions by recognizing Kosovo.
Original article posted here.
Lukashenko, in His Own Words
Below, excerpts from Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko's interview with The Wall Street Journal Tuesday. The interview was conducted in Russian, and translated by the Journal.
On the release of political opponent Alexander Kozulin earlier this year:
"The West perceived this as some kind of step toward democracy. You are welcome, thank you very much. You know, strictly between us, sometimes I think if they could find five or six more political prisoners here and told us to free them, and that then perhaps we would make a few more steps forward, we would do it readily. We could free even more. But they haven't found any more."
On the possibility of recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia:
"If you [the West] recognized Kosovo, why not recognize Abkhazia? I don't see any problems here. There is a precedent[hellip] Europe and America understand our position and our situation. And I will be honest, they are no longer pushing it as rigidly with us as before. So I don't think there would be negative repercussions for our relations or the like. I think this question is finished. It is no longer as acute as it was two months ago."
On the financial crisis:
"And I warned the Americans and others. No one listened to me. As it turned out, I was right. Now in America they are talking about an alternative to this ultraliberal market system, where everything is allowed, where you can eat more than what you make, and spend more than what you earn."
On Barack Obama:
"I look at Obama, a young man, a good-looking person. That is my first impression, I feel sorry for him. He looks 100% like Lukashenko, when I came to power after the downfall of the Soviet Union. The store shelves were empty, a severe financial crisis."
By ALAN CULLISON
MINSK, Belarus -- President Alexander Lukashenko is in talks with Moscow about placing in Belarus advanced Iskander missiles that could hit targets deep inside Europe.
President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, left, who met Oct. 26 near Moscow with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, says that Belarus would like to deploy missiles even if it doesn't reach an agreement with Moscow.
The talks raise the ante in the debate over a U.S. plan to deploy missile defense in Europe. They also complicate Western hopes for warmer ties with Belarus, which some in the U.S. and Europe hope could help to counterbalance an increasingly hostile Kremlin.
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Lukashenko said that he would like to see closer relations with the West but that he sympathizes with Russia on two flashpoints that have rocked relations -- the conflict in Georgia and U.S. plans to place antimissile systems in Europe to counter a potential threat from Iran.
Mr. Lukashenko said he "absolutely supports" Russia's plans to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad that would target the U.S. missile system. Kaliningrad is a Russian enclave in Europe that borders NATO members Poland and Lithuania, and missiles there could reach the proposed U.S. missile sites in Poland.
Mr. Lukashenko said Russia also had proposed putting Iskander missiles in Belarus, which is situated between Russia and Poland. And if a deal on the issue isn't reached, Belarus itself would like to deploy the missiles, he said.
"Even if Russia does not offer these promising missiles, we will purchase them ourselves," said Mr. Lukashenko, who said the technology for the Iskander optics and fire-control systems comes from Belarus. "Right now we do not have the funds, but it is part of our plans -- I am giving away a secret here -- to have such weapons."
Analysts said it is far from clear that Russia would really need to place missiles inside Belarus. The Kremlin has offered to give up its Kaliningrad plans if Washington drops its missile-defense system. Mr. Lukashenko's missile ambitions also could be a bargaining chip in his maneuvering between Russia and the West.
Though closely allied with and heavily dependent on Moscow, Mr. Lukashenko, a former collective-farm boss who has kept a tight grip on Belarus since he was elected president 14 years ago, has resisted the Kremlin's embrace.
But financial necessity may be tugging harder at Minsk than before. On Wednesday, Russia announced that it agreed to grant Belarus a $2 billion stabilization loan to shore up the government's finances, which have been strained by the credit crisis.
Under loan terms, Belarus agreed to pay for future oil and gas debts in rubles, a major priority of the Kremlin, which has sought to expand the use of the Russian currency beyond its borders.
Advisers to Mr. Lukashenko said he has lately put out feelers to improve relations with the U.S. and Europe, which slapped his government with sanctions in 2006 after he was accused of rigging his re-election. Sanctions were eased this year, after Mr. Lukashenko ordered the release of some political prisoners.
Like other leaders of former Soviet states, he has resisted Moscow pressure to side with the Kremlin in its conflict with Georgia by recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. So far the only countries to confer recognition are Russia and Nicaragua.
But he signaled he may tip toward Moscow on the issue and echoed Russia's argument that the West paved the way for the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions by recognizing Kosovo.
Original article posted here.
Lukashenko, in His Own Words
Below, excerpts from Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko's interview with The Wall Street Journal Tuesday. The interview was conducted in Russian, and translated by the Journal.
On the release of political opponent Alexander Kozulin earlier this year:
"The West perceived this as some kind of step toward democracy. You are welcome, thank you very much. You know, strictly between us, sometimes I think if they could find five or six more political prisoners here and told us to free them, and that then perhaps we would make a few more steps forward, we would do it readily. We could free even more. But they haven't found any more."
On the possibility of recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia:
"If you [the West] recognized Kosovo, why not recognize Abkhazia? I don't see any problems here. There is a precedent[hellip] Europe and America understand our position and our situation. And I will be honest, they are no longer pushing it as rigidly with us as before. So I don't think there would be negative repercussions for our relations or the like. I think this question is finished. It is no longer as acute as it was two months ago."
On the financial crisis:
"And I warned the Americans and others. No one listened to me. As it turned out, I was right. Now in America they are talking about an alternative to this ultraliberal market system, where everything is allowed, where you can eat more than what you make, and spend more than what you earn."
On Barack Obama:
"I look at Obama, a young man, a good-looking person. That is my first impression, I feel sorry for him. He looks 100% like Lukashenko, when I came to power after the downfall of the Soviet Union. The store shelves were empty, a severe financial crisis."
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Another resource hotspot in the grand chessboard
Energy superpower emerges in the Caspian
By M K Bhadrakumar
Turkmenistan knows better than any other country that predators will go to any extent to take away its valuable possessions. Five successive empires - Scythian, Parthian, Ywati, Hun and Turkmen - invaded the area to locate the "Akhal" oasis nestled in the foothills of the Kopet Dag mountains in southern Turkmenistan, and laid waste everything that came across their way until they could take away the treasured Akhal-Teke horses as spoils of war.
The ancient race of Akhal-Teke horses, dating to 2,400 BC, were much fancied for their elegance, strength, stamina and beauty. Alexander the Great apparently took away with him hundreds of these horses as prized trophies during his campaign in Central Asia.
So Turkmenistan's collective memory will be stirred by the announcement on Monday that the country may have in the Yoloten-Osman deposits one of the world's four or five largest gas fields.
British consultancy firm Gaffney, Cline & Associates (GCA), making the announcement in Ashgabat regarding the first results of its audit of Turkmen gas reserves, said its low estimate under the established international and classification system is that the fields may have a minimum 4 trillion cubic meters of gas and as much as a staggering 14 trillion cubic meters.
This catapults Yoloten-Osman, in the southeast of the country, to the status of Turkmenistan's No 1 gas field, overtaking even the fabulous Dowalatabad, whose reserves it will exceed by at least five times. It should be kept in mind that many other of Turkmenistan's many gas fields have yet to be fully explored, and the GCA has just made its initial findings known.
Without doubt, Turkmenistan is closing its gap with Russia and Iran, hitherto listed as having the world's largest and second-largest gas reserves at 48 trillion cubic meters and 26 billion cubic meters, respectively. If the GCA results are confirmed, Turkmenistan will have reserves just 20% lower than that of Russia and outstrip Iran by far.
It seems the late Turkmenistan president Saparmurat Niyazov stands vindicated. Just before he died in December 2006, Niyazov remarked that Turkmenistan held reserves that were adequate to export 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas for the next 250 years. The world, including the then visiting German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, didn't take Niyazov's statement seriously.
In March, Niayov's successor, Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, ordered the GCA audit to clear doubts about Turkmenbashi's controversial claim. In a British understatement, GCA manager Jim Gillet said in Ashgabat, "Given the huge gas reserves, it is now clear that whatever the results of any final clarification, I can confirm that there is more than sufficient gas to fulfill Turkmenistan's existing contract commitments." Turkmenistan has contracts to supply Russia with around 50 bcm annually, China with 40 bcm and with Iran 8 bcm.
Without doubt, the maths of energy security is being reset. October 13 will stand out as a watershed in the race for Caspian energy. Like the shy Akhal-Teke, Turkmenistan comes from behind and surges ahead on the race tracks, captivating the world audience, especially the main wagerers - Russian, European, Chinese and the ubiquitous Americans. For these seasoned hands betting on the race track, this will also be pari-mutuel wagering, as the French would say, meaning "among ourselves", with betting against each other and not against the race track.
Turkmenistan is undoubtedly a vital partner for Russia in gas supplies. The two countries have an agreement regarding gas prices and the volume of gas supplies for 2007-2009. Ashgabat has been extracting higher and higher prices from Russia for its gas supplies. The price was raised to $100 per 1,000 cubic meters last year from the level of $65. Then it was further raised to $130 for January-June 2008 and to $150 in the second half of 2008.
Ashgabat has been playing on the nerves of Russian energy giant Gazprom and its desperate need for Turkmen gas to meet its export obligations in the European market, which accounts for 70% of the Russian company's total revenue at the moment. Gazprom sells close to two-thirds of Russia's 550 bcm annual gas production in the rapidly growing domestic market, which compels it to secure Turkmen supplies to meet the contracted European commitments.
Russian newspaper Kommersant made an innocuous-sounding reference on Wednesday, quoting a source in Gazprom to the effect that the Russian monopoly's famous July 25 agreement with Turkmengaz does not involve Yoloten-Osman. It seems, in other words, that Russia held in its hands a chimera when it fancied that the July 25 agreement put Gazprom in complete charge of all of Turkmenistan's exports. Surely, that is proving to be a misconception of Himalayan proportions.
For Russia, arguably, the game now starts all over again. First and foremost, it is no longer the superpower in the world of natural gas as was widely regarded until last weekend. Turkmenistan is, unquestionably, also a gas superpower of comparable muscle power to Russia.
Again, Russia will need to come terms with a "multipolar" world of gas-producing countries. It needs to revisit its entire strategy toward consolidating a world gas market. The prospect of a gas cartel - a gas OPEC - materializing any time soon now recedes into the far background. There will be disappointment in Tehran that the idea will have to be thrown out of the window, but a collective sigh of relief can be heard in European capitals.
More important, Russia will have to rework its bonding with its Central Asian partners. Turkmenistan was a vital link in the Moscow-led energy chain of Central Asia's leading gas-producing countries - the others being Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Last year, Russia worked out plans - involving Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - for a gas pipeline along the Caspian Sea's eastern coast for handling Turkmenistan's anticipated exports. In September, during Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan agreed to the Russian plan for an expansion of the Central Asian gas pipeline system for handling anticipated Turkmen gas exports.
These initiatives were predicated on the assumption that Russia must gear up to handle all of Turkmen gas exports. During last year, Russia gained rights over the gas exports of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the basis of its offer to make purchases at "European prices". The entire economics and logistics behind these complicated webs of Russian gas diplomacy in Central Asia now require updating - and rapid updating since, unlike previously, Russia's competitors by now know its tactics and work ethics and there is consequently now no more surprise element.
The immediate Russian concern will be regarding the Nabucco gas pipeline proposal mooted by the European Union and backed by the United States as an energy project that would somewhat reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas supplies. Nabucco envisages the dispatch of Caspian gas to the European market via an energy hub in Turkey bypassing Russian territory. Nabucco's viability depends on access to Turkmen (or Iranian) gas supplies.
With GCA's announcement on Monday, the doubts have been dispelled at least in one direction - Turkmenistan indeed does have the capacity to feed Nabucco with all the gas it needs. This comes at an awkward time for Moscow when its rival project, South Stream, which aims at further tying up the European market with Russian gas supplies, is struggling to take off.
Nabucco will give South Stream a run for its money. If it materializes, it could also be a setback for the broader thrust of Russian diplomacy, which in the past two years has aimed at cultivating the countries in the southern tier of the European market - Austria, Italy, Greece and the Balkan and Central European countries. There is already immense pressure from the US on the South Stream's transit countries to back off from far-reaching energy collaboration with Russia.
Geopolitics is just one step behind. Russia hoped to temper the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion and the US designs to roll back the Russian presence in the Black Sea region by working out a system of energy dependence with the US's allies in the region. Moscow recently offered a $4 billion loan to Ukraine for establishing two nuclear power plants in its western region. This is despite the pro-US stance of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko.
Moscow's strategy was working well. In a telling remark on Tuesday, at a joint press conference with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, president of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso virtually acknowledged the effectiveness of the Russian diplomacy in Europe. He said that if the EU is moving toward resuming negotiations with Russia on a new partnership deal even in the aftermath of the Caucasus conflict, that was not a "gift" for Russia but because it was in the interests of Europe. He said EU had economic, financial and investment interests to safeguard and needed to work out cooperation with Moscow in maintaining energy security.
"I think it is in the interest of the EU to keep the dialogue with Russia to promote stability in Europe," Barroso underlined in a virtual snub to the US doctrine of isolating Russia over the Caucasus crisis.
