Showing posts with label Muqtada al-Sadr. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muqtada al-Sadr. Show all posts

Thursday, April 24, 2008

What a failed occupation and a successful insurgency looks like

Sadr says US will always be enemy
Moqtada Sadr. File pic
Moqtada Sadr lost a key aide on Friday, shot dead in Najaf

Radical Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr has said the US will always be his enemy "till the last drop of blood".

Mr Sadr was responding to a statement by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, who said that all those within the political process were not enemies.

"I have no enemy but you. You are the occupier," Mr Sadr's statement said.

Iraqi forces have been clashing with militias such as Mr Sadr's Medhi Army since last month. The US said 13 gunmen were killed in Baghdad on Saturday.

The latest fighting was in Baghdad's eastern Sadr City suburb, a stronghold of supporters of Moqtada Sadr.

On Friday, Riyad al-Nuri, a relative and key aide of the cleric, was killed by gunmen in the city of Najaf

Which political process do you want to involve me in when you are occupying my land?
Moqtada Sadr

The cleric blamed the US "occupation" for Mr Nuri's death.

In his statement on Saturday, Moqtada Sadr said: "I heard the statement of the terrorist American defence minister and I feel compelled to give a decent response to such a terrorist. I have no enemy but you. You are the occupier."

At the Pentagon on Friday, Mr Gates referred to Mr Sadr as a "a significant political figure".

Mr Sadr called a ceasefire with US-led forces in August last year, which Washington has cited as a key contributing factor to lower levels of violence.

"Those who are prepared to work within the political process in Iraq, and peacefully, are not enemies of the United States," Mr Gates said.

Woman in Sadr City, 12 April
Iraqi forces launched an offensive in Sadr City a week ago
"[Mr Sadr] has a large following. And I think it's important that he become a part of the process if he isn't already."

But Mr Sadr asked: "Which political process do you want to involve me in when you are occupying my land?"

He said he would continue resisting the US presence in a "way that we consider suitable".

He urged the Iraqi government to "rid the land of the occupier" but said his followers should not "raise your weapons against Iraqis as long as they don't help the occupier".

Saturday's fighting in Sadr City was some of the worst there since Iraqi forces launched an offensive a week ago, residents said. US forces used both tanks and air support.

In Najaf, a curfew remained in place after the murder Mr Nuri.

Hundreds of people have died in clashes between Iraqi forces and militias, mainly in Baghdad and in Basra in the south, since Prime Minister Nouri Maliki ordered his crackdown on armed gangs.

Original article posted here.

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Why does it take the Asia Times the chutzpah to report what the American media won't?

Muqtada's biggest battle already won

By Sreeram Chaulia

A new study by the Washington DC-based advocacy organization, Refugees International, reveals that Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's militant force, Jaish-al-Mahdi, is the largest social welfare dispenser in Iraq.

It is a tribute to the Mahdi Army's successful adaptation of the model pioneered by Hezbollah in Lebanon. When survival needs of food, water, housing, electricity and protection are in short supply, and the state apparatus is unable or unwilling to come to the rescue of the population, radical non-state actors can exploit the vacuum and step in as provider of last resort.

The quid pro quo here is that the militant outfit's benevolence earns political legitimacy from the poor who bear the brunt of war. In return for rebuilding homes, hospitals, schools and places of



worship destroyed by the enemy, the outfit wins fanatical loyalty from its target constituency. Since militant armies rely on guerrilla-style warfare, their core strength lies in mass public approval and participation in their ranks. Popularity is the treasury of a guerrilla movement that sustains it in asymmetrical war against conventionally superior foes. It is arguably as crucial to a militant force as backing from foreign state sponsors.

To be loved by the people on whose behalf an armed struggle is being waged is the dream of revolutionaries. It satisfies their psychological need for confirmation that the armed movement is indeed benefiting those they claim to be emancipating. Self-doubts can be costly for a guerrilla group, opening the door to defections, apostasy or factionalism. The government or foreign invading army against which the struggle is being waged can pounce on any signs of regret or introspection by militants and sow internal splits that can undo an outfit. Steady nurturing of mass popularity is an existential necessity for militant groups to remain cohesive and steadfast to their objectives. Mao Zedong, the classic exponent of people's war, highlighted another important function of cultivating popular support. In his apt metaphor, without the "ocean" of mass sympathy, the "fish" of the revolutionary army would die asphyxiated. However destitute and harassed, slum dwellers or landless laborers can shelter guerrillas on the run, offer local contacts and information, and even join them in battle as an auxiliary force.