It is not only with the European countries but also with its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that Russian diplomacy has effectively used energy as a calculus for generating political and strategic influence. At the very least, with the emergence of Turkmenistan as an energy superpower, the "co-relation of forces" within the CIS undergoes a change. This is not only for Russia but also for the other countries which consider themselves as leading players in Central Asia and the Caspian - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan (all of them have uneasy "partnerships" historically with post-Soviet Turkmenistan).
But Russia also has factors of advantage. It has a surplus of hard cash at a time when the Western banking system is collapsing. Gazprom can use this clout of financial liquidity as a bargaining chip to outsmart Western oil companies cultivating favor in Ashgabat. A Russian business daily reported on Tuesday that Putin is forthwith providing $9 billion to Russia's four largest oil and gas companies to "refinance" their foreign debt in the context of the meltdown of the Western banking system.
The government had earlier announced $5.5 billion in tax breaks for the Russian energy companies. The four Russian oil majors had addressed a letter to Putin last month asking for a total of $80 billion to pay off their foreign debts and finance strategic projects. Putin responded on Friday by saying the government would disburse up to $50 billion.
Now, how many Western governments can match Russia providing such backing out of sovereign wealth funds to its oil majors at the present time of global credit crunch? The decision-makers in Ashgabat are bound to factor in these hard realities when they weigh the relative merits of competing offers from Gazprom and Western oil and gas companies.
There is also a huge psychological factor. In the idiom of wagering, it is always the case that when you are essentially betting against all else, your chances of winning depend on making a more informed decision. Simply put, Moscow has multiple lines open to Ashgabat dating to the Soviet era.
All the same, the latest development provides the US with a window of opportunity to play itself back into the race for Caspian energy after Russia repeatedly outsmarted it in recent years. Clearly, there is now no dearth of a resource base if Washington is to push trans-Caspian gas pipeline projects.
The Turkmen government announced last week that it intended to increase its gas exports to 125 bcm annually by 2015. From the US perspective, that target seems reasonable enough to make a robust pitch for Nabucco in the short term even though Yoloten's gas will take time to be extracted for exports.
The US will make a pitch on behalf of Western companies as regards providing expertise. The deck has already been cleared. Washington no more harps on Turkmenistan's human-rights record, nor is it appealing to Western governments to pressure Ashgabat into making fundamental democratic reforms. As an American commentator put it, "It has become clear this year that the need for energy supplies has pushed rights concerns to the background in discussions with the Turkmen government".
Such pragmatism is nothing new to US diplomacy and Ashgabat can be expected to take note. Surely, the graph of US expectations is curving upward sharply. Washington would have had prior knowledge of the GCA's audit. A US expert on the Caspian wrote, "The implications of the GCA audit results are momentous for European and trans-Atlantic energy security ... Brussels and Washington can encourage Western companies to become involved in developing South Yoloten-Osman, Yaslar and other Turkmen gas fields with westbound pipeline outlets via Azerbaijan to Europe. This could significantly counterbalance Russian Gazprom's dominance in European markets."
Even so, he also acknowledged, "Conversely, the Kremlin will undoubtedly seek privileged access for Gazprom to the newly ascertained Turkmen resources, acting preemptively against the West. By combining those new resources (on top of the already committed Turkmen inputs) with its own volumes, Gazprom would boost its dominance in Europe to impregnable levels for a long time to come."
There is also much hyperbole in these expectations. The heart of the matter is that the US experts do not spot a dark horse. It is far too presumptuous to choreograph the battle scene in such straightforward terms of Russia versus the West. There is yet another serious player watching the fabulous Turkmen gas fields from the east - China.
US experts and cold warriors are obsessed with battling resurgent Russia on the beaches of the Caspian Sea, the mountains of the Caucasus and the steppes of Central Asia. But they are underestimating China's potential as a market for Turkmen gas and as a competitor to European countries.
Ashgabat is already committed to delivering up to 40 bcm gas annually to China through a $2.6 billion Central Asia-China gas pipeline that Beijing is financing. PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company (CNOGEDC) have a 50-50 sharing of the project's costs and have formed the Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Ltd as a wholly owned subsidiary for this purpose.
Interestingly, China is collaborating with local companies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for the construction, which is an altogether new and interesting experience for the Central Asian countries.
China is a latecomer in Turkmenistan but it has already overtaken the West and is second only to Russia in that country. At the time of the signing of the July 2007 Sino-Turkmen agreement on supply of Turkmen gas, US analysts pooh-poohed the agreement as a typical ploy by Ashgabat to drive a hard bargain vis-a-vis Russian and Western companies bidding for contracts. They overlooked that China was dead serious.
CNOGEDC is far from a novice; its expertise in oil and gas exploration work is well known in diverse markets, not only in the Caspian (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) but also in Indonesia, Algeria, Oman, Niger, Chad, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Canada.
China holds many trump cards. First, it is a "virgin" market with a strong urge to expand. Beijing plans to raise its ratio of natural gas consumption to total energy use by 2.5 percentage points to 5.3% by 2010. This is still far below the global average of 25% and is indicative of China's potential as a market. Two, China carries no imperial baggage - unlike the US or Russia. It is not prescriptive. It is not peddling "color revolution". China doesn't hector on free market or human rights. The Central Asian countries find such an attitude extremely comfortable.
Three, China has a game plan. It will not appear avaricious, like Western companies. Energy cooperation will invariably form part a broad Chinese thrust in the direction of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Thus, China will not hesitate to offer substantive assistance to Turkmenistan. Four, China will not overtly compete. Instead, China will most likely work with Russia on development packages to increase Turkmen gas production.
In contrast, the cold warriors in the US visualize the Western companies as lone rangers on the Central Asian steppe. In fact, the entire European energy diplomacy in the Caspian suffers almost fatally from the spirit of rivalry with Russia that Washington injects into it. Wherever German, Italian and French oil companies have shaken off the US tutelage and begun working with Russia, they have done far better. China's energy diplomacy in Central Asia and the Caspian offers a model for the European oil majors.
Of course, it will be fascinating to see how China learns from its own history. In 101 BC, Han emperor Wu-Ti was absolutely captivated by Akhal-Teke, which he called "heavenly blood-sweating horses". He wanted to buy a stallion as a model for making a horse statue made of gold in his palace. But the Turkmen for some obscure reason, rejected the Han request. Wu-Ti retaliated by dispatching an army of 80,000 to the inhospitable Turkmen deserts where the Akhal-Teke roams in abandon. The Chinese simply got hold of 30 purebred horses and some 3,000 partbreds and made their way back to Wu-Ti.
True, China has been absolutely mesmerized by the Akhal-Teke. Tu Fu, an 8th century Chinese poet wrote
The Ferghana horse is famed among nomad breeds.
Lean in build, like the point of a lance;
Two ears sharp as bamboo spikes;
Four hoofs light as though born of the wind.
Heading away across the endless spaces,
Truly, you may entrust him with your life.
All the same, today's China is unlikely to do what came naturally to Wu-Ti. Even if Ashgabat were to tell China that it cannot have the entire output of the Yoloten-Osman gas fields, Beijing will unlikely remonstrate. It will gladly settle for sharing the output with its friends in Russia or the West if that's indeed what Ashgabat wants.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Original article posted here.
By M K Bhadrakumar
Turkmenistan knows better than any other country that predators will go to any extent to take away its valuable possessions. Five successive empires - Scythian, Parthian, Ywati, Hun and Turkmen - invaded the area to locate the "Akhal" oasis nestled in the foothills of the Kopet Dag mountains in southern Turkmenistan, and laid waste everything that came across their way until they could take away the treasured Akhal-Teke horses as spoils of war.
The ancient race of Akhal-Teke horses, dating to 2,400 BC, were much fancied for their elegance, strength, stamina and beauty. Alexander the Great apparently took away with him hundreds of these horses as prized trophies during his campaign in Central Asia.
So Turkmenistan's collective memory will be stirred by the announcement on Monday that the country may have in the Yoloten-Osman deposits one of the world's four or five largest gas fields.
British consultancy firm Gaffney, Cline & Associates (GCA), making the announcement in Ashgabat regarding the first results of its audit of Turkmen gas reserves, said its low estimate under the established international and classification system is that the fields may have a minimum 4 trillion cubic meters of gas and as much as a staggering 14 trillion cubic meters.
This catapults Yoloten-Osman, in the southeast of the country, to the status of Turkmenistan's No 1 gas field, overtaking even the fabulous Dowalatabad, whose reserves it will exceed by at least five times. It should be kept in mind that many other of Turkmenistan's many gas fields have yet to be fully explored, and the GCA has just made its initial findings known.
Without doubt, Turkmenistan is closing its gap with Russia and Iran, hitherto listed as having the world's largest and second-largest gas reserves at 48 trillion cubic meters and 26 billion cubic meters, respectively. If the GCA results are confirmed, Turkmenistan will have reserves just 20% lower than that of Russia and outstrip Iran by far.
It seems the late Turkmenistan president Saparmurat Niyazov stands vindicated. Just before he died in December 2006, Niyazov remarked that Turkmenistan held reserves that were adequate to export 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas for the next 250 years. The world, including the then visiting German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, didn't take Niyazov's statement seriously.
In March, Niayov's successor, Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, ordered the GCA audit to clear doubts about Turkmenbashi's controversial claim. In a British understatement, GCA manager Jim Gillet said in Ashgabat, "Given the huge gas reserves, it is now clear that whatever the results of any final clarification, I can confirm that there is more than sufficient gas to fulfill Turkmenistan's existing contract commitments." Turkmenistan has contracts to supply Russia with around 50 bcm annually, China with 40 bcm and with Iran 8 bcm.
Without doubt, the maths of energy security is being reset. October 13 will stand out as a watershed in the race for Caspian energy. Like the shy Akhal-Teke, Turkmenistan comes from behind and surges ahead on the race tracks, captivating the world audience, especially the main wagerers - Russian, European, Chinese and the ubiquitous Americans. For these seasoned hands betting on the race track, this will also be pari-mutuel wagering, as the French would say, meaning "among ourselves", with betting against each other and not against the race track.
Turkmenistan is undoubtedly a vital partner for Russia in gas supplies. The two countries have an agreement regarding gas prices and the volume of gas supplies for 2007-2009. Ashgabat has been extracting higher and higher prices from Russia for its gas supplies. The price was raised to $100 per 1,000 cubic meters last year from the level of $65. Then it was further raised to $130 for January-June 2008 and to $150 in the second half of 2008.
Ashgabat has been playing on the nerves of Russian energy giant Gazprom and its desperate need for Turkmen gas to meet its export obligations in the European market, which accounts for 70% of the Russian company's total revenue at the moment. Gazprom sells close to two-thirds of Russia's 550 bcm annual gas production in the rapidly growing domestic market, which compels it to secure Turkmen supplies to meet the contracted European commitments.
Russian newspaper Kommersant made an innocuous-sounding reference on Wednesday, quoting a source in Gazprom to the effect that the Russian monopoly's famous July 25 agreement with Turkmengaz does not involve Yoloten-Osman. It seems, in other words, that Russia held in its hands a chimera when it fancied that the July 25 agreement put Gazprom in complete charge of all of Turkmenistan's exports. Surely, that is proving to be a misconception of Himalayan proportions.
For Russia, arguably, the game now starts all over again. First and foremost, it is no longer the superpower in the world of natural gas as was widely regarded until last weekend. Turkmenistan is, unquestionably, also a gas superpower of comparable muscle power to Russia.
Again, Russia will need to come terms with a "multipolar" world of gas-producing countries. It needs to revisit its entire strategy toward consolidating a world gas market. The prospect of a gas cartel - a gas OPEC - materializing any time soon now recedes into the far background. There will be disappointment in Tehran that the idea will have to be thrown out of the window, but a collective sigh of relief can be heard in European capitals.
More important, Russia will have to rework its bonding with its Central Asian partners. Turkmenistan was a vital link in the Moscow-led energy chain of Central Asia's leading gas-producing countries - the others being Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Last year, Russia worked out plans - involving Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - for a gas pipeline along the Caspian Sea's eastern coast for handling Turkmenistan's anticipated exports. In September, during Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan agreed to the Russian plan for an expansion of the Central Asian gas pipeline system for handling anticipated Turkmen gas exports.
These initiatives were predicated on the assumption that Russia must gear up to handle all of Turkmen gas exports. During last year, Russia gained rights over the gas exports of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the basis of its offer to make purchases at "European prices". The entire economics and logistics behind these complicated webs of Russian gas diplomacy in Central Asia now require updating - and rapid updating since, unlike previously, Russia's competitors by now know its tactics and work ethics and there is consequently now no more surprise element.
The immediate Russian concern will be regarding the Nabucco gas pipeline proposal mooted by the European Union and backed by the United States as an energy project that would somewhat reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas supplies. Nabucco envisages the dispatch of Caspian gas to the European market via an energy hub in Turkey bypassing Russian territory. Nabucco's viability depends on access to Turkmen (or Iranian) gas supplies.
With GCA's announcement on Monday, the doubts have been dispelled at least in one direction - Turkmenistan indeed does have the capacity to feed Nabucco with all the gas it needs. This comes at an awkward time for Moscow when its rival project, South Stream, which aims at further tying up the European market with Russian gas supplies, is struggling to take off.
Nabucco will give South Stream a run for its money. If it materializes, it could also be a setback for the broader thrust of Russian diplomacy, which in the past two years has aimed at cultivating the countries in the southern tier of the European market - Austria, Italy, Greece and the Balkan and Central European countries. There is already immense pressure from the US on the South Stream's transit countries to back off from far-reaching energy collaboration with Russia.
Geopolitics is just one step behind. Russia hoped to temper the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion and the US designs to roll back the Russian presence in the Black Sea region by working out a system of energy dependence with the US's allies in the region. Moscow recently offered a $4 billion loan to Ukraine for establishing two nuclear power plants in its western region. This is despite the pro-US stance of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko.
Moscow's strategy was working well. In a telling remark on Tuesday, at a joint press conference with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, president of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso virtually acknowledged the effectiveness of the Russian diplomacy in Europe. He said that if the EU is moving toward resuming negotiations with Russia on a new partnership deal even in the aftermath of the Caucasus conflict, that was not a "gift" for Russia but because it was in the interests of Europe. He said EU had economic, financial and investment interests to safeguard and needed to work out cooperation with Moscow in maintaining energy security.
"I think it is in the interest of the EU to keep the dialogue with Russia to promote stability in Europe," Barroso underlined in a virtual snub to the US doctrine of isolating Russia over the Caucasus crisis.
It is not only with the European countries but also with its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that Russian diplomacy has effectively used energy as a calculus for generating political and strategic influence. At the very least, with the emergence of Turkmenistan as an energy superpower, the "co-relation of forces" within the CIS undergoes a change. This is not only for Russia but also for the other countries which consider themselves as leading players in Central Asia and the Caspian - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan (all of them have uneasy "partnerships" historically with post-Soviet Turkmenistan).
But Russia also has factors of advantage. It has a surplus of hard cash at a time when the Western banking system is collapsing. Gazprom can use this clout of financial liquidity as a bargaining chip to outsmart Western oil companies cultivating favor in Ashgabat. A Russian business daily reported on Tuesday that Putin is forthwith providing $9 billion to Russia's four largest oil and gas companies to "refinance" their foreign debt in the context of the meltdown of the Western banking system.
The government had earlier announced $5.5 billion in tax breaks for the Russian energy companies. The four Russian oil majors had addressed a letter to Putin last month asking for a total of $80 billion to pay off their foreign debts and finance strategic projects. Putin responded on Friday by saying the government would disburse up to $50 billion.
Now, how many Western governments can match Russia providing such backing out of sovereign wealth funds to its oil majors at the present time of global credit crunch? The decision-makers in Ashgabat are bound to factor in these hard realities when they weigh the relative merits of competing offers from Gazprom and Western oil and gas companies.
There is also a huge psychological factor. In the idiom of wagering, it is always the case that when you are essentially betting against all else, your chances of winning depend on making a more informed decision. Simply put, Moscow has multiple lines open to Ashgabat dating to the Soviet era.
All the same, the latest development provides the US with a window of opportunity to play itself back into the race for Caspian energy after Russia repeatedly outsmarted it in recent years. Clearly, there is now no dearth of a resource base if Washington is to push trans-Caspian gas pipeline projects.
The Turkmen government announced last week that it intended to increase its gas exports to 125 bcm annually by 2015. From the US perspective, that target seems reasonable enough to make a robust pitch for Nabucco in the short term even though Yoloten's gas will take time to be extracted for exports.
The US will make a pitch on behalf of Western companies as regards providing expertise. The deck has already been cleared. Washington no more harps on Turkmenistan's human-rights record, nor is it appealing to Western governments to pressure Ashgabat into making fundamental democratic reforms. As an American commentator put it, "It has become clear this year that the need for energy supplies has pushed rights concerns to the background in discussions with the Turkmen government".
Such pragmatism is nothing new to US diplomacy and Ashgabat can be expected to take note. Surely, the graph of US expectations is curving upward sharply. Washington would have had prior knowledge of the GCA's audit. A US expert on the Caspian wrote, "The implications of the GCA audit results are momentous for European and trans-Atlantic energy security ... Brussels and Washington can encourage Western companies to become involved in developing South Yoloten-Osman, Yaslar and other Turkmen gas fields with westbound pipeline outlets via Azerbaijan to Europe. This could significantly counterbalance Russian Gazprom's dominance in European markets."
Even so, he also acknowledged, "Conversely, the Kremlin will undoubtedly seek privileged access for Gazprom to the newly ascertained Turkmen resources, acting preemptively against the West. By combining those new resources (on top of the already committed Turkmen inputs) with its own volumes, Gazprom would boost its dominance in Europe to impregnable levels for a long time to come."
There is also much hyperbole in these expectations. The heart of the matter is that the US experts do not spot a dark horse. It is far too presumptuous to choreograph the battle scene in such straightforward terms of Russia versus the West. There is yet another serious player watching the fabulous Turkmen gas fields from the east - China.
US experts and cold warriors are obsessed with battling resurgent Russia on the beaches of the Caspian Sea, the mountains of the Caucasus and the steppes of Central Asia. But they are underestimating China's potential as a market for Turkmen gas and as a competitor to European countries.
Ashgabat is already committed to delivering up to 40 bcm gas annually to China through a $2.6 billion Central Asia-China gas pipeline that Beijing is financing. PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company (CNOGEDC) have a 50-50 sharing of the project's costs and have formed the Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Ltd as a wholly owned subsidiary for this purpose.
Interestingly, China is collaborating with local companies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for the construction, which is an altogether new and interesting experience for the Central Asian countries.
China is a latecomer in Turkmenistan but it has already overtaken the West and is second only to Russia in that country. At the time of the signing of the July 2007 Sino-Turkmen agreement on supply of Turkmen gas, US analysts pooh-poohed the agreement as a typical ploy by Ashgabat to drive a hard bargain vis-a-vis Russian and Western companies bidding for contracts. They overlooked that China was dead serious.
CNOGEDC is far from a novice; its expertise in oil and gas exploration work is well known in diverse markets, not only in the Caspian (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) but also in Indonesia, Algeria, Oman, Niger, Chad, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Canada.
China holds many trump cards. First, it is a "virgin" market with a strong urge to expand. Beijing plans to raise its ratio of natural gas consumption to total energy use by 2.5 percentage points to 5.3% by 2010. This is still far below the global average of 25% and is indicative of China's potential as a market. Two, China carries no imperial baggage - unlike the US or Russia. It is not prescriptive. It is not peddling "color revolution". China doesn't hector on free market or human rights. The Central Asian countries find such an attitude extremely comfortable.
Three, China has a game plan. It will not appear avaricious, like Western companies. Energy cooperation will invariably form part a broad Chinese thrust in the direction of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Thus, China will not hesitate to offer substantive assistance to Turkmenistan. Four, China will not overtly compete. Instead, China will most likely work with Russia on development packages to increase Turkmen gas production.
In contrast, the cold warriors in the US visualize the Western companies as lone rangers on the Central Asian steppe. In fact, the entire European energy diplomacy in the Caspian suffers almost fatally from the spirit of rivalry with Russia that Washington injects into it. Wherever German, Italian and French oil companies have shaken off the US tutelage and begun working with Russia, they have done far better. China's energy diplomacy in Central Asia and the Caspian offers a model for the European oil majors.
Of course, it will be fascinating to see how China learns from its own history. In 101 BC, Han emperor Wu-Ti was absolutely captivated by Akhal-Teke, which he called "heavenly blood-sweating horses". He wanted to buy a stallion as a model for making a horse statue made of gold in his palace. But the Turkmen for some obscure reason, rejected the Han request. Wu-Ti retaliated by dispatching an army of 80,000 to the inhospitable Turkmen deserts where the Akhal-Teke roams in abandon. The Chinese simply got hold of 30 purebred horses and some 3,000 partbreds and made their way back to Wu-Ti.
True, China has been absolutely mesmerized by the Akhal-Teke. Tu Fu, an 8th century Chinese poet wrote
The Ferghana horse is famed among nomad breeds.
Lean in build, like the point of a lance;
Two ears sharp as bamboo spikes;
Four hoofs light as though born of the wind.
Heading away across the endless spaces,
Truly, you may entrust him with your life.
All the same, today's China is unlikely to do what came naturally to Wu-Ti. Even if Ashgabat were to tell China that it cannot have the entire output of the Yoloten-Osman gas fields, Beijing will unlikely remonstrate. It will gladly settle for sharing the output with its friends in Russia or the West if that's indeed what Ashgabat wants.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Original article posted here.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Looks like Venezuela may become to Russia what Israel is to the US
Russia offers Chavez $1 billion for weapons
By Michael Schwirtz
MOSCOW: The Kremlin has decided to offer a $1 billion loan for arms purchases to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who is currently on a two-day swing through Russia aimed at bolstering an already solid relationship that has caused increasing discomfort in the West.
Following a meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin on Thursday, Mr. Chavez, who is on his second visit to Russia in two months, traveled on Friday to the southern city of Orenburg near the border with Kazakhstan for a meeting with President Dmitry A. Medvedev. The two leaders held talks on enhancing economic cooperation and trade in both commercial goods and military technologies, according to a Kremlin statement.
The $1 billion dollar loan is to be allocated for programs related to military-technical cooperation, the statement said. A Kremlin spokesman would not elaborate on the details of the deal. Between 2005 and 2007 Venezuela has signed 12 contracts for weapons purchases from Russia for a total of more than $4.4 billion, the Kremlin statement said.
The move is the latest gesture of military friendship between Russia and Venezuela, two counties that have increasingly positioned themselves as mavericks vis-a-vis the West. The Kremlin says its economic and political stability have allowed it to broaden the scope of its military and economic cooperation beyond what it calls its traditional sphere of influence.
Moscow is also frustrated with what it considers aggressive military posturing from the West, particularly the United States. Washington's plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as its support of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, have set Russia on edge.
Today in Americas
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In turn, Russia has sought to expand its military footprint in recent years, inching closer and closer to American shores. Russian bombers have flown sorties close to Alaska and its naval vessels have been pushing deeper into the Atlantic.
Latin America, and Venezuela in particular, has become has become a major theater for this expansion.
Earlier this month a pair of Russian Tu-160 long range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons received a warm welcome when they landed in Venezuela. Russia has also dispatched squadron from the Russian Navy's North Sea Fleet to the Caribbean to take part in joint naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy sometime in November.
"Latin America, of course, is becoming an obvious link in the chain making up a multipolar world," Mr. Putin said during his meeting with Mr. Chavez. "We will allocate more and more attention to this vector of our economics and foreign policy." Russia has already delivered Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, Mi-17 transport helicopters, and thousands of Kalashnikov assault rifles to Venezuela. There are also plans to build a factory in the country that will manufacture these weapons under license.
Ties between the two countries appear to have been strengthened following Russia's five-day war with Georgia last month, which caused relations between Moscow and the West to plummet to their lowest point since the Cold War.
At his meeting with Mr. Medvedev on Friday, Mr. Chavez expressed "firm support" for Russia's unilateral recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Georgian separatist enclaves, Interfax reported. Only Nicaragua has officially followed Moscow's recognition, which prompted broad international criticism.
Mr. Chavez's remarks fell short of official recognition of the republics, despite speculation that he would use his visit to offer it.
Original article posted here.
By Michael Schwirtz
MOSCOW: The Kremlin has decided to offer a $1 billion loan for arms purchases to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who is currently on a two-day swing through Russia aimed at bolstering an already solid relationship that has caused increasing discomfort in the West.
Following a meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin on Thursday, Mr. Chavez, who is on his second visit to Russia in two months, traveled on Friday to the southern city of Orenburg near the border with Kazakhstan for a meeting with President Dmitry A. Medvedev. The two leaders held talks on enhancing economic cooperation and trade in both commercial goods and military technologies, according to a Kremlin statement.
The $1 billion dollar loan is to be allocated for programs related to military-technical cooperation, the statement said. A Kremlin spokesman would not elaborate on the details of the deal. Between 2005 and 2007 Venezuela has signed 12 contracts for weapons purchases from Russia for a total of more than $4.4 billion, the Kremlin statement said.
The move is the latest gesture of military friendship between Russia and Venezuela, two counties that have increasingly positioned themselves as mavericks vis-a-vis the West. The Kremlin says its economic and political stability have allowed it to broaden the scope of its military and economic cooperation beyond what it calls its traditional sphere of influence.
Moscow is also frustrated with what it considers aggressive military posturing from the West, particularly the United States. Washington's plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as its support of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, have set Russia on edge.
Today in Americas
U.S. bailout plan stalls after day of talks
McCain's peril in postponing the debate
In a time of crisis, is Obama too cool?
In turn, Russia has sought to expand its military footprint in recent years, inching closer and closer to American shores. Russian bombers have flown sorties close to Alaska and its naval vessels have been pushing deeper into the Atlantic.
Latin America, and Venezuela in particular, has become has become a major theater for this expansion.