In effect, this sets up a symbiotic relationship between militants and their constituents. The former's humanitarian assistance becomes a lifeline for the poor, and the latter's affection becomes the shield for the guerrillas. In insurrection theory, the two-way-street leads to a merger of the party or rebel outfit and its people to the extent that the two become indistinguishable.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, for instance, use the slogan "LTTE is the Tamil people and the Tamil people are the LTTE". A war on the outfit, by extension, gets interpreted as a war on the people it defends.

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the post-Saddam Hussein chaos created the perfect conditions of desperation in which the Jaish-al-Mahdi rose to astounding prominence.

Although Muqtada's father, Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, was a venerable grand ayatollah during Saddam's dictatorship, it was not expected that the son would go on to become a kingmaker in Iraqi politics and a thorn in the flesh for the American occupation forces.

His Mahdi Army, which began as a ragtag band of 500 Shi'ite seminary students to enforce vigilante justice in 2003, now boasts of over 10,000 dedicated mujahideen and millions of lay sympathizers won over by charitable activities.

The rise of this new force is, in many ways, the story of all that went horribly wrong with the American neo-conservative roadmap of remaking the Middle East. While Muqtada would bristle at his description as an "American creation", the fact is his outfit turned into a state-within-a-state thanks to the George W Bush administration's actions since 2003. Had there been no American invasion to topple Saddam and subsequent stationing of foreign troops on Iraqi soil, the world would not have witnessed the phenomenon that the Mahdi Army morphed into.

This observation is seconded by the similar trajectories of two other Islamist guerrilla groups in the Middle East - Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Counter-factually, we would not have had these movements if there were no Israeli aggressions on Lebanon or the Palestinian territories. Islamist militancy is essentially reactionary - a spiritual and temporal response to perceived oppression by foreign or homebred enemies. Once the reaction sets in and takes an organized form, it becomes a Janus-faced humanitarian-cum-terrorist machine. On the one hand, the outfit is the very epitome of kindness and Samaritanism to its own people. On the other hand, it strikes fear into the heart of the enemies with alleged Koranic sanction.

The usage of the charity model by Islamists is not limited to the Middle East. When a devastating earthquake shook Pakistan in October 2005, the banned Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) launched its own independent relief efforts, bypassing the corruption and red tape typical of governmental responses to disasters. The visible and efficient services of LeT and its sister religious bodies won instant appreciation among the suffering victims and furthered the sentiment in Pakistan's frontier and Kashmir regions that the government in Islamabad was incapable of succoring its citizens.

The delegitimization of the state, a civic authority mandated to care for its citizens, went in tow with extra legitimization of jihadi ideology among ordinary Pakistanis. As was to be expected in the relief-for-loyalty exchange, LeT operatives took hundreds of orphaned children under its wing for indoctrination in its extensive network of orphanages and madrassas (seminaries). LeT was also found to be offering "employment" to several people who lost their livelihoods in the natural calamity. It was no coincidence that a spate of LeT-ascribed terrorist attacks occurred in India shortly after the earthquake in Pakistan.

While the usage of humanitarian garb to recruit despondent youth for terrorist purposes is not unique to Islamist outfits, the special theological emphasis in Islam on charity (zakaat) is unmatched among world religions. Saudi Arabian charities are particularly notorious for fundraising in the name of social service and channeling enormous sums to wherever there is a jihadi cause to be aided.

The International Islamic Relief Organization, proscribed by the United Nations in 2006, used to be one major outlet of Saudi Arabian zeal for charity that boosted jihad in the Philippines and Indonesia. The al-Rasheed Trust, exposed in 2001, was run by Pakistan's Jaish-i-Muhammad. It was the brainchild of the Inter-Services Intelligence to fudge finances for terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir in the guise of social work.

As long as Jaish-al-Mahdi harnesses its religiously enjoined humanitarian image among downtrodden Shi'ites in Baghdad and southern Iraq, no frontal military assaults by the US and Iraqi armies can succeed in displacing Muqtada from his perch as the country's Robin Hood.

Israel is learning this lesson the hard way against its bete noires, Hezbollah and Hamas. Actions like the present blockade of the Gaza Strip, purportedly aimed at weakening terrorist movements, cause humanitarian crises that drive sufferers closer into the embrace of the movements. Punitive expeditions like the military assault on the Jaish-al-Mahdi will likewise exacerbate the protection deficit in Iraq and vindicate the success of the militant social work model.