Earlier this month a pair of Russian Tu-160 long range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons received a warm welcome when they landed in Venezuela. Russia has also dispatched squadron from the Russian Navy's North Sea Fleet to the Caribbean to take part in joint naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy sometime in November.
"Latin America, of course, is becoming an obvious link in the chain making up a multipolar world," Mr. Putin said during his meeting with Mr. Chavez. "We will allocate more and more attention to this vector of our economics and foreign policy." Russia has already delivered Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, Mi-17 transport helicopters, and thousands of Kalashnikov assault rifles to Venezuela. There are also plans to build a factory in the country that will manufacture these weapons under license.
Ties between the two countries appear to have been strengthened following Russia's five-day war with Georgia last month, which caused relations between Moscow and the West to plummet to their lowest point since the Cold War.
At his meeting with Mr. Medvedev on Friday, Mr. Chavez expressed "firm support" for Russia's unilateral recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Georgian separatist enclaves, Interfax reported. Only Nicaragua has officially followed Moscow's recognition, which prompted broad international criticism.
Mr. Chavez's remarks fell short of official recognition of the republics, despite speculation that he would use his visit to offer it.
Original article posted here.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
The proof of US involvement in Georgia
International Large-Scale Military Exercise ‘Immediate Response 2008’
August 1, 2008
Tea Kerdzevadze, Georgia Today
The International Training “Immediate Response 2008” conducted with the joint efforts of the USA and Georgian Armed Forces was held at Vaziani Military Base on July 15-31. The mission of the training was to improve combined capabilities and strengthen regional cooperation.
The exercise involved the conduction of a combined brigade-level CPX exercise with Georgian Armed Forces to develop a common understanding of coalition staff planning procedures; combined live-fire FTX/STX to train on tactics, techniques and procedures for the conduct of coalition security and stability operations and to deploy the 21st TSC EECP and exercise limited theater opening capabilities.
In total, 1,630 servicemen participated, including representatives of the Joint Staff, Land Forces Staff, IV Brigade, the 41st and 42nd Battalions and Engineer Battalion Company from Georgia. From the USA, 1,000 military servicemen took part in the exercise including the United States Army Europe, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1st Battalion 121 Infantry Regiment Georgian National Guard (Atlanta, Georgia) and 5045th General Support Unit. As well as Georgian and American participants, 10 servicemen each from Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Ukraine took part.
The exercise consisted of two stages. First of all, the practical and theoretical parts of the CPX exercises, situational and field trainings were held. The second stage comprised staff and command training. IV Brigade Staff participated in the first stage which underwent the training with modern computer equipment. Within the JKT Program, the I Brigade by which it streamlined decision making process, took direct participation in the planning process and elaborated the action plan. After approving the plan, the operations were carried out via computers.
Preparation for the military training “Immediate Response” started in summer 2007. Since then, planning conferences were held from time to time to discuss and arrange all kinds of issues concerning the exercises, including logistical and medical support and equipment transportation. Georgia provided 90 percent of the logistical support for the exercise with local resources, including railway, customs clearance and security issues. In the framework of the logistical support, Georgia also modernized Vaziani Military Base as well. The rest of the equipment - basic field gear, tents, power generators, logistical vehicles and two HH-60 Blackhawk medical evacuation helicopters - were shipped from the United States, Germany and Italy.
The opening ceremony of Immediate Response 2008 was held at Vaziani Military Base on July 15. The ceremony was opened accompanied with the national anthems of five countries. The Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces LTC Alexander Osepaishvili and SETAF Brigadier General William B. Garrett delivered speeches. BG Garrett stated that he welcomed the exercise Immediate Response 2008 saying it was an honor and a privilege to be in Georgia. “Over the next several weeks, we will live together, work together and train together. This is an invaluable opportunity to get to know and understand one another, to learn about different cultures and to build enduring relationships between professional militaries,” said the Brigadier General. He also expressed particular gratitude towards the Georgian Armed Forces for the strong support not only for the exercise but also for continuing service with the American forces, allies and partners.
The training scenario envisaged a peacekeeping operation in Iraq. This training helped the IV Brigade with its preparations to be deployed in Iraq. The US Marine Corps and the American National Guard Company carried out the field operations with the IV Brigade Staff. The joint training took place on Vaziani firing ground and Vaziani airport. Settlement models were arranged on Vaziani airport where the soldiers were trained how to battle within inhabited areas. Their main purpose was to create and implement a full range of operational tasks; to set up check-points, seize settled areas, convey information, patrol, etc.
The scenario of the training was the following: the situation was held within a built-up, inhabited area. As the terrorists carried out sudden attack over the inhabitants, the Georgian and American militaries patrolled and evacuated and rescued the citizens. If any of the inhabitants were wounded the soldiers administered medical assistance and transported them to the appropriate facilities. After this the military servicemen implemented the clearance operation from the terrorists within the inhabited area.
On July 21, President Mikheil Saakashvili, Minister of Defense David Kezerashvili, the Chief of the Joint Staff of GAF Brigadier General Zaza Gogava and the Deputy Chief of JS LTC Alexander Osepaishvili attended this training and became acquainted with the joint Georgian-American training. At first, they visited the tactical operations center and command post of the US division. Then they went to Vaziani Airport to see the demonstrated training. After the end of the demonstrated exercise, the President of Georgia delivered a speech to the Georgian military servicemen who had participated in the training, saying: “The main task of Georgian officers and soldiers is training. This international exercise is a unique case as we have the possibility to hold trainings along with the representatives of the best army in the world for a month. I think that we have created a new military school in Georgia in recent years. Believe that what all of you have learned now will remain in our country and will be shared with the future generations. That is why we have to train theoretically and practically as this is a precondition of victory. The main thing is to get acquainted with independent decision-making and free thinking.”
On July 28, a demonstration day for media representatives was held in the framework of the international training “Immediate Response”. The event was attended by the Chief of Joint Staff of GAF Brigadier General Zaza Gogava, his deputies LTC Grigol Tatishvili and LTC Alexander Osepaishvili and Head of the US South European Forces Brigadier General William B. Garrett. The event was opened by the Officer of J-3 Operational Planning Department of Joint Forces Col. Erick Nantz who introduced the training presentation. The second stage of the exercise continued at Vaziani Airdrome where Georgian and American military servicemen carried out demonstrative training for the guests.
The scenario was set in one of the small urban areas of Iraq.
The main duty of the peacekeeping forces was to seize the terrorist who was hiding in one of the houses. The terrorist tried to escape when the coalition forces appeared but the troops did their best to detain him. After this, the platoon performed a humanitarian operation and transferred wounded people to hospital by military helicopters.
The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USA H.E. John Tefft also attended the exercise. After the demonstrative training he outlined the importance of the training, saying: “It is in a spirit of Partnership for Peace, part of the NATO program. It was very rewarding for me to see the joint work of soldiers from different countries. The command post trainings also went successfully. Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and Georgian soldiers participated in the exercise jointly. I believe that the exercise fulfilled its main purpose.”
Immediate Response is an annual, bilateral security cooperation exercise conducted between US and coalition partners. Approximately 1,600 military personnel consisting of US soldiers, airmen, marines and army civilian employees; and Georgian military personnel make up Task Force Immediate Response 2008. The training is designed to exercise combined interoperability, conduct combined arms live fire, conduct training on responsive medical aid in a combat environment and bilateral training with Georgian and other multinational defense forces. This is the first time that Immediate Response is conducted in Georgia. Poland and Bulgaria has commonly hosted this exercise in years past.
The SETAF Brigadier General William B. Garrett commanded the exercise from American side. We asked him for his thoughts and comments on Immediate Response.
What is the primary aim of the exercise “Immediate Response 2008”? What are the objectives of the exercise?
We are conducting this exercise to enhance interoperability with a key coalition partner. Georgia has provided consistent support to ongoing operations in Iraq. Georgia is the third largest force contributor to Operation Iraqi Freedom and that means a lot to the United States.
What do you expect from “Immediate Response 2008”?
The combined approach – active participation from all the countries involved – provided an invaluable opportunity to learn about different cultures, and to promote understanding and cooperation between our forces and strengthen our partnerships for the future.
What benefits will this exercise bring for the Georgian Armed Forces?
The Georgian Armed Forces will gain greater tactical proficiency as well as improving their ability to work with coalition partners. But the benefits gained from this exercise are not limited to Georgian Soldiers. American, Armenian, Azeri and Ukrainian service members all benefited from this exercise. I might also point out that the Georgian 4th Infantry Brigade is scheduled to deploy to Iraq next year. The tough, realistic training provided during Immediate Response 2008 will certainly help them prepare for that deployment.
How do you estimate the preparation level of Georgian military servicemen?
The Georgian Soldiers we trained with the last few weeks from the 4th Brigade are fit, motivated, and disciplined. They are eager to learn. They interact well with their coalition partners. American soldiers are very proud to serve alongside Georgian soldiers.
As you are informed the IV Brigade is preparing to carry out peacekeeping mission in Iraq? What recommendations would you give our soldiers in this regard?
Continue to train hard for the mission in Iraq, incorporate the experiences of those who are currently serving in Iraq, and build on those things you learned during Exercise Immediate Response 08.
What obstacles do you see in the process of implementation of “Immediate Response 2008”? What is the most challenging of this exercise?
We don’t see obstacles, only challenges. There were several aspects to this exercise that were critical to success; I can not name one in particular. Our Georgian counterparts really went the extra mile to accommodate this exercise and provided excellent support. They were fantastic hosts and we look forward to working with them in the future.
On July 15, First Deputy Defence Minister Batu Kutelia and Chief of the Joint Staff of Georgian Armed Forces, Brigadier General Zaza Gogava, went on an official visit to Iraq.
They visited the 1st Infantry Brigade stationed in FOB Delta, Basra Base and Cop Cleary. The Battalion commanders briefed the MoD officials about operations and tasks provided by Georgian military contingent in Vassit Province.
In the framework of this visit, Minister Batu Kutelia and BG Zaza Gogava met with the following multi-national forces: Iraq Commanding General, General David Petraeus, Multi-National Corps- Iraq Deputy Commanding General for the Coalition, Brigadier General Nicholas Matern and the 10th Mountain CG, Major General Michael Oates. During the meetings with the multi-national forces, the commanders evaluated the Georgian peacekeeping mission very positively.
Currently in Iraq, the Georgian military contingent is represented by the 1st Infantry Brigade that rotated with the 3rd Infantry Brigade in January 2008. The Georgian contingent in Iraq counts 2000 personnel. The main base which is under Georgians’ control is FOB Delta, located in city of Al Kut, Vassit Province. The main tasks for Georgian military are to set up roadblocks, stationary and mobile checkpoints, provide security in Vassit Province and to control of the checkpoint located at the Iran –Iraq border.
The part of Iranian border that is now controlled by Georgian peacekeepers was the place where smuggled arms once passed. During operations provided by Georgian troops, there were 110,000 vehicles and 560,958 people checked, and 1,500 Iraqi civilians were provided with medical services by the Georgian military doctors.
The Georgian troops actively participate with their American counterparts in Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) where the military cooperates with civilian agencies and institutions in order to bring peace and stability and foster better relations. “We have a very good relationship with the local inhabitants,” said Captain Zaur Makaradze, CIMIC group commander, from the 1st Infantry Brigade. On the question how dangerous it is Captain Makharidze answered with smile “It’s quite dangerous, but we are not afraid…We help Iraqi people.”
Deputy Defence Minister Batu Kutelia commented on the visit: “We have discussed the success of Georgian Military in Iraq and General Petraeus evaluates our mission very highly. He thanked us for our decision to continue our contingent here in Iraq until the end of year.”
According to BG Gogava: “General Petraeus estimated very positively the Georgian troops… He has once more underlined the high level of preparedness of the Georgian soldiers. There were a lot of thankful words said about Georgian Armed Forces. Afterwards there was a detailed conversation about the present situation in Vassit Province, and what a positive role has been played by the Georgian soldiers. These were the main subjects which were discussed by us. Then after we talked about the future plans, and the role of Georgian military in future operations in Vassit Province.”
Internal Minister of de facto South Ossetia Mikheil Mindzaev, has confirmed the information over equipment of the fortification structures. According to Mindzaev, the ministry is obliged to conduct engineering works and reinforce the posts in such a manner.
He added that there was not alternative and they were only acted in response to the same kind of activity on the part of the Georgians.
Moreover, the minister stated that the Georgian side intends to implement provocations and these actions will be directed towards peaceful population in the breakaway region. “We are aware that Tskhinvali is violating the agreement by such steps, but it is worth noting that Georgia has taken the first steps in violation and we only responded,” Mikhail Mindzaev stated.
The launching of fortifying activities on the part of Ossetian separatists has been evaluated as grave violation of the agreement by OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Original article posted here.
August 1, 2008
Tea Kerdzevadze, Georgia Today
The International Training “Immediate Response 2008” conducted with the joint efforts of the USA and Georgian Armed Forces was held at Vaziani Military Base on July 15-31. The mission of the training was to improve combined capabilities and strengthen regional cooperation.
The exercise involved the conduction of a combined brigade-level CPX exercise with Georgian Armed Forces to develop a common understanding of coalition staff planning procedures; combined live-fire FTX/STX to train on tactics, techniques and procedures for the conduct of coalition security and stability operations and to deploy the 21st TSC EECP and exercise limited theater opening capabilities.