Sreeram Chaulia is a researcher on international affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship in Syracuse, New York.

Original article posted here.

Thursday, April 03, 2008

It is clear who won this recent Iraqi squirmish

Iraq's Sadr calls million-strong march against US

Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called on Thursday for a million-strong demonstration against US "occupation", a potentially destabilizing show of force after his followers battled US and government troops.

The demonstration would take place next Wednesday April 9, the fifth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, when the US commander in Iraq is also scheduled to brief Congress in Washington about progress in the war.

Original article posted here.

Iraqi Update

Iraq's Shia Power Struggle

Al Jazeera

Riz Khan interviews Patrick Cockburn, who has been a Middle East correspondent since 1979 for the Financial Times and The Independent and asks if Iraq is on the verge of a new civil war.

Part 1

Part 2

Friday, June 15, 2007

As weazl has said, Muqtada setting himself up for bigger prizes

Muqtada: The born-again mullah

By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - A famous phrase was imprinted in our minds from the Hollywood classic of the 1940s, Casablanca. At the end of the film, an American (played by Humphrey Bogart) shoots a Nazi officer in Vichy-controlled Casablanca. The French police chief, Claude Rains, refuses to arrest Bogart and instead calls on his policemen to "round up the usual suspects". Bogart and Rains then walk off together, saying that this is the start of a "beautiful friendship".

That phrase kept coming to mind on Wednesday as the bombing of the Shi'ite shrines took place in Samarra (125 kilometers north of Baghdad), raising alarms in a country already divided by sectarian violence. Who are the "usual suspects" in Iraq? There is no single answer to that question. Simply, everybody in Iraq is a suspect. That was clear from the flurry of accusations that erupted shortly after the attack. The Americans blamed al-Qaeda. Shi'ite cleric Sadr al-Muqtada blamed the Americans. The Iranians blamed the Ba'athists loyal to the late president Saddam Hussein. The Ba'athists blamed Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

The truth is that it is not really important anymore to know who blew up the minarets of al-Askari Mosque (Golden Dome). What matters is that this single terrorist act exposed just how chaotic and infiltrated Iraq has become, how terrible incapable Maliki really is, how useless his security plan has become, and how confused the Americans are on what to do with the helpless premier.

It also proved, however, that one man emerged wiser from this entire ordeal: cleric turned politician and former rebel leader Muqtada.

When the Golden Dome was attacked in February 2006, starting the sectarian violence that has rocked Iraq for the past 16 months, there were plenty of "usual suspects" to blame.

Some accused radical extremist Sunnis, but that was hard to believe. The Sunni fundamentalists, headed at the time by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, do not carry out amateur terrorist operations. They strike with three objectives: collective death, pain, and destruction. Last year's attack (as well as this week's) was not intended to kill Shi'ites but to provoke them. Had Zarqawi wanted to kill, he would have detonated bombs in broad daylight, killing hundreds of Shi'ite worshippers in the process, and not strike when the shrine was empty.

Other observers blamed radical Shi'ites who wanted the crime to look like the dirty work of Sunni groups. They wanted to use the terrorist bombing to justify a massive killing campaign against Sunnis, telling the world: "They did it and we are taking revenge." To some Shi'ites it was indeed almost like a blessing in disguise - the perfect excuse they needed to justify striking at a traditional enemy - without a shred of evidence that "the Sunnis did it".

Supporters of this argument claim that those who set off the explosives last year did not want to kill Shi'ites. On the contrary, they wanted minimal destruction of human life, but a lot of political, collateral and sectarian damage. Others, mainly the Arab nationalists in Iraq, blamed the United States, arguing that the US objective is to see sectarian violence in Iraq, to ignite the fire and then play the role of the fireman, and justify its continued presence in Iraq.

Most of these arguments still hold in the latest bombing. The only real difference is that the Iraqi leaders have surprisingly - and for the first time in years - shown a lot of wisdom in response to the terrorist attack. Some tit-for-tat revenge attacks did take place nevertheless, but on a much smaller scale than what was expected, or compared with what happened last year. At that time, almost immediately Sunnis mosques were burned, clerics were assassinated, and entire Sunni neighborhoods were destroyed.

This time, hours after the attack, only four Sunni mosques were attacked, including the Grand Mosque of Iskandariyya. On Thursday, another two mosques were attacked by angry Shi'ites. Rather than order his followers to roam the streets and set Sunni communities ablaze, Muqtada spoke of restraint, and called on his followers to refrain from striking at the Sunnis because the were "innocent" of the Samarra bombings.