In total, 1,630 servicemen participated, including representatives of the Joint Staff, Land Forces Staff, IV Brigade, the 41st and 42nd Battalions and Engineer Battalion Company from Georgia. From the USA, 1,000 military servicemen took part in the exercise including the United States Army Europe, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1st Battalion 121 Infantry Regiment Georgian National Guard (Atlanta, Georgia) and 5045th General Support Unit. As well as Georgian and American participants, 10 servicemen each from Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Ukraine took part.
The exercise consisted of two stages. First of all, the practical and theoretical parts of the CPX exercises, situational and field trainings were held. The second stage comprised staff and command training. IV Brigade Staff participated in the first stage which underwent the training with modern computer equipment. Within the JKT Program, the I Brigade by which it streamlined decision making process, took direct participation in the planning process and elaborated the action plan. After approving the plan, the operations were carried out via computers.
Preparation for the military training “Immediate Response” started in summer 2007. Since then, planning conferences were held from time to time to discuss and arrange all kinds of issues concerning the exercises, including logistical and medical support and equipment transportation. Georgia provided 90 percent of the logistical support for the exercise with local resources, including railway, customs clearance and security issues. In the framework of the logistical support, Georgia also modernized Vaziani Military Base as well. The rest of the equipment - basic field gear, tents, power generators, logistical vehicles and two HH-60 Blackhawk medical evacuation helicopters - were shipped from the United States, Germany and Italy.
The opening ceremony of Immediate Response 2008 was held at Vaziani Military Base on July 15. The ceremony was opened accompanied with the national anthems of five countries. The Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces LTC Alexander Osepaishvili and SETAF Brigadier General William B. Garrett delivered speeches. BG Garrett stated that he welcomed the exercise Immediate Response 2008 saying it was an honor and a privilege to be in Georgia. “Over the next several weeks, we will live together, work together and train together. This is an invaluable opportunity to get to know and understand one another, to learn about different cultures and to build enduring relationships between professional militaries,” said the Brigadier General. He also expressed particular gratitude towards the Georgian Armed Forces for the strong support not only for the exercise but also for continuing service with the American forces, allies and partners.
The training scenario envisaged a peacekeeping operation in Iraq. This training helped the IV Brigade with its preparations to be deployed in Iraq. The US Marine Corps and the American National Guard Company carried out the field operations with the IV Brigade Staff. The joint training took place on Vaziani firing ground and Vaziani airport. Settlement models were arranged on Vaziani airport where the soldiers were trained how to battle within inhabited areas. Their main purpose was to create and implement a full range of operational tasks; to set up check-points, seize settled areas, convey information, patrol, etc.
The scenario of the training was the following: the situation was held within a built-up, inhabited area. As the terrorists carried out sudden attack over the inhabitants, the Georgian and American militaries patrolled and evacuated and rescued the citizens. If any of the inhabitants were wounded the soldiers administered medical assistance and transported them to the appropriate facilities. After this the military servicemen implemented the clearance operation from the terrorists within the inhabited area.
On July 21, President Mikheil Saakashvili, Minister of Defense David Kezerashvili, the Chief of the Joint Staff of GAF Brigadier General Zaza Gogava and the Deputy Chief of JS LTC Alexander Osepaishvili attended this training and became acquainted with the joint Georgian-American training. At first, they visited the tactical operations center and command post of the US division. Then they went to Vaziani Airport to see the demonstrated training. After the end of the demonstrated exercise, the President of Georgia delivered a speech to the Georgian military servicemen who had participated in the training, saying: “The main task of Georgian officers and soldiers is training. This international exercise is a unique case as we have the possibility to hold trainings along with the representatives of the best army in the world for a month. I think that we have created a new military school in Georgia in recent years. Believe that what all of you have learned now will remain in our country and will be shared with the future generations. That is why we have to train theoretically and practically as this is a precondition of victory. The main thing is to get acquainted with independent decision-making and free thinking.”
On July 28, a demonstration day for media representatives was held in the framework of the international training “Immediate Response”. The event was attended by the Chief of Joint Staff of GAF Brigadier General Zaza Gogava, his deputies LTC Grigol Tatishvili and LTC Alexander Osepaishvili and Head of the US South European Forces Brigadier General William B. Garrett. The event was opened by the Officer of J-3 Operational Planning Department of Joint Forces Col. Erick Nantz who introduced the training presentation. The second stage of the exercise continued at Vaziani Airdrome where Georgian and American military servicemen carried out demonstrative training for the guests.
The scenario was set in one of the small urban areas of Iraq.
The main duty of the peacekeeping forces was to seize the terrorist who was hiding in one of the houses. The terrorist tried to escape when the coalition forces appeared but the troops did their best to detain him. After this, the platoon performed a humanitarian operation and transferred wounded people to hospital by military helicopters.
The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USA H.E. John Tefft also attended the exercise. After the demonstrative training he outlined the importance of the training, saying: “It is in a spirit of Partnership for Peace, part of the NATO program. It was very rewarding for me to see the joint work of soldiers from different countries. The command post trainings also went successfully. Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and Georgian soldiers participated in the exercise jointly. I believe that the exercise fulfilled its main purpose.”
Immediate Response is an annual, bilateral security cooperation exercise conducted between US and coalition partners. Approximately 1,600 military personnel consisting of US soldiers, airmen, marines and army civilian employees; and Georgian military personnel make up Task Force Immediate Response 2008. The training is designed to exercise combined interoperability, conduct combined arms live fire, conduct training on responsive medical aid in a combat environment and bilateral training with Georgian and other multinational defense forces. This is the first time that Immediate Response is conducted in Georgia. Poland and Bulgaria has commonly hosted this exercise in years past.
The SETAF Brigadier General William B. Garrett commanded the exercise from American side. We asked him for his thoughts and comments on Immediate Response.
What is the primary aim of the exercise “Immediate Response 2008”? What are the objectives of the exercise?
We are conducting this exercise to enhance interoperability with a key coalition partner. Georgia has provided consistent support to ongoing operations in Iraq. Georgia is the third largest force contributor to Operation Iraqi Freedom and that means a lot to the United States.
What do you expect from “Immediate Response 2008”?
The combined approach – active participation from all the countries involved – provided an invaluable opportunity to learn about different cultures, and to promote understanding and cooperation between our forces and strengthen our partnerships for the future.
What benefits will this exercise bring for the Georgian Armed Forces?
The Georgian Armed Forces will gain greater tactical proficiency as well as improving their ability to work with coalition partners. But the benefits gained from this exercise are not limited to Georgian Soldiers. American, Armenian, Azeri and Ukrainian service members all benefited from this exercise. I might also point out that the Georgian 4th Infantry Brigade is scheduled to deploy to Iraq next year. The tough, realistic training provided during Immediate Response 2008 will certainly help them prepare for that deployment.
How do you estimate the preparation level of Georgian military servicemen?
The Georgian Soldiers we trained with the last few weeks from the 4th Brigade are fit, motivated, and disciplined. They are eager to learn. They interact well with their coalition partners. American soldiers are very proud to serve alongside Georgian soldiers.
As you are informed the IV Brigade is preparing to carry out peacekeeping mission in Iraq? What recommendations would you give our soldiers in this regard?
Continue to train hard for the mission in Iraq, incorporate the experiences of those who are currently serving in Iraq, and build on those things you learned during Exercise Immediate Response 08.
What obstacles do you see in the process of implementation of “Immediate Response 2008”? What is the most challenging of this exercise?
We don’t see obstacles, only challenges. There were several aspects to this exercise that were critical to success; I can not name one in particular. Our Georgian counterparts really went the extra mile to accommodate this exercise and provided excellent support. They were fantastic hosts and we look forward to working with them in the future.
On July 15, First Deputy Defence Minister Batu Kutelia and Chief of the Joint Staff of Georgian Armed Forces, Brigadier General Zaza Gogava, went on an official visit to Iraq.
They visited the 1st Infantry Brigade stationed in FOB Delta, Basra Base and Cop Cleary. The Battalion commanders briefed the MoD officials about operations and tasks provided by Georgian military contingent in Vassit Province.
In the framework of this visit, Minister Batu Kutelia and BG Zaza Gogava met with the following multi-national forces: Iraq Commanding General, General David Petraeus, Multi-National Corps- Iraq Deputy Commanding General for the Coalition, Brigadier General Nicholas Matern and the 10th Mountain CG, Major General Michael Oates. During the meetings with the multi-national forces, the commanders evaluated the Georgian peacekeeping mission very positively.
Currently in Iraq, the Georgian military contingent is represented by the 1st Infantry Brigade that rotated with the 3rd Infantry Brigade in January 2008. The Georgian contingent in Iraq counts 2000 personnel. The main base which is under Georgians’ control is FOB Delta, located in city of Al Kut, Vassit Province. The main tasks for Georgian military are to set up roadblocks, stationary and mobile checkpoints, provide security in Vassit Province and to control of the checkpoint located at the Iran –Iraq border.
The part of Iranian border that is now controlled by Georgian peacekeepers was the place where smuggled arms once passed. During operations provided by Georgian troops, there were 110,000 vehicles and 560,958 people checked, and 1,500 Iraqi civilians were provided with medical services by the Georgian military doctors.
The Georgian troops actively participate with their American counterparts in Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) where the military cooperates with civilian agencies and institutions in order to bring peace and stability and foster better relations. “We have a very good relationship with the local inhabitants,” said Captain Zaur Makaradze, CIMIC group commander, from the 1st Infantry Brigade. On the question how dangerous it is Captain Makharidze answered with smile “It’s quite dangerous, but we are not afraid…We help Iraqi people.”
Deputy Defence Minister Batu Kutelia commented on the visit: “We have discussed the success of Georgian Military in Iraq and General Petraeus evaluates our mission very highly. He thanked us for our decision to continue our contingent here in Iraq until the end of year.”
According to BG Gogava: “General Petraeus estimated very positively the Georgian troops… He has once more underlined the high level of preparedness of the Georgian soldiers. There were a lot of thankful words said about Georgian Armed Forces. Afterwards there was a detailed conversation about the present situation in Vassit Province, and what a positive role has been played by the Georgian soldiers. These were the main subjects which were discussed by us. Then after we talked about the future plans, and the role of Georgian military in future operations in Vassit Province.”
Internal Minister of de facto South Ossetia Mikheil Mindzaev, has confirmed the information over equipment of the fortification structures. According to Mindzaev, the ministry is obliged to conduct engineering works and reinforce the posts in such a manner.
He added that there was not alternative and they were only acted in response to the same kind of activity on the part of the Georgians.
Moreover, the minister stated that the Georgian side intends to implement provocations and these actions will be directed towards peaceful population in the breakaway region. “We are aware that Tskhinvali is violating the agreement by such steps, but it is worth noting that Georgia has taken the first steps in violation and we only responded,” Mikhail Mindzaev stated.
The launching of fortifying activities on the part of Ossetian separatists has been evaluated as grave violation of the agreement by OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Original article posted here.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Monday, September 08, 2008
Fanning the Georgian flames
US shrinks from arming Georgia
By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON - As if the outgoing administration of US President George W Bush didn't already have enough on its plate, the question of whether and how to re-arm Georgia in the aftermath of its thrashing last month by Russia is moving steadily up an increasingly crowded foreign policy agenda.
Moscow has already signaled that any move to supply the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili with the advanced weapons that he has long sought - including the powerful hand-held anti-tank rockets and Stinger surface-to-air missiles which contributed heavily to Russia's defeat in Afghanistan - will significantly increase tensions with Washington, which soared to a post-Cold War high in the wake of the Russian intervention.
But besides pledging to continue its push for Georgia's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)- something with which Washington's European allies would have to go along with - the Bush administration has so far declined to make any promises in regard to military aid.
Indeed, even Vice President Dick Cheney, who had reportedly pushed hard for sending such advanced equipment to Georgia even before last month's war, refrained from making any promises last Thursday during his high-profile visit to the Georgian capital.
"Over time, I'm sure, people will look at what happened with the military here and what the needs are," an official who accompanied Cheney on his four-hour stay in Tbilisi told US reporters on the vice president's plane. "But I think the focus for the moment is on the humanitarian and long-term economic needs."
The issue is nonetheless likely to loom large in the coming months, particularly if foreign policy plays a key role in the ongoing presidential election campaign, which moved into high gear on Friday with the end of the Republican National Convention.
In his acceptance of the Republican presidential nomination on Thursday night, Senator John McCain called for "solidarity" with Georgia in a speech that was remarkably light on foreign policy issues. From the moment that hostilities between Georgia and Russia began, McCain, who considers Saakashvili a friend and who he spoke with frequently by phone during the crisis, has consistently called for stronger action against Russia than the administration has been willing to take, including expelling it from the Group of Eight (G-8) nations.
While McCain has not explicitly endorsed filling Saakashvili's wish list, some of his key neo-conservative advisers, such as Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations and Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, have pressed the administration to take such a course. Their appeal has been supported by two of McCain's closest senate colleagues.