Instead, he called on the Americans to evacuate from Samarra, and withdrew his deputies from Parliament, making a political point that he would no longer support the United Iraqi Alliance that leads with a Shi'ite majority, unless the security problems are addressed. That was a sophisticated and civilized way of doing things - new for someone like Muqtada.

These calls were repeated by the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who called on Shi'ite "believers" to refrain from seeking revenge for the bombings, which he described as "heinous". The Kurds made similar remarks, through President Jalal Talabani, and so did his Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashemi.

Of all the remarks, Muqtada's was by far the most interesting - and powerful. He said: "Let the Iraqi people be aware that no Sunni has attacked the shrine, but it is the occupation's hidden hand, which wants bad things to happen to us."

Two weeks ago, when an attack took place on a Sunni mosque in Iraq, he contacted the Sunni imam and offered to send his Shi'ite militiamen to protect Sunni places of worship. He also suggested a joint prayer between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Many dismissed his calls then as nothing but empty rhetoric, aimed at convincing Sunnis, Americans and Iraqi officials that he was not a criminal.

Muqtada's history speaks volumes about his credentials as a Shi'ite nationalist and his involvement in guerrilla warfare against the Sunnis after 2003, wanting to punish the entire community for having produced Saddam Hussein, who ruled from 1979-2003. When Muqtada first rose to prominence after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, however, he was believed to have much in common with Iraqi Sunnis.

He was opposed to the US invasion and a fervent critic of the "political process" that was instigated by former Iraqi administrator Paul Bremer. As things became clearer in Baghdad, he became an opponent of Iran-led Shi'ite politicians, accusing them of being agents for the mullahs of Tehran. First on his hate list was Iran's No 1 man in Iraq, Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim.

Muqtada refused the partitioning of Iraq - echoing what the Sunnis have been saying all along - and vetoed giving more autonomy to the Kurds, or control over oil-rich Kirkuk. He established himself, like Sunni nationalists, as both anti-American and anti-Iranian, maintaining his militia to fight the Americans and not get involved in sectarian violence with Iraqi Sunnis.

This changed after his war with ex-prime minister Iyad Allawi in 2004, when Muqtada realized that the only people willing to stick heir necks out for him were Iraqi Shi'ites. Before establishing himself as a serious Iraqi leader (his young age did not help), as he is trying to do today, he had to make a name as a Shi'ite one. In a certain way, he wanted to do what Hassan Nasrallah - his friend and idol - had done in Lebanon with Hezbollah.

Nasrallah started off as a local Shi'ite chief in 1992 and over a 15-year period managed to establish himself as a pan-Lebanese, and



eventually pan-Arab, statesman and leader, matched by none in the Arab world except Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. If Nasrallah is the next Nasser, then Muqtada wants to be the next Nasrallah.

Today, Muqtada is expanding his power base and trying to write off his sectarian past and build bridges with the Sunnis, to repeat what Nasrallah did in Lebanon. Hezbollah started off in 1982 as a Shi'ite organization that was funded by Iran and planned to establish an Iran-style theocracy in Beirut. With time, its agenda, and image, changed in the minds of the Lebanese.

Muqtada's Shi'ite credentials are no longer in question, if they ever were, and he is probably the most popular Shi'ite leader in Iraq, matched only by the old and wise Sistani. He is a man of the masses, popular within the slums of Baghdad and among the urban poor, who see him as an honest, dedicated, and uncorrupted nationalist who does not seek political office or wealth, only the freedom of his country and respect for his community.

He has arms, a large following (estimated at more than 60,000 armed men), family heritage (his father and uncle were famous leaders), and religious legitimacy (being a "Sayyed" because of being a direct descendent of the Prophet Mohammed). After having disappeared from public life for nearly three months this year, Muqtada re-emerged a few weeks ago, almost reborn. The first thing he did was dismiss 11 commanders of his Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), because they had been involved in illegal conduct during his absence, such as kidnapping Sunni notables.

When members of the Mahdi Army seized Sunni neighborhoods in south and west Baghdad, trying to uproot their residents, Muqtada condemned and disavowed the attack through his spokesman Salah al-Obaidi. The latter said that local commanders in the Bayaa and Amil neighborhoods had acted on their own instinct, without orders from Muqtada. The spokesman added, "Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr refuses all kind of violence and he refuses to answer violence with violence."

That is new talk for the Sadrists, who used to answer violence with - to say the least - double violence. If authentic, it is evidence that Muqtada is in fact a reborn man. The fact that elements from Muqtada's following might have acted without authorization from him were confirmed by Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Garver, the US military spokesman, who said: "We have seen a fracturing of Jaysh al-Mahdi in the last few months. We see elements acting on their own. He may be trying to prevent that. It could be a positive thing for Iraq, the coalition, and the Iraqi people or it could be a negative thing, depending on how these new leaders are going to behave."

The record of the Sadrists over the past few weeks has shown that they indeed have been behaving themselves - especially after the new bombings in Samarra. Another Muqtada aide, Abdul-Hadi al-Mohamaddawi, who heads Muqtada's office in Karbala, added, "Many of the people in the Sadr trend are not real Sadrists and they don't have a real belonging to the Sadr front. They corrupted the reputation of the Sadr office."

Muqtada himself had repeated that in an interview with the government daily Al-Sabah early this month, saying that the Mahdi Army is not a political party but a populist movement "with the good and the bad" in it. Last week, he gave another interview to Iraqi television, blaming all of Iraq's troubles on the Americans and praising the Sunnis and Shi'ites who collaborated to fight al-Qaeda.

Muqtada is working to please not only the Sunnis but the Kurds as well. On Monday, he sided with the Kurds against Turkey, which is amassing troops on Iraq's northern border, threatening to invade Iraqi Kurdistan to root out Kurdish nationalists. Although Muqtada is ideologically opposed to the Kurdish district - and distrustful of the Kurds at large because of their good relations with the Americans - he nevertheless cannot let his own views get in the way of becoming a pan-Iraqi leader. Muqtada warned Ankara on the bombing of Iraqi Kurdistan: "We will not be silent in front of this threat." This came after Turkey had shelled villages in Dohuk, a northern province of Iraq.

Last week, Muqtada visited Sistani at his home in Najaf. The meeting was ostensibly to inquire on Sistani's health. The elder cleric had announced last year that he would halt his political consultations because he was being overshadowed by younger, radical, and unwise politicians (in clear reference to Muqtada, although he did not mention him by name). It was believed then that Sistani was saddened by how popular Muqtada was becoming at his own expense.

At times of war, Iraqis need the protection that Muqtada offers, not wise words from the venerable Sistani. When a young Shi'ite complains to Sistani that his brother had been killed, for example, the ayatollah reads him a few phrases from the Koran, then tells him to go report to the police. That has little effect on angry young Shi'ites, especially in a region where revenge is so deep-rooted in Arab culture. When a similar case occurs with Muqtada, he not only promises revenge but actually takes it.

That pleases young Iraqis and explains why Muqtada's clout would be increasing at the expense of Sistani. The latter's seclusion lasted for some time but he has recently re-emerged and still gives occasional advice on matters related to politics, concentrating more, however, on religious, social and philosophical affairs. The importance of the Sistani-Muqtada meeting (the first since Muqtada re-emerged from three months in hiding) was in how the Sadrists reported it to the media.

The Sadrists depicted their leader and Sistani as equals, "two religious authorities". The difference in titles, ranks, history and legitimacy was glossed over by the Sadrist media. They were there to consult as partners in the Shi'ite community and not, as one would expect, to hear out the grand ayatollah's views. That is testimony to how "involved" and active Muqtada is in creating a new image for himself, not only as an Iraqi nationalist, but as a religious heavyweight as well, in the Shi'ite community.

Clearly, Muqtada al-Sadr is very serious about his new image, and the days to come will witness more gestures - both symbolic and tangible - to prove to the world that he is not just a Shi'ite nationalist.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.



Original article posted here.

Saturday, June 09, 2007

Creating theocracy: US brutality, corruption, incompetancy allow fundamentialist thug to raise legimate claims and pave foundation for future rule

Al-Sadr, in rare TV interview, decries U.S. presence

Cleric criticizes prime minister, calling him 'neglectful' and sectarian

By LEILA FADEL

BAGHDAD — In a rare appearance on state-operated Iraqi television, radical anti-American Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on Thursday called the U.S.-backed government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki "neglectful" and sectarian and blamed Iraq's problems on the U.S. presence in the country.

The tone of his statements weren't surprising. Al-Sadr has been consistently anti-American since his Mahdi Army militia first rebelled against the U.S. presence in 2004.