"Specifically, the Georgian military should be given the anti-aircraft and anti-armor systems necessary to deter any renewed Russian aggression," wrote independent Democrat Joe Lieberman and Lindsay Graham, in the Wall Street Journal late last month. "We avoided giving the types of security aid that could have been used to blunt Russia's conventional onslaught. It is time for that to change," according to the two senators.
Their advice was published just as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev formally recognized the two breakaway Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, in defiance of a personal appeal by Bush for him not to do so.
While Bush and other top administration officials strongly denounced Medvedev's move - Cheney on September 4 called it "an illegitimate, unilateral attempt to change [Georgia's] borders by force". The administration has so far moved relatively cautiously, ignoring appeals for stepped-up military aid to rebuild Georgia's battered forces and upgrade its weaponry. The emphasis instead has been on the delivery of humanitarian and economic assistance.
"The first order of business should not be some sort of punishment," Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Daniel Fried told the Washington Times. "Russia has to decide how much it wants to isolate itself from the world. We don't want to have a bad relationship with Russia. We've never wanted that."
So far, US actions have been largely limited to its pledge to push Georgia's and Ukraine's membership in NATO, effectively shelving Russia ascension to the World Trade Organization, and to suspend a bilateral strategic dialogue and review a number of other bilateral military cooperation agreements.
In the immediate aftermath of the five-day war, Washington also quickly sealed a long-pending bilateral accord that would permit it to build missile defense systems in Poland. That move drew particularly harsh criticism from Moscow, which has also reiterated a vow to strongly oppose any efforts to admit Georgia and Ukraine to NATO - a military alliance which it sees as aimed at encircling and containing Russia.
Aside from those moves the administration has focused on supplying humanitarian and economic assistance to Georgia - albeit via military transport aircraft and warships in the Black Sea. In conjunction with the European Union (EU) it has also helped arrange a US$750 million line of credit to help Tbilisi finance the repair of the substantial infrastructural damages it incurred in the war.
In addition, Washington has pledged $1 billion in economic and reconstruction assistance, more than half of which will be sent over the next five months. That amount would make the Caucasian nation the fourth biggest US aid recipient after Israel, Iraq, and Egypt.
The administration's relative caution, particularly with respect to military aid, appears motivated by several factors.
Increasing tensions with Moscow further could seriously jeopardize other top foreign policy interests, according to senior officials and independent analysts, including Washington's hopes for applying additional pressure, particularly through the UN Security Council, on Iran to halt its nuclear program. It could prompt Russia to suspend an agreement that lets NATO use Russian and Central Asian bases and air space to supply its troops in Afghanistan.
A more aggressive stance could also harm relations with key European allies, such as Germany, France, and Italy, which are eager to ramp down tensions, in part due to their own heavy investments in Russia's economy and dependence on gas supplies.
US officials are also reluctant to address the question of additional military aid in light of the Georgian armed forces' poor performance during the war - the army retreated in chaos at the first contact, while all of its warships were destroyed in port - and what some of them describe as the recklessness of Saakashvili himself in ordering the attack on Tskhinvali that triggered Russia's offensive.
Jim Lobe's blog on US foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.
Original article posted here.
By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON - As if the outgoing administration of US President George W Bush didn't already have enough on its plate, the question of whether and how to re-arm Georgia in the aftermath of its thrashing last month by Russia is moving steadily up an increasingly crowded foreign policy agenda.
Moscow has already signaled that any move to supply the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili with the advanced weapons that he has long sought - including the powerful hand-held anti-tank rockets and Stinger surface-to-air missiles which contributed heavily to Russia's defeat in Afghanistan - will significantly increase tensions with Washington, which soared to a post-Cold War high in the wake of the Russian intervention.
But besides pledging to continue its push for Georgia's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)- something with which Washington's European allies would have to go along with - the Bush administration has so far declined to make any promises in regard to military aid.
Indeed, even Vice President Dick Cheney, who had reportedly pushed hard for sending such advanced equipment to Georgia even before last month's war, refrained from making any promises last Thursday during his high-profile visit to the Georgian capital.
"Over time, I'm sure, people will look at what happened with the military here and what the needs are," an official who accompanied Cheney on his four-hour stay in Tbilisi told US reporters on the vice president's plane. "But I think the focus for the moment is on the humanitarian and long-term economic needs."
The issue is nonetheless likely to loom large in the coming months, particularly if foreign policy plays a key role in the ongoing presidential election campaign, which moved into high gear on Friday with the end of the Republican National Convention.
In his acceptance of the Republican presidential nomination on Thursday night, Senator John McCain called for "solidarity" with Georgia in a speech that was remarkably light on foreign policy issues. From the moment that hostilities between Georgia and Russia began, McCain, who considers Saakashvili a friend and who he spoke with frequently by phone during the crisis, has consistently called for stronger action against Russia than the administration has been willing to take, including expelling it from the Group of Eight (G-8) nations.
While McCain has not explicitly endorsed filling Saakashvili's wish list, some of his key neo-conservative advisers, such as Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations and Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, have pressed the administration to take such a course. Their appeal has been supported by two of McCain's closest senate colleagues.
"Specifically, the Georgian military should be given the anti-aircraft and anti-armor systems necessary to deter any renewed Russian aggression," wrote independent Democrat Joe Lieberman and Lindsay Graham, in the Wall Street Journal late last month. "We avoided giving the types of security aid that could have been used to blunt Russia's conventional onslaught. It is time for that to change," according to the two senators.
Their advice was published just as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev formally recognized the two breakaway Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, in defiance of a personal appeal by Bush for him not to do so.
While Bush and other top administration officials strongly denounced Medvedev's move - Cheney on September 4 called it "an illegitimate, unilateral attempt to change [Georgia's] borders by force". The administration has so far moved relatively cautiously, ignoring appeals for stepped-up military aid to rebuild Georgia's battered forces and upgrade its weaponry. The emphasis instead has been on the delivery of humanitarian and economic assistance.
"The first order of business should not be some sort of punishment," Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Daniel Fried told the Washington Times. "Russia has to decide how much it wants to isolate itself from the world. We don't want to have a bad relationship with Russia. We've never wanted that."
So far, US actions have been largely limited to its pledge to push Georgia's and Ukraine's membership in NATO, effectively shelving Russia ascension to the World Trade Organization, and to suspend a bilateral strategic dialogue and review a number of other bilateral military cooperation agreements.
In the immediate aftermath of the five-day war, Washington also quickly sealed a long-pending bilateral accord that would permit it to build missile defense systems in Poland. That move drew particularly harsh criticism from Moscow, which has also reiterated a vow to strongly oppose any efforts to admit Georgia and Ukraine to NATO - a military alliance which it sees as aimed at encircling and containing Russia.
Aside from those moves the administration has focused on supplying humanitarian and economic assistance to Georgia - albeit via military transport aircraft and warships in the Black Sea. In conjunction with the European Union (EU) it has also helped arrange a US$750 million line of credit to help Tbilisi finance the repair of the substantial infrastructural damages it incurred in the war.
In addition, Washington has pledged $1 billion in economic and reconstruction assistance, more than half of which will be sent over the next five months. That amount would make the Caucasian nation the fourth biggest US aid recipient after Israel, Iraq, and Egypt.
The administration's relative caution, particularly with respect to military aid, appears motivated by several factors.
Increasing tensions with Moscow further could seriously jeopardize other top foreign policy interests, according to senior officials and independent analysts, including Washington's hopes for applying additional pressure, particularly through the UN Security Council, on Iran to halt its nuclear program. It could prompt Russia to suspend an agreement that lets NATO use Russian and Central Asian bases and air space to supply its troops in Afghanistan.
A more aggressive stance could also harm relations with key European allies, such as Germany, France, and Italy, which are eager to ramp down tensions, in part due to their own heavy investments in Russia's economy and dependence on gas supplies.
US officials are also reluctant to address the question of additional military aid in light of the Georgian armed forces' poor performance during the war - the army retreated in chaos at the first contact, while all of its warships were destroyed in port - and what some of them describe as the recklessness of Saakashvili himself in ordering the attack on Tskhinvali that triggered Russia's offensive.
Jim Lobe's blog on US foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.
Original article posted here.
Thursday, September 04, 2008
Updates on the Grand Chessboard
Putin's Ruthless Gambit
The Bush Administration Falters in a Geopolitical Chess Match
By Michael T. Klare
"TomDispatch" -- - Many Western analysts have chosen to interpret the recent fighting in the Caucasus as the onset of a new Cold War, with a small pro-Western democracy bravely resisting a brutal reincarnation of Stalin's jack-booted Soviet Union. Others have viewed it a throwback to the age-old ethnic politics of southeastern Europe, with assorted minorities using contemporary border disputes to settle ancient scores.
Neither of these explanations is accurate. To fully grasp the recent upheavals in the Caucasus, it is necessary to view the conflict as but a minor skirmish in a far more significant geopolitical struggle between Moscow and Washington over the energy riches of the Caspian Sea basin -- with former Russian President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin emerging as the reigning Grand Master of geostrategic chess and the Bush team turning out to be middling amateurs, at best.
The ultimate prize in this contest is control over the flow of oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Caspian basin to eager markets in Europe and Asia. According to the most recent tally by oil giant BP, the Caspian's leading energy producers, all former "socialist republics" of the Soviet Union -- notably Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- together possess approximately 48 billion barrels in proven oil reserves (roughly equivalent to those left in the U.S. and Canada) and 268 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (essentially equivalent to what Saudi Arabia possesses).
During the Soviet era, the oil and gas output of these nations was, of course, controlled by officials in Moscow and largely allocated to Russia and other Soviet republics. After the breakup of the USSR in 1991, however, Western oil companies began to participate in the hydrocarbon equivalent of a gold rush to exploit Caspian energy reservoirs, while plans were being made to channel the region's oil and gas to markets across the world.
Rush to the Caspian
In the 1990s, the Caspian Sea basin was viewed as the world's most promising new source of oil and gas, and so the major Western energy firms -- Chevron, BP, Shell, and Exxon Mobil, among others -- rushed into the region to take advantage of what seemed a golden opportunity. For these firms, persuading the governments of the newly independent Caspian states to sign deals proved to be no great hassle. They were eager to attract Western investment -- and the bribes that often came with it -- and to free themselves from Moscow's economic domination.
But there turned out to be a major catch: It was neither obvious nor easy to figure out how to move all the new oil and gas to markets in the West. After all, the Caspian is landlocked, so tankers cannot get near it, while all existing pipelines passed through Russia and were hooked into Soviet-era supply systems. While many in Washington were eager to assist U.S. firms in their drive to gain access to Caspian energy, they did not want to see the resulting oil and gas flow through Russia -- until recently, the country's leading adversary -- before reaching Western markets.
What, then, to do? Looking at the Caspian chessboard in the mid-1990s, President Bill Clinton conceived the striking notion of converting the newly independent, energy-poor Republic of Georgia into an "energy corridor" for the export of Caspian basin oil and gas to the West, thereby bypassing Russia altogether. An initial, "early-oil" pipeline was built to carry petroleum from newly-developed fields in Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea to Supsa on Georgia's Black Sea coast, where it was loaded onto tankers for delivery to international markets. This would be followed by a far more audacious scheme: the construction of the 1,000-mile BTC pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Tbilisi in Georgia and then on to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast. Again, the idea was to exclude Russia -- which had, in the intervening years, been transformed into a struggling, increasingly impoverished former superpower -- from the Caspian Sea energy rush.
Clinton presided over every stage of the BTC line's initial development, from its early conception to the formal arrangements imposed by Washington on the three nations involved in its corporate structuring. (Final work on the pipeline was not completed until 2006, two years into George W. Bush's second term.) For Clinton and his advisors, this was geopolitics, pure and simple -- a calculated effort to enhance Western energy security while diminishing Moscow's control over the global flow of oil and gas. The administration's efforts to promote the construction of new pipelines through Azerbaijan and Georgia were intended "to break Russia's monopoly of control over the transportation of oil from the region," Sheila Heslin of the National Security Council bluntly told a Senate investigating committee in 1997.
Clinton understood that this strategy entailed significant risks, particularly because Washington's favored "energy corridor" passed through or near several major conflict zones -- including the Russian-backed breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With this in mind, Clinton made a secondary decision -- to convert the new Georgian army into a military proxy of the United States, quipped and trained by the Department of Defense. From 1998 to 2000 alone, Georgia was awarded $302 million in U.S. military and economic aid -- more than any other Caspian country -- and top U.S. military officials started making regular trips to its capital, Tbilisi, to demonstrate support for then-president Eduard Shevardnadze.
In those years, Clinton was the top chess player in the Caspian region, while his Russian presidential counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, was far too preoccupied with domestic troubles and a bitter, costly, ongoing guerrilla war in Chechnya to match his moves. It was clear, however, that senior Russian officials were deeply concerned by the growing U.S. presence in their southern backyard -- what they called their "near abroad" -- and had already had begun planning for an eventual comeback. "It hasn't been left unnoticed in Russia that certain outside interests are trying to weaken our position in the Caspian basin," Andrei Y. Urnov of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in May 2000. "No one should be perplexed that Russia is determined to resist the attempts to encroach on her interests."