He's also grown increasingly critical of al-Maliki, who came to office last year largely on the strength of al-Sadr's support, and last month al-Sadr withdrew his backers from al-Maliki's government.

His willingness to sit for an interview that lasted nearly an hour marked a new stage in his efforts to recast himself as a nationalist figure capable of uniting Sunni and Shiite partisans, two weeks after he resurfaced from a months-long absence.

In the interview, al-Sadr said that "the layers of government and parties are turning their backs on the people." He added that the government is only half-hearted in its efforts to serve the people.

He said that Sunnis and Shiites have a common enemy — Sunni extremists, known in Iraqi Arabic as takfir. In Islam, takfir is the act of declaring someone an infidel.

"The enemy of all Islam has become the takfir," al-Sadr said. "Before they were killing Shiites with their car bombs. Now they are killing Sunnis with their car bombs. They have become a common enemy."

Al-Sadr, believed to be in his early 30s, ticked off a laundry list of Iraq's problems — sectarianism, lack of services, lack of security, the Mahdi Army's reputation as a brutal killer of Sunnis. But the culprit was always the same — "the occupation."

Al-Sadr also rejected any interference from Iran, which the U.S. military has accused of supplying elements of the Mahdi Army and other Shiite militias with weapons, training and support.

The U.S. military said al-Sadr took refuge in Iran during his absence. Al-Sadr's aides deny that he was outside Iraq.

"I must maintain friendly and good relations with Iran, but nothing else," al-Sadr said.

He said he would never negotiate with American officials, despite assertions last week by Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. military commander in Iraq, that the U.S. was interested in opening such talks.

"I refuse any sit-down with the occupation, whether in Iraq or outside," he said.

Britain ready for talks
Meanwhile, the British ambassador to Iraq signaled that his government was ready to talk to those behind the abduction of five Britons in Baghdad last month. Iraqi officials have said they believe the Britons were taken by the Mahdi Army militia, which is largely loyal to al-Sadr.

Many people in Iraq believe al-Sadr is Iraq's most popular political figure, thanks largely to the millions of impoverished Shiites who were devoted to his father, a popular cleric who was assassinated during Saddam Hussein's rule. Al-Sadr has cemented that loyalty with his Mahdi Army, which many Shiites credit with protecting them from Sunni insurgents.

Al-Sadr said other Arab countries need to help end the "suffering of Iraqis" in the interest of their own security.

Original article posted here.

Saturday, May 26, 2007

Just when you thought the "surge" war working (sorry, that was a joke)

Al-Sadr Re-appears, Threatens U.S.
BAGHDAD - Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr appeared in public for the first time in months on Friday, delivering a fiery anti-American sermon to thousands of followers and demanding U.S. troops leave Iraq.

It was not immediately clear why he chose to return now to his base in the Shiite holy city of Najaf from Iran. His speech had new nationalist overtones, calling on Sunnis to join with him in the fight against the U.S. presence. He also criticized the government's inability to provide reliable services to its people.


Al-Sadr's reappearance, four months after he went underground at the start of the U.S.-led Baghdad security crackdown, came just hours before his Mahdi Army militia lost its top commander in the southern city of Basra in a gunbattle with British soldiers, Iraqi police said.

The 33-year-old al-Sadr is believed to be honing plans to consolidate political gains and foster ties with Iran - and possibly trying to take advantage of the absence of a major rival, Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, who was recently diagnosed with lung cancer and went to Iran for treatment.

The U.S. military also announced Friday that six U.S. soldiers were killed in a series of attacks across Iraq in recent days. The deaths put May on pace to be one of the deadliest months for U.S. forces here in years.

Al-Sadr traveled in a long motorcade from Najaf to the adjacent holy city of Kufa on Friday morning to deliver his sermon before 6,000 worshippers.

"No, no for Satan. No, no for America. No, no for the occupation. No, no for Israel," he chanted in a call and response with the audience at the start of his speech.

He repeated his long-standing call for U.S. forces to leave Iraq.

"We demand the withdrawal of the occupation forces, or the creation of a timetable for such a withdrawal," he said. "I call upon the Iraqi government not to extend the occupation even for a single day."

He also condemned fighting between his Mahdi Army militia and Iraqi security forces, saying it "served the interests of the occupiers." Instead, he said the militia should turn to peaceful protests, such as demonstrations and sit-ins, he said.

In Washington, National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe expressed hope that al-Sadr's reappearance signaled that he wanted "to play a positive role inside Iraq."

"He has an opportunity to be a part of the political reconciliation process. We'll see if he and his followers participate," he said.

Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army fought U.S. troops to a virtual standstill in 2004, but to avoid renewed confrontation he ordered his militants off the streets when the U.S. began its security crackdown in the Baghdad area 14 weeks.

His associates say his strategy is based partly on a belief that Washington will soon start reducing troop strength, leaving a void in Iraq's security and political power structure that he can fill.

Al-Sadr also believes that Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government may soon collapse under its failure to improve security, services and the economy, al-Sadr's aides say. A political reshuffle would give the Sadrist movement, with its 30 seats in the 275-member parliament, an opportunity to become a major player.

In a move that could hasten the collapse, al-Sadr pulled his supporters out of al-Maliki's government last month over the prime minister's refusal to call for a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal.

The Mahdi Army received a severe blow Friday when its 23-year-old Basra leader, Wissam al-Waili, was shot and killed along with his brother and two aides during a battle with British forces Friday afternoon, police said.

The battle began about 4 p.m. when British forces attempted to arrest al-Waili after he left a mosque in a residential area in central Basra, police said. Al-Waili and his three companions opened fire and were killed when the British troops shot back, police said. Spokesmen for the British forces could not immediately be reached for comment.

Meanwhile, three U.S. soldiers were killed in roadside bombings in the capital and the surrounding areas, the military said Friday. Two others were killed in explosions north of Baghdad, and a sixth soldier was hit by gunfire in the volatile Diyala province, the military said.

The killings raised the American death toll for the month to at least 88. Last month, 104 U.S. troops were killed in Iraq.

Military officials have warned that U.S. casualties were likely to rise as more troops deployed to Iraq and the military pushed ahead with its Baghdad security crackdown.

"We have more people on the ground, this leads to an opportunity for more contact, more conflict, more clashes," said Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, a U.S. military spokesman.

Original article posted here.

Monday, May 21, 2007

The continued bumbling occupation

Exclusive: Secret US plot to kill Al-Sadr

By Patrick Cockburn In Baghdad

The US Army tried to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr, the widely revered Shia cleric, after luring him to peace negotiations at a house in the holy city of Najaf, which it then attacked, according to a senior Iraqi government official.

The revelation of this extraordinary plot, which would probably have provoked an uprising by outraged Shia if it had succeeded, has left a legacy of bitter distrust in the mind of Mr Sadr for which the US and its allies in Iraq may still be paying. "I believe that particular incident made Muqtada lose any confidence or trust in the [US-led] coalition and made him really wild," the Iraqi National Security Adviser Dr Mowaffaq Rubai'e told The Independent in an interview. It is not known who gave the orders for the attempt on Mr Sadr but it is one of a series of ill-considered and politically explosive US actions in Iraq since the invasion. In January this year a US helicopter assault team tried to kidnap two senior Iranian security officials on an official visit to the Iraqi President. Earlier examples of highly provocative actions carried out by the US with

little thought for the consequences include the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the Baath party.

The attempted assassination or abduction took place two-and-a-half years ago in August 2004 when Mr Sadr and his Mehdi Army militiamen were besieged by US Marines in Najaf, south of Baghdad.

Dr Rubai'e believes that his mediation efforts - about which he had given the US embassy, the American military command and the Iraqi government in Baghdad full details - were used as an elaborate set-up to entice the Shia leader to a place where he could be trapped.

Mr Sadr emerged as the leader of the Sadrist movement in Baghdad at the time of the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. It had been founded by his father, also a cleric, who had confronted Saddam's regime in the 1990s and had been murdered by his agents in 1999. Its blend of nationalism, religion and populism proved highly attractive to Iraqi Shia, particularly to the very poor.

Although Mr Sadr escaped with his life at the last moment, the incident helps explain why he disappeared from view in Iraq when President George Bush stepped up confrontation with him and his Mehdi Army militia in January.

Dr Rubai'e said: "I know him very well and I think his suspicion and distrust of the coalition and any foreigner is really deep-rooted," and dates from what happened in Najaf. He notes that after it had happened Mr Sadr occupied the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf as a place of refuge. Dr Rubai'e had gone to Najaf in August 2004 to try to mediate an end to the fighting. He met Mr Sadr who agreed to a set of conditions to end the crisis. "He actually signed the agreement with his own handwriting," said Dr Rubai'e. "He wanted the inner Najaf, the old city, around the shrine to be treated like the Vatican."

Having returned to Baghdad to show the draft document to Iyad Allawi, who was prime minister at the time, Dr Rubai'e went back to Najaf to make a final agreement with Mr Sadr.