Russia Resurgent
At this critical moment, a far more capable player took over on Russia's side of the geopolitical chessboard. On December 31, 1999, Vladimir V. Putin was appointed president by Yeltsin and then, on March 26, 2000, elected to a full four-year term in office. Politics in the Caucasus and the Caspian region have never been the same.
Even before assuming the presidency, Putin indicated that he believed state control over energy resources should be the basis for Russia's return to great-power status. In his doctoral dissertation, a summary of which was published in 1999, he had written that "[t]he state has the right to regulate the process of the acquisition and the use of natural resources, and particularly mineral resources [including oil and natural gas], independent of on whose property they are located." On this basis, Putin presided over the re-nationalization of many of the energy companies that had been privatized by Yeltsin and the virtual confiscation of Yukos -- once Russia's richest private energy firm -- by Russian state authorities. He also brought Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas supplier, back under state control and placed a protégé, Dmitri Medvedev -- now president of Russia -- at its helm.
Once he had restored state control over the lion's share of Russia's oil and gas resources, Putin turned his attention to the next obvious place -- the Caspian Sea basin. Here, his intent was not so much to gain ownership of its energy resources -- although Russian firms have in recent years acquired an equity share in some Caspian oil and gas fields -- but rather to dominate the export conduits used to transport its energy to Europe and Asia.
Russia already enjoyed a considerable advantage since much of Kazakhstan's oil already flowed to the West via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through Russia before terminating on the Black Sea; moreover, much of Central Asia's natural gas continued to flow to Russia through pipelines built during the Soviet era. But Putin's gambit in the Caspian region evidently was meant to capture a far more ambitious prize. He wanted to ensure that most oil and gas from newly developed fields in the Caspian basin would travel west via Russia.
The first part of this drive entailed frenzied diplomacy by Putin and Medvedev (still in his role as board chairman of Gazprom) to persuade the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to ship their future output of gas through Russia. Success was achieved when, in December 2007, Putin signed an agreement with the leaders of these countries to supply 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year through a new conduit along the Caspian's eastern shore to southern Russia -- for ultimate delivery to Europe via Gazprom's existing pipeline network.
Meanwhile, Putin moved to undermine international confidence in Georgia as a reliable future corridor for energy delivery. This became a strategic priority for Moscow because the European Union announced plans to build a $10 billion natural-gas pipeline from the Caspian, dubbed Nabucco" after the opera by Verdi. It would run from Turkey to Austria, while linking up to an expanded South Caucasus gas pipeline that now extends from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Erzurum in Turkey. The Nabucco pipeline was intended as a dramatic move to reduce Europe's reliance on Russian natural gas -- and so has enjoyed strong support from the Bush administration.
It is against this backdrop that the recent events in Georgia unfolded.
Checkmate in Georgia
Obviously, the more oil and gas passing through Georgia on its way to the West, the greater that country's geostrategic significance in the U.S.-Russian struggle over the distribution of Caspian energy. Certainly, the Bush administration recognized this and responded by providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to the Georgian military and helping to train specialized forces for protection of the new pipelines. But the administration's partner in Tbilisi, President Mikheil Saakashvili, was not content to play the relatively modest role of pipeline protector. Instead, he sought to pursue a megalomaniacal fantasy of recapturing the breakaway regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia with American help. As it happened, the Bush team -- blindsided by their own neoconservative fantasies -- saw in Saakashvili a useful pawn in their pursuit of a long smoldering anti-Russian agenda. Together, they walked into a trap cleverly set by Putin.
It is hard not to conclude that Russian prime minister goaded the rash Saakashvili into invading South Ossetia by encouraging Abkhazian and South Ossetian irregulars to attack Georgian outposts and villages on the peripheries of the two enclaves. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly told Saakashvili not to respond to such provocations when she met with him in July. Apparently her advice fell on deaf ears. Far more enticing, it seems, was her promise of strong U.S. backing for Georgia's rapid entry into NATO. Other American leaders, including Senator John McCain, assured Saakashvili of unwavering U.S. support. Whatever was said in these private conversations, the Georgian president seems to have interpreted them as a green light for his adventuristic impulses. On August 7th, by all accounts, his forces invaded South Ossetia and attacked its capital city of Tskhinvali, giving Putin what he long craved -- a seemingly legitimate excuse to invade Georgia and demonstrate the complete vulnerability of Clinton's (and now Bush's) vaunted energy corridor.
Today, the Georgian army is in shambles, the BTC and South Caucasus gas pipelines are within range of Russian firepower, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia have declared their independence, quickly receiving Russian recognition. In response to these developments, the Bush administration has, along with some friendly leaders in Europe, mounted a media and diplomatic counterattack, accusing Moscow of barbaric behavior and assorted violations of international law. Threats have also been made to exclude Russia from various international forums and institutions, such as the G-8 club of governments and the World Trade Organization. It is possible, then, that Moscow will suffer some isolation and inconvenience as a result of its incursion into Georgia.
None of this, so far as can be determined, will alter the picture in the Caucasus: Putin has moved his most powerful pieces onto this corner of the chessboard, America's pawn has been decisively defeated, and there's not much of a practical nature that Washington (or London or Paris or Berlin) can do to alter the outcome.
There will, of course, be more rounds to come, and it is impossible to predict how they will play out. Putin prevailed this time around because he focused on geopolitical objectives, while his opponents were blindly driven by fantasy and ideology; so long as this pattern persists, he or his successors are likely to come out on top. Only if American leaders assume a more realistic approach to Russia's resurgent power or, alternatively, choose to collaborate with Moscow in the exploitation of Caspian energy, will the risk of further strategic setbacks in the region disappear.
Michael T. Klare is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (Metropolitan Books).
Original article posted here.
The Bush Administration Falters in a Geopolitical Chess Match
By Michael T. Klare
"TomDispatch" -- - Many Western analysts have chosen to interpret the recent fighting in the Caucasus as the onset of a new Cold War, with a small pro-Western democracy bravely resisting a brutal reincarnation of Stalin's jack-booted Soviet Union. Others have viewed it a throwback to the age-old ethnic politics of southeastern Europe, with assorted minorities using contemporary border disputes to settle ancient scores.
Neither of these explanations is accurate. To fully grasp the recent upheavals in the Caucasus, it is necessary to view the conflict as but a minor skirmish in a far more significant geopolitical struggle between Moscow and Washington over the energy riches of the Caspian Sea basin -- with former Russian President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin emerging as the reigning Grand Master of geostrategic chess and the Bush team turning out to be middling amateurs, at best.
The ultimate prize in this contest is control over the flow of oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Caspian basin to eager markets in Europe and Asia. According to the most recent tally by oil giant BP, the Caspian's leading energy producers, all former "socialist republics" of the Soviet Union -- notably Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- together possess approximately 48 billion barrels in proven oil reserves (roughly equivalent to those left in the U.S. and Canada) and 268 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (essentially equivalent to what Saudi Arabia possesses).
During the Soviet era, the oil and gas output of these nations was, of course, controlled by officials in Moscow and largely allocated to Russia and other Soviet republics. After the breakup of the USSR in 1991, however, Western oil companies began to participate in the hydrocarbon equivalent of a gold rush to exploit Caspian energy reservoirs, while plans were being made to channel the region's oil and gas to markets across the world.
Rush to the Caspian
In the 1990s, the Caspian Sea basin was viewed as the world's most promising new source of oil and gas, and so the major Western energy firms -- Chevron, BP, Shell, and Exxon Mobil, among others -- rushed into the region to take advantage of what seemed a golden opportunity. For these firms, persuading the governments of the newly independent Caspian states to sign deals proved to be no great hassle. They were eager to attract Western investment -- and the bribes that often came with it -- and to free themselves from Moscow's economic domination.
But there turned out to be a major catch: It was neither obvious nor easy to figure out how to move all the new oil and gas to markets in the West. After all, the Caspian is landlocked, so tankers cannot get near it, while all existing pipelines passed through Russia and were hooked into Soviet-era supply systems. While many in Washington were eager to assist U.S. firms in their drive to gain access to Caspian energy, they did not want to see the resulting oil and gas flow through Russia -- until recently, the country's leading adversary -- before reaching Western markets.
What, then, to do? Looking at the Caspian chessboard in the mid-1990s, President Bill Clinton conceived the striking notion of converting the newly independent, energy-poor Republic of Georgia into an "energy corridor" for the export of Caspian basin oil and gas to the West, thereby bypassing Russia altogether. An initial, "early-oil" pipeline was built to carry petroleum from newly-developed fields in Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea to Supsa on Georgia's Black Sea coast, where it was loaded onto tankers for delivery to international markets. This would be followed by a far more audacious scheme: the construction of the 1,000-mile BTC pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Tbilisi in Georgia and then on to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast. Again, the idea was to exclude Russia -- which had, in the intervening years, been transformed into a struggling, increasingly impoverished former superpower -- from the Caspian Sea energy rush.
Clinton presided over every stage of the BTC line's initial development, from its early conception to the formal arrangements imposed by Washington on the three nations involved in its corporate structuring. (Final work on the pipeline was not completed until 2006, two years into George W. Bush's second term.) For Clinton and his advisors, this was geopolitics, pure and simple -- a calculated effort to enhance Western energy security while diminishing Moscow's control over the global flow of oil and gas. The administration's efforts to promote the construction of new pipelines through Azerbaijan and Georgia were intended "to break Russia's monopoly of control over the transportation of oil from the region," Sheila Heslin of the National Security Council bluntly told a Senate investigating committee in 1997.
Clinton understood that this strategy entailed significant risks, particularly because Washington's favored "energy corridor" passed through or near several major conflict zones -- including the Russian-backed breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With this in mind, Clinton made a secondary decision -- to convert the new Georgian army into a military proxy of the United States, quipped and trained by the Department of Defense. From 1998 to 2000 alone, Georgia was awarded $302 million in U.S. military and economic aid -- more than any other Caspian country -- and top U.S. military officials started making regular trips to its capital, Tbilisi, to demonstrate support for then-president Eduard Shevardnadze.
In those years, Clinton was the top chess player in the Caspian region, while his Russian presidential counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, was far too preoccupied with domestic troubles and a bitter, costly, ongoing guerrilla war in Chechnya to match his moves. It was clear, however, that senior Russian officials were deeply concerned by the growing U.S. presence in their southern backyard -- what they called their "near abroad" -- and had already had begun planning for an eventual comeback. "It hasn't been left unnoticed in Russia that certain outside interests are trying to weaken our position in the Caspian basin," Andrei Y. Urnov of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in May 2000. "No one should be perplexed that Russia is determined to resist the attempts to encroach on her interests."
Russia Resurgent
At this critical moment, a far more capable player took over on Russia's side of the geopolitical chessboard. On December 31, 1999, Vladimir V. Putin was appointed president by Yeltsin and then, on March 26, 2000, elected to a full four-year term in office. Politics in the Caucasus and the Caspian region have never been the same.
Even before assuming the presidency, Putin indicated that he believed state control over energy resources should be the basis for Russia's return to great-power status. In his doctoral dissertation, a summary of which was published in 1999, he had written that "[t]he state has the right to regulate the process of the acquisition and the use of natural resources, and particularly mineral resources [including oil and natural gas], independent of on whose property they are located." On this basis, Putin presided over the re-nationalization of many of the energy companies that had been privatized by Yeltsin and the virtual confiscation of Yukos -- once Russia's richest private energy firm -- by Russian state authorities. He also brought Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas supplier, back under state control and placed a protégé, Dmitri Medvedev -- now president of Russia -- at its helm.
Once he had restored state control over the lion's share of Russia's oil and gas resources, Putin turned his attention to the next obvious place -- the Caspian Sea basin. Here, his intent was not so much to gain ownership of its energy resources -- although Russian firms have in recent years acquired an equity share in some Caspian oil and gas fields -- but rather to dominate the export conduits used to transport its energy to Europe and Asia.
Russia already enjoyed a considerable advantage since much of Kazakhstan's oil already flowed to the West via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through Russia before terminating on the Black Sea; moreover, much of Central Asia's natural gas continued to flow to Russia through pipelines built during the Soviet era. But Putin's gambit in the Caspian region evidently was meant to capture a far more ambitious prize. He wanted to ensure that most oil and gas from newly developed fields in the Caspian basin would travel west via Russia.
The first part of this drive entailed frenzied diplomacy by Putin and Medvedev (still in his role as board chairman of Gazprom) to persuade the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to ship their future output of gas through Russia. Success was achieved when, in December 2007, Putin signed an agreement with the leaders of these countries to supply 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year through a new conduit along the Caspian's eastern shore to southern Russia -- for ultimate delivery to Europe via Gazprom's existing pipeline network.
Meanwhile, Putin moved to undermine international confidence in Georgia as a reliable future corridor for energy delivery. This became a strategic priority for Moscow because the European Union announced plans to build a $10 billion natural-gas pipeline from the Caspian, dubbed Nabucco" after the opera by Verdi. It would run from Turkey to Austria, while linking up to an expanded South Caucasus gas pipeline that now extends from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Erzurum in Turkey. The Nabucco pipeline was intended as a dramatic move to reduce Europe's reliance on Russian natural gas -- and so has enjoyed strong support from the Bush administration.
It is against this backdrop that the recent events in Georgia unfolded.
Checkmate in Georgia
Obviously, the more oil and gas passing through Georgia on its way to the West, the greater that country's geostrategic significance in the U.S.-Russian struggle over the distribution of Caspian energy. Certainly, the Bush administration recognized this and responded by providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to the Georgian military and helping to train specialized forces for protection of the new pipelines. But the administration's partner in Tbilisi, President Mikheil Saakashvili, was not content to play the relatively modest role of pipeline protector. Instead, he sought to pursue a megalomaniacal fantasy of recapturing the breakaway regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia with American help. As it happened, the Bush team -- blindsided by their own neoconservative fantasies -- saw in Saakashvili a useful pawn in their pursuit of a long smoldering anti-Russian agenda. Together, they walked into a trap cleverly set by Putin.
It is hard not to conclude that Russian prime minister goaded the rash Saakashvili into invading South Ossetia by encouraging Abkhazian and South Ossetian irregulars to attack Georgian outposts and villages on the peripheries of the two enclaves. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly told Saakashvili not to respond to such provocations when she met with him in July. Apparently her advice fell on deaf ears. Far more enticing, it seems, was her promise of strong U.S. backing for Georgia's rapid entry into NATO. Other American leaders, including Senator John McCain, assured Saakashvili of unwavering U.S. support. Whatever was said in these private conversations, the Georgian president seems to have interpreted them as a green light for his adventuristic impulses. On August 7th, by all accounts, his forces invaded South Ossetia and attacked its capital city of Tskhinvali, giving Putin what he long craved -- a seemingly legitimate excuse to invade Georgia and demonstrate the complete vulnerability of Clinton's (and now Bush's) vaunted energy corridor.
Today, the Georgian army is in shambles, the BTC and South Caucasus gas pipelines are within range of Russian firepower, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia have declared their independence, quickly receiving Russian recognition. In response to these developments, the Bush administration has, along with some friendly leaders in Europe, mounted a media and diplomatic counterattack, accusing Moscow of barbaric behavior and assorted violations of international law. Threats have also been made to exclude Russia from various international forums and institutions, such as the G-8 club of governments and the World Trade Organization. It is possible, then, that Moscow will suffer some isolation and inconvenience as a result of its incursion into Georgia.
None of this, so far as can be determined, will alter the picture in the Caucasus: Putin has moved his most powerful pieces onto this corner of the chessboard, America's pawn has been decisively defeated, and there's not much of a practical nature that Washington (or London or Paris or Berlin) can do to alter the outcome.
There will, of course, be more rounds to come, and it is impossible to predict how they will play out. Putin prevailed this time around because he focused on geopolitical objectives, while his opponents were blindly driven by fantasy and ideology; so long as this pattern persists, he or his successors are likely to come out on top. Only if American leaders assume a more realistic approach to Russia's resurgent power or, alternatively, choose to collaborate with Moscow in the exploitation of Caspian energy, will the risk of further strategic setbacks in the region disappear.
Michael T. Klare is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (Metropolitan Books).
Original article posted here.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
More mongering of EU trying to recreate New Cold War -- Mission accomplished
UK warns over 'Russia aggression' | ||
UK prime minister Gordon Brown has said Nato and the EU must reassess their relations with the Kremlin to prevent further "Russian aggression". His comments came amid fears Russia could cut oil and gas flows in the row over Georgia. Mr Brown, writing in the Observer, urged the EU to do a "root and branch" review of relations with the Kremlin. On Saturday President Dmitry Medvedev and Mr Brown spoke by phone as Russia moved to ease tensions with Europe. Rights and responsibilities Mr Brown wrote in Sunday's Observer newspaper one day ahead of a summit of European heads of state to discuss the South Ossetia crisis. The conflict in the region began on 7 August when Georgia tried to regain control of South Ossetia by force, which was followed by a Russian counter-attack deep into Georgia. Mr Brown said: "When Russia has a grievance over an issue such as South Ossetia, it should act multilaterally by consent rather than unilaterally by force." He went on: "My message to Russia is simple. If you want to be welcome at the top table of organisations such as the G8, OECD and WTO, you must accept that with rights come responsibilities.
"We want Russia to be a good partner in the G8 and other organisations, but it cannot pick and choose which rules to adhere to. "That is why I will argue tomorrow that Russia should accept Georgia's territorial integrity and international mechanisms for addressing these conflicts, and withdraw troops to their previous positions. "And, in the light of Russian actions, the EU should review - root and branch - our relationship with Russia." He added: "We are also reflecting on the Nato response. We must re-evaluate the alliance's relationship with Russia, and intensify our support to Georgia and others who may face Russian aggression." Mr Brown also said the summit "must add urgency to the work on Europe's energy agenda". "We must more rapidly build relationships with other producers of oil and gas," Mr Brown said. 'Very clear message' The prime minister said he had told Mr Medvedev to expect a "determined response" from European leaders. Shadow foreign secretary William Hague said European states should resist a rush to sanctions and instead exert long-term pressure. "It is very important for the EU now to reassess its relationship with Russia and send a very clear message," he told Sky News. "I do not think the measures looked at tomorrow should be cheap or quick. This requires clear and united and patient firmness over a sustained period of time." He added: "It is wrong that it is now easier for Russian citizens to get visas into European countries than it is for Georgians. "Georgia is a transparent democracy, an open society. Russia is clearly going in the wrong direction in that respect." Former Liberal Democrat leader, Sir Menzies Campbell, said it could be dangerous to isolate Russia. "I think we've got to make clear our displeasure about the way in which Russia has acted outrageously," he told the BBC. "But if by doing so, in a particular way and with particular language, we drive Russia into isolation, then sulking Russia, in isolation, will be even more difficult to deal with. "And that's why when people talk about expulsion from the G8 and things of that kind, I think they've got to understand what the possible consequences of that would be to the Russian government's attitude." 'Disregard for principles' Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary David Miliband has said there is no excuse for the violation of international law. Writing in the Mail on Sunday, he said: "Russia has become the aggressor - it has gone from claiming to defend Russian passport holders in regions of Georgia to seeking the break-up of the state, showing disregard for the principles of modern international relations. "The immediate instinct of the prime minister and I was clear: to speak out against aggression, to call for respect for human rights and international law and to rally world opinion behind these principles." During his conversation with Mr Brown, Mr Medvedev said Russia was in favour of the deployment to Georgia of additional monitors from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In a separate development, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to his German counterpart Frank-Walter Steinmeier. They agreed on the need to "put an end to attempts to use the situation surrounding Georgia... to raise tensions in Europe by speculating on non-existent threats concerning other post-Soviet countries", said the Russian foreign ministry. Georgia has cut diplomatic ties with Russia after Moscow recognised the independence of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. | ||
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Obama's Georgia position: No change, same ole shit
Change? Regarding Georgia and South Ossetia the gibberish seems frighteningly familiar in positions taken yesterday regarding Georgia.
http://www.bloomberg.com/a
In an earlier statement regarding Kosovo, Obama had been particularly subtle. While he said that "Kosovo’s independence is a unique situation resulting from the irreparable rupture Slobodan Milosevic’s actions caused; it is in no way a precedent for anyone else in the region or around the world." it also seems to me that everyone can argue that their particular situation is unique.
http://2008central.net/200
And why would recognizing the right of self determination of people who want to be independent be abhorrent to Western values? Isn't this what concerning Tibet is all about?
The fact is that these positions are driven less by principled positions that by real-politic maneuvers in a geo-strategic fight of positions taken "to preserve US interests." The US has been promoting the breakup of both Bolivia and Venezuela, but, as is usual with the Bush Administration, has failed miserably. (Venezuela: oil rich Zania region http://notapundit.wordpres
As a result of Bush's meddling, Bolivian president Evo Morales was forced to issue a recall vote regarding his presidency after refusing to recognize the secessionist attempts. He won the recall vote easily, but it still seems that trouble is brewing, and it is quite likely that US money and advice spurs these efforts.
http://www.taipeitimes.com
So when Obummer and McCain talk about the illegality of South Ossetia to be independent, and the unwise behavior of Russia to recognize autonomy, please do not believe a word of it. Rather it all comes down to friends, enemies and natural resources. And in this regard Obummer is singing much the same song as the front and center warmongers, Bush and McCain, filled with much the same hypocrisy and duplicity.
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Russia not so scared, and calling the West's bluff
Russia recognises Georgian rebels | ||||||
| Russian president speaks to BBC President Dmitry Medvedev has declared that Russia formally recognises the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Mr Medvedev told the BBC Russia had tried to preserve Georgian unity for 17 years, but that the situation had changed after this month's violence. He said Moscow now felt obliged to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as other countries had done with Kosovo. The decree, in defiance of a plea from the US, has provoked a wave of protest. Georgia accused Russia of an unconcealed annexation of its territory, and said the decrees had no legal force.
The US and France called the Russian move regrettable, while the UK said it categorically rejected it. Nato said the declaration violated numerous UN Security Council resolutions that Russia itself had endorsed. However the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have had de facto independence since the early 1990s, thanked Russia. Fighting between Russia and Georgia began on 7 August after the Georgian military tried to retake South Ossetia by force. Russian forces subsequently launched a counter-attack and the conflict ended with the ejection of Georgian troops from both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and an EU-brokered ceasefire. 'No easy choice' In an announcement on Russian state television, President Medvedev said he had signed a decree to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. He instructed the Russian foreign ministry to open negotiations on formal diplomatic relations with the two regions and called on other states to follow his country's example. Mr Medvedev said he had "taken into account the expression of free will by the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples" and accused Georgia of failing over many years to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the problem.
"That was no easy choice to make, but it is the sole chance of saving people's lives," he added. The move followed votes in both houses of parliament on Monday, which called on Moscow to recognise the regions' independence. In an interview with the BBC at his residency in Sochi, on the border with Abkhazia, Mr Medvedev later said Russia had been obliged to act following a "genocide" started by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili against separatists in South Ossetia. The president compared Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the West's recognition of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. He also denied that Russia had breached the ceasefire agreement with Georgia, saying pursuing the security of the two regions included addressing their status. "The most important thing was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe to save the lives of people for whom we are responsible, because most of them they are Russian citizens," he said. "So we had to take a decision recognising the two states as independent." Mr Medvedev said relations with the West were deteriorating sharply and that a new Cold War could not be excluded, but that Russia did not want one. "There are no winners in a Cold War," he said. Violation Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria responded to the Russian announcement angrily, saying: "This is an unconcealed annexation of these territories, which are a part of Georgia." Western countries, including the US, Germany, the UK and France immediately condemned the move.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speaking from the West Bank city of Ramallah, said the decision was "regrettable". "Since the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council this simply will be dead on arrival in the Security Council," she said. Late on Monday, the US state department had warned that recognition of the two provinces' independence would be "a violation of Georgian territorial integrity" and "inconsistent with international law". In a statement, it said President George W Bush had called on Russia's leadership to "meet its commitments and not recognise these separatist regions". In the two breakaway regions, however, Moscow's move was warmly welcomed. The leader of South Ossetia's separatist government, Eduard Kokoity, said he would ask Moscow to set up a military base on his territory. In the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali there were scenes of jubilation while residents in Abkhazia took to the streets to celebrate the news, firing into the air. "We feel happy," said Aida Gabaz, a 38-year-old lawyer in the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi. "We all have tears in our eyes. We feel pride for our people." 'New understanding' Earlier on Tuesday, Russia cancelled a visit by Nato's secretary general, one of a series of measures to suspend co-operation with the military alliance.
Russia's ambassador to Nato said the trip would be delayed until relations between the two were clarified. Dmitry Rogozin said a "new understanding" needed to be reached between Russia and Nato. The BBC's Humphrey Hawksley, in Moscow, says the recognition is bound to dramatically heighten tensions in Russia's already fragile relationship with the West. He says this and a series of other announcements indicate that Russia is preparing itself for a showdown. Although most of Russia's forces pulled out of the rest of Georgia last Friday, it is maintaining a presence both within the two rebel regions and in buffer zones imposed round their boundaries. Port control Some Russian troops also continue to operate near the Black Sea port of Poti, south of Abkhazia, where Russia says it will carry out regular inspections of cargo. HAVE YOUR SAY Russia is right to recognise South Ossetia and guarantee its security Branco, Bulgaria The US said on Tuesday that its warships would deliver aid to Georgia's port of Poti, which is under Russian control. The move could mean US and Russian forces coming face to face. Earlier, the head of European security organisation, the OSCE, Alexander Stubb, accused Russia of trying to empty South Ossetia of Georgians. Speaking to the BBC's Europe Today programme, he said: "They are clearly trying to empty southern Ossetia from Georgians, which I don't think goes by any of the books that we deal with in international relations". At a checkpoint in South Ossetia, the BBC's Gabriel Gatehouse said a South Ossetian commander said many Georgian civilians had already left of their own accord, because they were scared of the guns. | ||||||
This is an unconcealed annexation of these territories, which are a part of Georgia 
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