It was agreed that the last meeting would take place in the house in Najaf of Muqtada's father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who had been murdered by Saddam's gunmen with two of his sons five years before. Dr Rubai'e and other mediators started for the house. As they did so they saw the US Marines open up an intense bombardment of the house and US Special Forces also heading for it. But the attack was a few minutes premature. Mr Sadr was not yet in the house and managed to escape.

Although Dr Rubai'e, as Iraqi National Security Adviser since 2004 and earlier a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, is closely associated with the American authorities in Baghdad, he has no doubt about what happened.

He sees the negotiations as part of a charade to lure Mr Sadr, who is normally very careful about his own security, to a house where he could be eliminated.

"When I came back to Baghdad I was really, really infuriated, I can tell you," Dr Rubai'e said. "I went berserk with both [the US commander General George] Casey and the ambassador [John Negroponte]." They denied that knew of a trap and said they would look into what happened but he never received any explanation from them.

The US always felt deeply threatened by Mr Sadr because, unlike the other Shia parties, he opposed the occupation and demanded that it end.

There were two attempts to crush his movement in 2004, neither of which was successful. The first, at the end of March, began with the closure of his newspaper and the arrest of one of his close advisers. A warrant for Mr Sadr's own arrest was issued. A US general said his only alternatives were to be killed or captured.

The US authorities appeared to have little understanding of the reverence with which the Sadr family was regarded by many Iraqi Shia.

The crackdown provoked a reaction for which the US was ill-prepared. The Mehdi Army, though poorly armed and untrained, took over part of Baghdad and many Shia cities and towns in southern Iraq. The US had to rush troops to embattled outposts.

A second crisis began in Najaf in August and this time the US and the recently appointed government of Iyad Allawi appear to have decided to smash Mr Sadr and his movement for ever. But they dared not assault the shrine of Imam Ali, one of the holiest Shia shrines.

Other Shia parties suspected that once Mr Sadr was dealt with they would be marginalised. The crisis was finally defused when Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani, after undergoing medical treatment in London, returned to Najaf and negotiated an agreement with Mr Sadr under which he withdrew but did not disarm his forces.

The attempt to kill or imprison Mr Sadr was first revealed by Dr Rubai'e to Ali Allawi, the former Iraqi finance minister, who gives an account of what happened in his recent book The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the war, Losing the peace.

Dr Rubai'e said this weekend in Baghdad that he stands by his account given there. He does not think the Americans were planning to kill him along with Mr Sadr because he had a senior American officer with him almost all the time.

Muqtada al-Sadr is one of the most extraordinary figures to emerge during the war in Iraq,a pivotal figure leading a broad-based political movement with a powerful military wing.

The appeal of the 33-year-old Shia cleric is both religious and nationalist. He is regarded with devotion by millions. He is also a survivor and an astute politician who has often out-manoeuvred his opponents. The US and Britain have repeatedly underestimated the strength of his support.

The al-Sadrs are one of the great Shia religious families. His relative, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was the founder of a politically active Shia movement and was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Muqtada's father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr in effect founded the Sadrist movement in the 1990s. Finding he could not control him, Saddam Hussein had him murdered with two of his sons in Najaf in 1999, provoking widespread rioting.

To the surprise of all, the Sadrist movement re-emerged with Muqtada at its head during the fall of the old regime. In April 2003 it took over large parts of Shia Iraq. Its base was the vast Shia slum, renamed Sadr City, that contains a third of the population of Baghdad.

The US and its Iraqi allies regarded Muqtada as a highly threatening figure. Paul Bremer, the ill-fated US viceroy in Iraq after the invasion, detested and unwisely under-rated the Sadrists. When he moved against them in April 2004 he was astonished to see them take over much of southern Shia Iraq in a few days. Muqtada took refuge in Najaf.

There was a heavy fighting in August 2004 when the US made an all-out effort to eliminate Muqtada and his movement. Once again he survived, thanks to a compromise arranged by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

His movement became less confrontational. It took part in the elections in 2005, winning 32 seats out of 275. The Mehdi Army was viewed by the Sunni as an organisation of sectarian death squads.

The US began increasingly to confront the Sadrists. But they were an essential support of the Iraqi government, making it difficult for the US to move against them. When the reinforced US forces in Baghdad did threaten the Mehdi Army, Muqtada simply sent his militiamen home, and disappeared from view.

Original article posted here.